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Dr. Okwudiba Nnoli

Political will and the Margin of Autonomy in Tanzanian Foreign Policy

Tanzania achieved independence in 1961 strongly dedicated to fundamental principles in foreign affairs. President Nyerere believes that a rational and moral international order based on universally valid principles can be achieved. According to this view the demands of principles transcend the limits of expediency and the narrow self-interest of states. Tanzanian's foreign policy objectives include a commitment to national independence, the security of its citizens and regime, the pursuit of non-alignment and justice in relations among nations, support for the UN as an agency for world peace, and the promotion of African unity. At the same time Tanzanian leaders have sought to utilize some of the world's wealth to their nation's benefit. Most of these goals have been justified on ethical and philosophical grounds.

Arguing that man is the ultimate unit of action, as well as the purpose of all policies the President contends that all decisions must attempt to honour man's dignity and increase his happiness. Only human beings have honour and dignity, and justice demands a recognition of these basic human characteristics. Thus Tanzania is opposed to all those states and individuals who use their wealth and power to oppress others and violate their dignity. It, therefore, strongly condemns colonialism, neocolonialism and apartheid. Colonialism thrives on the political domination and oppression of a people by another. Similarly, neo-colonialism substitutes economic for political domination. Both deny human equality and mutilate the full personality of nations and the dignity of their members. Apartheid which is based on the assumption that one man can rule another because he is outwardly physically different from him is more dange-

rous than colonialism and neocolonialism because it thrives on group prejudice.

Nonalignment was the result of two major attitudes to foreign affairs, the one strategic, the other philosophical. First, President Nyerere perceived and expected the big powers to seek to preserve and extend their areas of influence in the world ; and to try to rationalize this hegemonic urge by ideological and moralistic window-dressing. Second, he rejected the arrogant assumption by both sides of the cold War that they had evolved a perfect pattern of society. Rather he preferred that all states should continue to think of new and more progressive forms of human organization. Both attitudes dictated the policy of nonalignment. By avoiding alliances with the major powers, the nation would maximize the margin of autonomy available in world politics and thereby contribute to humanity's search for truth, peace, and justice.

Tanzania's strong support for the United Nations arises from the President's belief that it is the only human organisation capable of introducing law and authority in inter-state relations and, therefore, capable of promoting world peace and justice. President believes that internally, there is law, but externally "the law of the jungle operates, ameliorated only by considerations of long term, as against immediate benefits. Thus the world community—which is full of conflicts needs U.N.O.

The goal of African unity is predicated on the assumption of a fundamental harmony of the interests of the African states. Their destiny is inexorably interlinked, such that the independence of a sections is meaningless as long as other sections are not free ; and progress in one area of the continent is incomplete without progress in other areas. African unity is a prerequisite for African Economic growth can effectively maximizes the national capacities of the African states. First, a wider market is more conducive to industrialization which is the backbone of modern economic growth. Second, by increasing the bargaining power of the African peoples, African unity increases their share of world's resources.

However, whether or not these goals would be achieved depended not on their clear enunciation and adequate rationalization on ethical or philosophical grounds but rather on the ability of the Tanzanian leaders to surmount the obstacles in the path of their accomplishment. For example, in the absence of any experience by the Tanzanian leaders during the colonial period of inter governmental negotiations usually characterized by a hard-headed, often ruthless pursuit of national interest through the application of national power it was difficult for the country to participate meaningfully in a world community in which parochial national interests colour the assessment of events, and national power is the major determinant of success. From a background of national dependence, and in a world of vested interests, it was unrealistic to expect to pursue an active policy of asserting national freedom and championing justice in relations among nations without making enemies,

As result of its colonial past Tanzania's economy was dominated by foreign ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange, and the consequent foreign exploitation of indigenous resources. Various forms of socio-cultural and political dependence sustained these ownership and exploitative relations. Thus major national activities were externally oriented. In the international division of labour the nation was confined to primary production for export and the importation of manufactured goods. The net effect of this post-colonial situation was inflexibility in the reorganization of national activities.

Nevertheless, Tanzania has achieved a success and margin of autonomy in its foreign policy which is out of proportion to its national power. External pressures have failed to force a modification of its foreign policy objectives. They have only caused a change of the strategy for accomplishing them. The strong political will of the Tanzanian leaders has been instrumental in bringing about this foreign policy posture. Believing that time is on the side of a people who are united in their pursuit of human principles, President Nyerere enjoins Tanzanian policy maker to pursue an enterprise relentlessly and with perseverance if the goal is right and the means

good ; he argues that the right solution is preferable to a quick solution.²

The Poverty of National Power

Tanzanian foreign policy is severely constrained by the poverty of national power. As an exceedingly poor country its economy is dominated by traditional forms of economic activity. Agricultural activities account for over 90% of the total labour force,³ while manufacturing accounts for only about 5% of total output. The average per capita of about shs. 500 compares unfavourably with the figure of shs. 10,500 for such middle-range developed nations as Britain and France, and about shs. 21,000 for the richer states such as the United States, Canada and Sweden.⁴ At the time of independence only 144 million kilowatt of electricity was sold in the country ; and out of a total of only 8,996 miles of road, only 660 miles were bituminized, 310 miles were gravel roads and as many as 8,028 miles were earth roads.⁵

In addition, the country lacks valuable mineral resources or strategic raw materials, and offers no strategic advantages to other members of the world community then those interested in the liberation of Mozambique and South Africa. In commodities such as sisal, cashewnuts and pyrethrum where its share of the world output is fairly significant the country suffers from organizational problems and or synthetics are adequate substitutes. Therefore the nation's ability to influence the prices of its major exports is very limited.

Even then, these exports are, as is the case for sisal and cashewnuts, sold through overseas brokers, or, as is the case for coffee and cotton, by auction ; or through foreign-controlled distribution networks, as is the case with meat products and pyrethrum ; or through the marketing agencies of the socialist nations. In none of these cases does the state have any say whatever about the price structure of the resulting manufacture at any time from the first step in their processing to the time that consumer prices are attached to them. Thus the government's effort to influence export market-

ing strategy or the prices of the manufactured goods can only have a very limited success. The potential is further lowered by the shortage of competent manpower or marketing know-how. Consequently, the purchasing power of its exports declines.

Militarily Tanzania is equally weak. Its army was not built up to about 5,000 men until 1968 when it also acquired its first tanks. Its first fighter aircrafts were purchased in May, 1974. In 1966, on a scale of servicemen per inhabitants the country had ratio of 1 : 3,400 compared to 1 : 65 for the United States, 1 : 260 for China, 1 : 780 for France, 1:829 for South Africa, and 1 : 963 for Rhodesia.⁶ Out of the nation's total expenditure for 1966 of shs. 940.8 million, shs. 162.4 million was spent on law, order and defence. The relative figures for 1967 were shs. 1,058.4 million and shs. 170.6 million respectively. However, on the part of some of the country's enemies at the time, South Africa's total defence expenditures were shs. 2,100 million in 1964-1965 and shs. 2,560 million in 1966-1967, Portugal spent about 40% of its national budget on defence; and the Rhodesian budget allocation for defence rose from shs. 222 million before 1965 to shs. 280 million in 1967 and shs. 294 million in 1968.⁷

As regards flexibility in national life the country emerged to independence with severe handicaps. Its colonial heritage ensured that British and European trading firms dominated the export and import trade. Prior to independence, importing and exporting were initially largely in European hands while Asians and Arabs controlled internal trade. Later as the Asians moved into the import business the European importing houses began to handle essentially agency lines and capital goods. Although Africans began to enter trade during the interwar years, by 1967 their share of the business was still minimal. This situation was reinforced by the domination of the banking system by three British banks: Barclays Bank D.C.O., the Standard Bank, and the Grindlays Bank. Also institutional dependence on Britain existed in the monetary system. As a member of the sterling zone based in London the nation used the British pound as the basis of its currency. Under the circumstance, for example, it was

impossible to increase the supply of money in the country independently of the balance of payments. And it was not until 1966 when the East African Currency Board which managed the currency was replaced by the Bank of Tanzania that the nation became able to have discretion over the use of the nation's domestic surplus.⁸

Thus at the time of independence, the advanced capitalist countries particularly Britain monopolized Tanzania's trade. About 35.8% of the country's exports in 1961 went to Britain and 37.6% of its imports came from there. Next in order of importance was the United States which purchased 10% of the nation's exports and provided 5.5% of its imports. On the contrary trade with the socialist countries was practically non-existent.⁹ More generally speaking, at the time of independence over 80% of the country's exports went to the sterling area, the European Economic Community and the countries of the European Free Trade Association. The United States and Canada took another 12%. A similar situation existed in the import sector. In 1962 Tanzania imported over 90% of its goods from the advanced capitalist nations. Only less than 1% of the total exports and about 1% of the imports involved the socialist countries.

As a result of the inflexibility imposed by this state of affairs inspite of the vigorous attempt by the Tanzanian leaders to diversify their trade by 1966, only modest progress was achieved in increasing trade with the East. Part of the reason for this condition was the absence of any attempt to diversify the internal structures which conducted the trade. The trading firms, banks and monetary system were dominated by Western interests which could not be sympathetic to trade with East and which were reluctant to venture into new and unproven areas of trade or reorient their activities away from traditional markets and clients. The adverse effects of such structural dependence diminish with increased responsiveness of the interacting states. However, in fundamental terms the trade objectives of Tanzania and the advanced capitalist nations were incompatible. Hence the negative consequences of such dependence could be fully felt.

Another factor which contributes to the poverty of national

power is related to the shortage of personnel and expertise in the country. The overall manpower targets expected for the implementation of the First Five Year Plan were not fulfilled.¹⁰ Foreigners selected and prepared the plan's projects. The plan was biased for infrastructural and capital intensive projects, which the advanced countries are interested in promoting in the new states and neglected the interest of the country in labour intensive projects with forward linkages to rapid and balanced socio-economic changes capable of increasing national independence and welfare. In addition, the superior capacity of the advanced nations for data collection and analyses, as well as their greater ability to provide skilled and experienced personnel for negotiations gives them a bargaining advantage over Tanzania.

The Resource Base of the Political Will

In spite of its poverty of power Tanzania was able to prevent other states from using it against its will. A significant part of this achievement is accounted for by its heritage of dual colonial administrations. The uncertainty which attended the transition from German to British colonial rule first a mandated territory under the League of Nations and then as a UN trust territory, adversely affected foreign investment. British rule in 1919 caused a sharp decline in both private capital inflow and the donation of governmental grants. German financiers were reluctant to invest in a territory controlled by Britain.¹¹ At the same time British investors were uncertain about the new political status of the country as a League of Nations mandated territory.¹²

When in 1946 the political status of the nation as a United Nations' trust territory administered by Britain stabilized and was clarified Tanzania began to attract some external private investment. However its inflow was adversely affected by the proximity of Kenya and Uganda as favoured British colony and protectorate respectively. Not only was the nation poor in mineral wealth and strategic resources its 'trust' status caused relatively little British investment and aid to be channeled to the country. Its usefulness to Britain was consequently limited to its role as a market for British import

of cheap raw materials and the sale of British goods and services either directly or through the White settlers in Kenya.

The ties linking the nation with Britain were relatively weak and could, therefore, more easily be broken than equivalent ties between Britain and Kenya or Uganda. More importantly, there was less social differentiation in Tanzania. In particular, an indigenous bourgeois class with strong vested interests in the status quo and dependent largely on British investments and institutions did not emerge. At the same time the British colonial regime's racist policies created a situation in which the underdeveloped bourgeois class was dominated by the Asian racial minority. Although the Asians dominated the lower echelons of the early post-independent economy, it was the African majority which is jealous of this Asian economic power and hostile to it that held political power. The Asian bourgeoisie could not, therefore exert an effective pressure on the political leadership. Under these circumstances a united national stand on foreign policies could easily be achieved.

Similarly, the Kulak and working classes were underdeveloped. Although social differentiations in the rural areas continued during the colonial period, and a small number of Kulak farmers existed at the time of independence, the Kulaks as a class were politically insignificant. Also the wage earning population of Tanzania has been very small, numbering only 411,538 in 1961.¹³ Since much of this working force was migrant in nature, its class consciousness was low and therefore its pressure on foreign policy was weak. The peasantry has been equally weak. Lacking a long tradition of violent struggle against exploitation by feudal lords or colonial rulers, its political consciousness has been low. Largely illiterate and ignorant of the workings of the world market system which affect their cash crops, the farmers have not sought to influence national policies toward the external market conditions or any other aspect of external transactions.

In addition British colonial regime's socio-economic policies did not have as disastrous an effect on inter-ethnic relations in Tanzania as it did in Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda, largely because of its pattern of social stratification and distribution of population. In comparison with Nigeria the racial factor muted ethnic

tension among the Tanzanian African population. By confining the Africans to positions below the Europeans and Asians the colonial system of racial stratification united the Africans against the other races. Tension between the Africans and Asians was more pronounced than among the African population. As regards the geographical and demographical distribution of population, there are about 120 major ethnic groups in a total population of about 14 million compared with forty-eight in Kenya, twenty-eight in Uganda and eight in Nigeria. Out of these the largest, the Sukuma, numbers just over one million, or roughly 7% of the population. In comparison, the Baganda make up 16.2% of the total population of Uganda ; and in Kenya, the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya constitute 18.6%, 12.8% and 12.6% respectively.

Even then the Sukuma do not occupy as significant socio-economic and strategic positions as the Baganda and the Kikuyu, who constitute the most economically and socially advanced groups, and provide the capital cities of their respective countries. Although economically important as cotton growers and cattle rearers, they are not as economically powerful as the much smaller Chagga, Haya and Nyakyusa peoples. And they live about 1,000 miles away from Dar es Salaam, which is located among the smaller and less economically advanced Zaramos. There is no single ethnic group dominant over all the others; and no rivalry between two or more ethnic groups, each dominant in a region as in Nigeria. In addition, of the nine largest ethnic groups seven are located around the edges of the territory. Culturally, they tend to be oriented away from national affairs toward related groups on the other side of the border.¹⁴ Also Swahili, as a lingua franca for all the groups in the country, acts as a countervailing force against the emergence of interethnic misunderstanding and tension. Interethnic rivalry has, therefore, had a very limited impact on national cohesion.

In fact, national unity is reflected in the unanimity which has characterized the nationalist movement for independence in Tanzania. The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) quickly found support among the various African groups. As a result, it became difficult for opposing political parties to exploit the ethnic factor.

Even during the colonial period its pre-eminence was validated by its usual sweep of the polls. The one-party state was in fact achieved through the ballot-box well before its constitutional promulgation 1965. In turn the activities of the party reinforced national cohesion. Led by Julius Nyerere of the small and economically insignificant Zanki ethnic group, it de-emphasized ethnic and racial diversity and succeeded in integrating the major and minor population groups within its fold.

Nyerere's personality has also been an important resource base of the national will. His moral convictions, deep sense of humility, sensitivity to human suffering, strong dedication to humanitarian principles, indomitable will to persevere and succeed, utter disdain for the naked pursuit of material interests and the unrestrained use of power, abhorrence of the anti-social effects of wealth and power, and his commitment to national independence, human equality and individual freedom have united the whole population behind his leadership. In addition he encourages extensive discussions of issues by the whole population. It is the apparent insatiable desire for dialogue as well as his concern for the masses which earned him the respectful nickname of 'Nwalimu'. His non-authoritarian character impels him to emphasize dialogue and persuasion in his relations with the masses, an approach which has served to mobilize the vast majority of the population behind the national leadership. Convinced that in the long run good prevails over evil and dedicated to the pursuit of justice in domestic and international life he has infused into the Tanzanian population a strong political purpose and sense of mission which bolster national morale.

The Evidence of Political Will in Foreign Policy

1. The Aftermath of the 1964 Army Mutiny

The first major clash of interest between Tanzania and the Western nations occurred in 1964 soon after the suppression of the mutiny of the Tanganyikan Rifles with the aid of British troops. That uprising and the consequent British intervention represent the only major failure to assert the nation's political will in the face of

temptations and pressures to surrender to superior forces. On January 20, 1964 the First Battalion of the Nation's army mutinied over the slow pace of Africanization within its ranks and in demand of better wages and living conditions. The President and Vice-President were forced to go temporarily into hiding. About 14 people were killed and 120 injured in the ensuing disorder. And when the conditions seemed to be returning to normal similar mutinies occurred in Uganda and Kenya on January 22 and 23 respectively. The fear of renewed disorders compelled the President to invite British military assistance to disarm the soldiers.

The field force unit which was the only other Tanzanian instrument capable of dealing with the situation was largely deployed in Zanzibar to help in maintaining order following the January 12 revolution on the Island. Kenya and Uganda could not help because they too faced mutinies. Only Britain had sufficient forces in the area and adequate links with the country to carry out the task. As soon as the mutiny broke it transferred two thousand of its troops to the area preparatory to any possible intervention. Prior to the mutiny most of the military aid received by Tanzania was British. Britain supplied the commander of the mutinous army, all its expatriate personnel and most of its equipment. In response to President Nyerere's invitation, 1,400 British marine commandos landed in Dar es Salaam on January 24 from an aircraft carrier in the Indian ocean off the coast of the country. Although the battle-ship that brought them came originally from Aden it had been moved simultaneously with a British frigate toward the coastland of the nation on the pretence of the possible evacuation of the 5,000 Britishers of Asian origin in Zanzibar.

The humiliation of having to use the soldiers of an imperialist power to maintain domestic order forced the country to end its military dependence on Britain. Within a week of the mutiny loyal Tanzanian officers were promoted to the highest positions in the army. It was impossible, therefore, for British officers to return to their former dominant positions. And in March 1964 the British offer of aid for the projected air wing of the Tanzanian armed forces, and for reforming the army was rejected.¹⁵ Instead, Tanzania invited

Canada, Sweden, West Germany and China to provide the necessary aid. The United States and Britain put pressure on the nation to reverse its decision to accept Chinese military assistance, and they also prevailed on Canada and West Germany to comply with the country's military requests. Tanzania's refusal to reverse its decision on Chinese aid caused the Western nations to begin to perceive it as a bridge-head for Chinese penetration of Africa. Hostile British and American press described Chinese aid in almost alarmist terms. In spite of its poverty of power, however, Tanzania was able to resist these pressures.

2. The Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar

The union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April, 1964 marked the culmination of Nyerere's drive for some form of political union among the East African countries. His desire for regional unity is so strong that prior to independence he was willing to sacrifice his equally strong desire for national independence in order to "celebrate East Africa's independence in 1962 rather than take the risk of perpetuating the balkanization of East Africa."¹⁶ However his arguments were not persuasive enough to prevent Tanzania and Uganda from achieving independence in 1961 and 1962 respectively as separate states. Nevertheless, he remained undaunted in the pursuit of this goal, declaring in 1964 Tanzania's willingness to federate with either Kenya or Uganda rather than with neither.¹⁷ When between 1964 and 1966 the prospects of such a federation faded, unity among the three East African states was limited to their collaboration within the framework of the East African Common Services Organization (EASO).

In spite of its economic imbalance in favour of Kenya and against Tanzania and Uganda, the organisation resisted all reforms for an equitable distribution of the benefits accruing from the mutual co-operation of the three states. In 1961 the Raisman Commission's recommendation for a redistributable revenue pool from which funds could be transferred to Uganda and Tanzania proved inadequate.¹⁸ The Kampala Agreement of 1964 which sought to allocate more industries to Tanzania and Uganda rather than to Kenya would not

be ratified by the later. Under the circumstances Tanzania was decisive in taking unilateral actions to protect its interests until an agreement could be reached. In 1964 it imposed a consumption tax on the import of beer, and a progressive registration tax on motor vehicles which disrupted the virtually uniform excise duties of the region's customs union. In 1965 it introduced a development tax not administered by the East African Income Tax Department, established a separate central bank and currency, and introduced certain import restrictions on goods from Kenya and Uganda which were further extended in 1966. It was not until the signing of the Treaty of East African Co-operation in 1967 that Tanzania eschewed such unilateral actions.

These setbacks to an East African federation were counter-balanced by the union with Zanzibar. It came in the wake of the Zanzibari revolution of January 12, 1964. The internal situation on the island was quite fluid at the time. Western hostility to the new revolutionary regime posed serious dangers to its internal and external security. Apart from the problems of nation-building which attended the union, the image of President Nyerere as a moderate African leader built up over the years by the Western press and governments began to be dismantled. A period of Western suspicion of Tanzania as a pro-communist state was initiated. The Eastern embassies in Zanzibar and some of the Zanzibari leaders were the alleged sources of communist influence. Malicious Western press comments played up the differences between the leaders of the two parts of the Union,²⁰ and suggested that the new state was on the verge of being dominated by communists.²¹ Between April and June 1964 the British and American ambassadors in Dar es Salaam persistently complained to President Nyerere about the communist presence in Zanzibar and pressed for its early removal.²²

Nevertheless, and inspite of its difficulties the union has remained the only viable one of any two or more previously sovereign African states, presenting a common front in external relations thereby avoiding divisive competition for external resources, and increasing their bargaining power.²³ It has an arrangement similar to that uniting Northern Ireland with Great Britain. The union agreement

granted Zanzibar a large measure of autonomy in such internal matters as justice, education, agriculture, health, and social welfare. It assigned the federal or union government all other activities, particularly those, such as foreign affairs, defence, external trade and borrowing, citizenship, and immigration, vital the existence of a security community and a political union.

3. Conflict with West Germany

One of the major diplomatic consequences of the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar was the conflict between Tanzania and West Germany in 1964. Prior to the union Zanzibar maintained very warm relations with East Germany and none with West Germany. On the contrary Tanganyika had carried on close and friendly relations with West Germany and virtually none with East Germany. Tanzania's drive for a common policy on the German question led to protracted negotiations with the two German states for a solution. In the end it decided to maintain the West German embassy in Dar es Salaam and to limit the East German representation in the country to the status of an unofficial Consulate-General in Dar es Salaam ; and pledged not to recognize East Germany. The West German government objected very strongly to this decision, and insisted that the only East German representation it would accept was a trade mission, but that if a Consulate-General was permitted it should be based in Zanzibar and limited in its jurisdiction to the island.

Tanzania's refusal to accede to these demands led West Germany to withdraw its military assistance to the country while threatening to cut off its economic assistance as well unless Tanzania rescinded its decision.²⁴ On February 27, 1965 a day after this punitive policy was communicated to President Nyerere, all West German military advisers in the country were evacuated and the proposal for a further West German development of the Kilombero valley was frozen. Tanzania responded by declaring all existing and subsequent West German aid unacceptable.²⁵ Although President Nyerere was still unwilling to recognize East Germany he was equally unwilling to limit the proposed unofficial East German

Consulate-General to Zanzibar. In addition to the reduction of aid the dispute closed any possibility of further assistance to the First Five Year Plan as had been expected.²⁶ Nevertheless, national independence had been asserted inspite of the economic price demanded for it.²⁷

4. Conflict with the United States

Toward the end of 1964 a feeling of national insecurity pervaded the country. Much of it arose from Western hostility to the Zanzibar revolution, the aftermath of the army mutiny, and the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. German punitive action over the East German question fanned the embers of these fears. They were also reinforced by evidence from outside the nation of the will and ability of foreign powers to intervene in African affairs. Events in Zaire in 1964 and 1965 were eye openers. The United States supplied military equipment to sympathetic factions in that country, recruited Cuban exile pilots from their airforce, and provided transportation facilities for them with its airforce planes.²⁸ All this was done inspite of Tanzanian, African and indeed world opposition. The height of Western intervention in that country came in November 1964 when Belgian paratroopers with United States logistic air support mounted from the British island territory of St. Helena landed in Stanleyville to release hostages held by the patriotic forces of that nation. Thenceforth, Western intentions in Africa in general and in Tanzania in particular become fiercely suspect.

Under this atmosphere of insecurity and suspicion, Tanzanian Foreign Minister Oscar Kambona in November 1964 alleged an imminent invasion of the country by South African mercenaries with the aid of British farmers in the Kilimanjaro region. Inspite of the doubtful nature of the available evidence, twenty-one British farmers were deprived of thier land, and three of them together with a British teacher involved in a counter demonstration against these accusations were deported.²⁹ In January 1965 another alleged plot was discovered, this time by the revolutionary regime in Zanzibar. Mr. Carlucci, the US Consulate-General on the island and Mr.

Gordon, the US Deputy Chief of Mission in Dar es Salaam were the alleged conspirators. As a result of pressure from the Zanzibari leaders the two diplomats were expelled from the country.

On February 14, 1965 when it became obvious that Tanzanian action would not be rescinded under threat of withdrawal of aid the US retaliated by recalling its ambassador from Dar es Salaam and expelling the Tanzanian counsellor in Washington. The same day, Tanzania recalled its ambassador from the US. Although diplomatic relations were not broken, it was not until July 1965 that the ambassadors returned to their respective positions. As a result of this conflict the United States enthusiasm for aid to Tanzania cooled off. Of the total US loans to the country from 1961 to 1968 of shs. 511 million, only shs. 217 million was given between 1965 and 1968. Out of this later sum, only shs. 126 million was donated between 1965 and 1967, with shs. 91 million being offered in 1968 when the Chinese offer to finance the Tanzania-Zambia railway had become a stimulus for Western aid.

5. Diplomatic Break with Britain over Rhodesia

When on November 11, 1965 the white minority regime in Rhodesia unilaterally declared the country's independence Tanzania expected Britain to intervene on moral and legal grounds to topple the rebel regime. Although Britain imposed sanctions on Rhodesia these measures were too weak to be seriously intended to have the desired effect. And it became increasingly clear that Britain would not strengthen its sanctions to a realistic level. In reaction Tanzania instructed its delegation to the meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers held in Addis Ababa in November 1965 to propose concerted African diplomatic sanctions against Britain. Instead the meeting called on all African states to break diplomatic relations with Britain if the Rhodesian rebellion was not ended by December 15, 1965.

In response to this OAU decision Tanzania broke off diplomatic relations with Britain on December 16, 1965. In addition President Nyerere refused to attend the Commonwealth Conference on Rhodesia in Lagos in January 1966 on the grounds that it would be

fruitless because Britain had not accepted the principle of "No Independence Before Majority Rule" (NIBMAR) in Rhodesia.³⁰ On identical grounds he did not attend the Commonwealth Conference held in September 1966. And during 1966 and 1967 Tanzania vigorously exposed the hypocrisy of the British policy on Rhodesia at the United Nations and elsewhere.³¹ In retaliation, Britain froze the shs. 150 million interest-free loan it had offered earlier in 1965, as well as the shs. 7 million it had granted to the Tanzania Land Bank and the shs. 2.34 million it had given to the Pemba Telephone Exchange and Pemba Secondary School³². The pace of the decline of British aid accelerated. For example, whereas in 1965 Britain contributed 44.5% of the total aid receipt of Tanzania, in 1966 its share dropped to 4% and in 1967 to 2%.³³

6. Resistance to Pressure Over the Tan-Zam Railway

Chinese participation in the building of the railway from Tanzania to Zambia has generated hostility from the West. Western countries feel that Chinese involvement with the project would pave the way for Chinese ideological and political predominance in the region similar to that of USSR in the Arab world following its financing of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt. First, they sought to discredit the ability of the Chinese to build the railway by arguing that the cultural revolution had seriously disrupted the Chinese economy that the Chinese could not be trusted to fulfil their obligation toward the project, and that Chinese technology and other resources were inadequate. Second, they spread the false notion that Chinese intention was to dump its surplus products and people on the African continent. Third, when such propaganda failed to have the desired effect, different railway projects were promoted in the area in order to render the undertaking superfluous.³⁴

However, these pressures have not undermined the venture, which has made rapid progress since it was first initiated. The first agreement was signed in Peking on September 5, 1967 following the Chinese expenditure of shs. 20 million in 1965 to survey the project. Under it China agreed to provide Tanzania and Zambia with an interest-free loan of about shs. 2,865,200,000 to be used over a

period of ten years commencing on January 1, 1968 and with a grace period of five years. Repayment in freely convertible currency and or exports is to be shared equally by the governments of Tanzania and Zambia and spread over a period of 30 years commencing in 1983. Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda officially inaugurated its construction in October of 1970, although actual construction work commenced a little earlier. In 1971 the first section covering a distance of 502 kilometers from Dar es Salaam was completed. The speed with which this section was built indicates that the line will be fully operational well before the scheduled completion date in 1977. Thus in spite of immense operational difficulties and political pressures from the Western powers work on the railway has gone on and made rapid progress.

7. The Recognition of Biafra

On April 13, 1968 Tanzania recognized the secessionist state of Biafra as an independent and sovereign entity separate from Nigeria. That political action reflected the nation's strong political will to honour the dignity of man, his physical survival, and his well being.³⁶ The importance of political will in determining this action is particularly clear because of many reasons which the country had to escape the moral responsibility of recognition. Among these is Tanzania's indebtedness to Federal Nigeria for its help in replacing the British troops invited in 1964 to disarm the mutinous soldiers of the Tanganyika Rifle, as well as Nigerian technical assistance in the form of several magistrates seconded to the Tanzanian judiciary.

Tanzania also had a strong interest in Nigerian unity consonant with its cherished goal of African unity and its championship of the political federation of the East African countries. In this regard it is significant that it did not share the views of the Ivory Coast, Gabon and Zambia that the Nigerian federation was imposed from outside.³⁷ What was crucial was the withdrawal of the consent from the federation by the people of Eastern Nigeria.³⁸ The nation could also have been dissuaded from recognition by Biafra's dwindling military fortunes. By the time of recognition the federal troops had entered Onitsha, the most important trading centre in Biafra and

were threatening Port Harcourt, its most important industrial centre. There was still no immediate prospect of removing the blockade and, therefore, of relieving Biafra's desperate arms situation. Its military position appeared weak. Again although moslems constitute over one-third of Tanzanian population, Biafra's anti-moslem propaganda, as well as its increasing use of mercenary and Portuguese logistic aid both of which could have been abhorred by Tanzania under normal circumstances could not counteract the persuasiveness of the moral argument. Similarly, the fear of being branded an imperialist stooge or diplomatically isolated by the vast majority of the African states who supported Nigeria was not strong enough. Finally, Tanzania resisted the xenophobia of balkanization, which had caught such a grip on the African leaders that they could not comprehend the moral nature of the crisis and its implications for the African people.

Although Biafra was eventually defeated by, and reabsorbed into, federal Nigeria, which showed a great deal of magnanimity in victory, Tanzania did not view its policy of recognition as having failed. Its major motive force was the compulsion to do what was right. Thus the criterion of success was its moral justification rather than the outcome of the civil war. Tanzania was determined to make it clear to the rest of Africa that it was genuinely concerned about the well being of the peoples of Africa, that such well-being outweighed the abstract concepts of unity, sovereignty, or territorial integrity, and that it has a duty to speak out whenever this wellbeing is blatantly violated.

8. Opposition to Iddi Amin of Uganda

General Amin's seizure of power in Uganda in January 1971 precipitated a crisis in relations between Uganda and Tanzania. Although personal friendship between Nyerere and Obote might have influenced the situation, Tanzania's reaction to the coup indicates that insecurity was the dominant motivating factor.

It immediately issued the document Nwongozo, created the militia and strengthened the army. The spate of coup d'etats in

Africa and the speed with which their leaders switched foreign friends which reflected the sympathy of foreign forces in these coups underline the need for a more vigorous defense of internal security by the African states. In addition Amin's immediate post-coup utterances implied a Ugandan offer of friendship to Tanzania's enemies, the racist minority and colonialist regimes of southern Africa. Also the coup undermined the basis of the legitimacy of the Tanzanian regime. The close geographical proximity of Uganda and Tanzania, the increasing emulation of the Tanzanian experiment by Dr. Obote, and the increasing similarities of the foreign policies of their two regimes provided a favourable condition for a bandwagon effect which could lead to a similar uprising in Tanzania. Thus non-recognition of General Amin and an unequivocal opposition to him serves the dual purpose of undermining the basis of a similar occurrence in Tanzania, and increasing the vigilance of the population against all forms of subversion. The resulting mutual hostility between the two countries inevitably intruded into the multilateral relations of the East African Community (EAC). Since the political decision of the organization is made by the East African Authority consisting of the Presidents of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania sitting together, Tanzanian non-recognition of General Amin and Nyerere's strong determination not to sit together with him made it difficult for the authority to meet. However, Tanzania accepted a compromise solution which permitted the authority to decide issues without a meeting of the three presidents. It was under such an arrangement that Tanzania accepted the Ugandan members to the 12th Session of the East African Legislative Assembly in May 1971, and Charles Maina was appointed the Secretary-General of the EAC in June 1971.

Nevertheless, the conflict hampered the activities of the organization. In February 1971 Uganda cut off direct airways and telecommunications links with Tanzania for a short period of time on grounds of state security. The situation worsened in July when Tanzania rejected Ugandan appointments to the organisation on minor technical grounds.³⁹ Amin reacted by declaring two Tanzanian officials of the community *personae non grata* in Uganda, closing the Uganda-Tanzania border, again suspending all telephone, telecommunication, and airways flights between the two countries, and

suspending the steamer service on Lake Victoria which connects them.⁴⁰ General Amin seemed determined to use the leverage provided by the mutual desire to ensure the normal functioning of the activities of the regional entity to win concessions from Tanzania on the question of recognition. But Tanzania was equally determined not to be brow beaten into recognition by such blackmail and insisted on the principle of the separation of bilateral and multilateral relations.

Even when on August 23, 1971 the crisis degenerated into a military clash at the border town of Mutukula, Tanzania held fast to this principle. In fact President Kenyatta's mediation of the first phase of the crisis succeeded in part because of the prior acceptance by Uganda of the idea. The Ugandan Government statement of October 26, 1971 explicitly stated that "Uganda actively wants to see the continuation and growth of the East African Community. For that reason, Uganda has already stated that she is willing to accept the distinction between bilateral difficulties and multilateral progress"⁴¹ And even when during the second phase of the conflict which was characterized by the abortive invasion of Uganda by Ugandan exiles resident Tanzania in September 1972. Tanzania suffered a humiliating military and diplomatic defeat it still refused to recognize the regime of General Amin. The Mogadishu Agreement which ended that phase of the conflict did not call for or imply such recognition.⁴²

9. The Restructuring of National Life

Defined in terms of transactions and responsiveness, the society inherited by independent Tanzania was not confined to national geographical borders.⁴³ It consisted essentially of the advanced capitalist states, foreign enterprises in the country, the national leadership, and local subnational groups and individuals. However, an informal alliance existed between the advanced capitalist states and foreign enterprises on the one hand, and the national leadership and the subnational groups and individuals on the other. Since the interests of these two blocs were fundamentally largely incompatible⁴⁴ and the power balance favoured the external forces, the interests of

the later prevailed in national life. They determined the fundamental structures of internal and external transactions. Nevertheless, a certain measure of autonomy was available to the national leadership, especially in relatively minor issue areas such as the nature of the party system and the sources of aid. But the degree of autonomy was in practice governed by this balance of power. And it was not until 1967 that a meaningful shift began to take place in it. Such a shift reflected the strength of the nation's political will as well as attempts to strengthen it.

The Arusha Declaration enunciated in February 1967 provided for the direct control of the "commanding heights of the economy" by the state. Nationalization reduced the power of the foreign enterprises through a drastic curtailment of their number and size. The declaration also provided for a framework of values, resources, and institutions within which the activities of the remaining foreign enterprises would operate, this further reducing their power. A Wages and Incomes policy was elaborated between 1966 and 1968; policy in reaction to UDI in Rhodesia particularly with regard to relations with Zambia stabilized and became clearer; and the Arusha declaration finally identified the national goals of self-reliance, socialism and equity, the national control of the economy, rural development based essentially on ujamaa village programme, national independence, and individual participation in all aspects of national life.

Also the leadership code of the Arusha Declaration is important because it eliminated the growth of an indigenous class whose objective interests lie in an alliance with the external forces. According to it all leaders must be workers and peasants. They must not be tainted by capitalistic or feudalistic practices such as the holding of shares in private companies, the receipt of more than one salary, the renting of houses or the pursuit of commercial activities.⁴⁵ And the concept of leader is broadly conceived to include members of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) National Executive Committee, ministers, members of Parliament, senior officials of organizations affiliated to TANU, all those elected or appointed under any clause of the TANU constitution, councillors, and civil servants in the high and middle-income levels. It is extended to include a man, a man

and his wife, a woman, or a woman and her husband.⁴⁶ It is becoming increasingly clear that capitalists of Africa tend to rely on their external counterparts in the advanced capitalist nations for capital, expertise, access to markets, and when need be for political support.

Another rationale for the code is that if the national elite, particularly the political leaders, are reactionary and selfish they cannot win the confidence of the people nor inspire the masses with an enthusiasm for national development. Since in the final analysis all the people working together constitute the main engine of development a good leadership which helps to create development consciousness and capacity in a society is necessary for national progress.⁴⁷ Leaders cannot engender development consciousness in a people if they are not concerned about the welfare of the vast majority but are oriented primarily toward their own interests, power and wealth, or those of their class. The demands for good leadership, therefore, require, that the society be so organized that only those who are fully dedicated to the interests of the whole people can assume positions of authority.

Another series of efforts to curtail the power of external forces concerns the diversification of intergovernmental transaction away from dependence on Britain and the other advanced states. As a result three patterns have emerged namely (a) disengagement from dependent relations with Britain ; (b) a shift away from transactions with the major powers to relations with the middle powers ; and (c) a relative shift in emphasis from bilateral to multilateral relations. The net effect of the programme of trade diversification has been a shift away from Britain. By 1967 the proportion of Tanzanian exports that went to Britain declined from 35.8% in 1961 to 30.6% in 1964 and 29.0% in 1966. Imports from Britain declined from 37.6% in 1961 to 25.3% in 1964 and 28.8% in 1967. The low initial proportion of export and import trade with Britain makes the respective decline more significant than otherwise. During the period 1967 to 1974, relatively little change occurred in this trend in trade diversification. However, it is significant that by 1971 China had replaced

Britain as Tanzania's most important supplier of imports. Imports from Britain declined from 20.8% in 1967 to 18% in 1971.

Similarly British aid to Tanzania has declined. During the colonial and early post-independence periods Britain virtually monopolized external assistance to the country. About 87.5% of the total aid in 1961 and 89.5% in 1962 came from Britain. By 1965 British aid had assumed a downward trend which was accelerated that year by the crisis over Rhodesia to the point whereby in 1969 all British financial and technical assistance had for all practical purposes ceased. The dark prospects for British aid further worsened in 1970 following British efforts that year to interfere with the World Bank's decision on a loan application by Tanzania.

Also there has been a progressive decrease in Tanzania's reliance on the major powers such as the Soviet Union, France and the United States. Apart from Britain, the United States was the only major power which carried on salient transactions with Tanzania during the early post independence period. And during the period 1968 to 1974 it was the only major power which maintained a credible aid link with the nation. In the area of foreign trade, however, relations with the US have never assumed any importance. The proportion of Tanzania's exports that goes to it has never exceeded 10% and the proportion imports from it has never exceeded 8%. In the field of foreign aid where the US maintains a sizable programme the rate of growth of its activities has declined.

Another major power of interest to Tanzania, the Soviet Union has never acquired a firm foothold in the country. Soviet aid to the nation began in 1964 but has consistently failed to gather momentum. And Soviet trade relations with Tanzania have not been significant. Both export and import trade did not start until 1963; neither of them has ever accounted for even 1% of the total export or import and the trend is not decisively upwards. Tanzania's sensitivity to the Sino-Soviet dispute, its high level of transactions with China and its desire for a non-aligned posture with regard to that dispute impels it to seek a certain level of transactions with the Soviet Union similar to that with the US. USSR unwillingness to collaborate with

this policy stems from its belief that the extent of Tanzanian reliance on China contradicts its non-aligned aspirations on the Sino-Soviet dispute.

China is the only major power with which Tanzania has increased transactions. Both trade and aid with it have gathered momentum. The percentage of the country's imports which came from China has remarkably increased from 4.8% in 1967 to 14% in 1967 and 29% in 1971. However much of this increase is accounted for by the impact of the Tanzanian railway on imports from China. With an increase in the import of capital goods for the railway, and consumer goods in order to compensate for Chinese assistance in defraying the local cost of the project it is not surprising that imports from China have shifted radically. No such radical shift is evident in Tanzania's exports to China. In addition Chinese aid has proved to be quite beneficial: it is interest-free; provides for a long grace period and time for repayment; and encourages a speedy handover of aid projects to Tanzanians.

On the other hand, Tanzania's transactions with the middle powers has increased. In this regard, aid from the Scandinavian countries, Canada and the Netherlands have become increasingly significant. Tanzanians admire these states for their fairly realistic approach to the problems facing the newly independent nations and for their good record as aid donors. The middle powers are states which do not have important political pressures to maintain or a desire to consolidate spheres of political influence around the world. At the same time they have advanced economies which can be of some help to countries like Tanzania require in their quest for development. But unfortunately very little trade exists between Tanzania and these states. Although the same logic which calls for greater reliance on them for aid implies increased interaction in trade matters export to Sweden does not exceed 1% of total imports. The situation is similar for Denmark, Norway, Finland and Yugoslavia.

Finally, in continuation of its strong emphasis on multilateral aid evident during the early post-independent period, Tanzania has reinforced the trend toward the UN agencies and other multilateral

sources of aid. Multilateral aid to the country began in 1963 and has since involved the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), UNESCO, UNICEF, the International Development Agency (IDA) and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). By 1968, UN multilateral sources had become the most important avenues of aid to Tanzania. Although by 1974 they had yielded the first position among aid donors to China, they have remained very strong contributors in the second place.

Apart from these attempts to reduce the power of external forces in determining the nature and direction of national life, Tanzania has sought to increase the power of the local forces. Socialist policies and programmes for rural development aspire to this goal. Central to both activities is the programme of developing ujamaa villages. Its importance for rural development lies in its potential impact on production in a country where the bulk of the population lives in the rural areas. Its centrality to socialism is reflected in its embodiment of the three basic principles of Tanzanian socialism. These are collective ownership, co-operative living, and co-operative work. With respect to rural development the ujamaa village programme supplemented by agricultural extension services in non-ujamaa villages, the provision of development oriented socio-economic and political infrastructure in the rural areas, the encouragements of self-help projects, and the maintenance of publicly owned farms in the rural areas.

The socialist programmes embodied in the Arusha Declaration were supplemented by other contained in *Mwongozo* published in February 1971. Although Presidential Circular of February 1970 urged all public institutions to set up worker's councils to provide the workers in the parastatal and other public institutions with access to and influence over their major decisions, workers' participation in national enterprises gathered momentum after the publication of *Mwongozo*. Similarly during this period workers have been encouraged to establish and operate consumer co-operative shops in order to be able to control the prices and distribution of goods which they

need. This policy conforms to Mwongozo's goal of effective citizen participation in the processes of both production and distribution in the society, which is also reflected in the current shift of the co-operative movement from the marketing of goods along to both their production and marketing. Another means advocated by Mwongozo for increasing national power is mass participation in the formulation and implementation of the development plans.

Although numerous obstacles face these programme, nationalization, leadership code, socialism, rural development, and citizen participation in national life—as long as the armed forces remain loyal to the regime and the leaders adhere or are forced to adhere to the national interest, trial and error would provide the necessary experience to overcome these obstacles and transform the society to increase national power. Nevertheless by reducing the size of the most significant foreign enterprises nationalization has shifted the balance of power between internal and external forces to a position more favourable to the domestic forces than before. Also the Arusha Declaration and Mwongozo by providing an essentially indigenously determined framework into which external resources may be integrated have reduced the chances for external decisions to intrude adversely into national life. Further success in this direction now depends predominantly on the sense of service, hardwork, initiative and intellectual acumen of Tanzanians as they seek to implement these policies and programmes.

Conclusion

The major lesson of the Tanzanian diplomatic experience concerns the margin of autonomy available to Third World countries. Their colonial heritage of dependence on external forces has created a mentality which prevents their leaders from paying attention to identifying the limits of national power. It has also blinded them to possible united action with others which is capable of increasing their influence in world affairs through negotiations in areas of joint interest rather than through appeals to sympathy and humanitarian aid. The resultant belief in national powerlessness is reinforced by the fact that many Third World leaders have an

objective interest in maintaining national economic dependence on the advanced states or are convinced that they are incapable of making major reforms of their domestic and external relations and must, therefore, request marginal amelioration of particular unsatisfactory situations on a piecemeal basis through reliance on the wealthy states.⁴⁸ Tanzania on the other hand has demonstrated that the contemporary international system allows the weak nations a certain margin of autonomy and influence out of proportion to their economic and military strength.

However, the nation's experience also shows that in order to seize the opportunities thus provided the poor and weak nation must have a strong political will and an over-riding dedication to the interests of the vast majority of its population. Given these, it would not have to compromise its basic foreign policy goals. Rather a continual reappraisal of its foreign policy strategy based on its previous experiences would suffice to achieve durable benefits from international transactions. In spite of the conflicts with the advanced countries Tanzania's policy goals have not been abandoned; and the zeal with which they were pursued during the early period of independence has not waned. If anything the goals have been reiterated and are now pursued with increased confidence.

National independence and individual freedom, the total liberation of Africa from colonialism and racism, African unity, justice in international life, and world peace have all retained their pre-independence priority. Similarly non-alignment has remained a cornerstone of Tanzanian foreign policy. It has not seemed to matter whether or not these objectives and other goals of foreign policy have been accomplished to a reasonable degree. The goal of African unity is still confined to the level of rhetoric, the total political emancipation of Africa is still a long way from realization, world peace is still threatened even though less menacingly, naked power and selfish national interests still rule the world community. The wealthy and powerful states continue to oppress the weak and powerless ones. And within states the wealthy and powerful groups still oppress their less wealthy and powerful compatriots. Short run success has not been Tanzania's yard-stick for judging whether or not it should

abandon its foreign policy goals. For example its failure to prevent the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 from coming into force did not affect its subsequent vote against the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. Given a strong political will to persevere in what is right until final victory setbacks and failures have not led to changes in the goals of foreign policy to themselves but rather in the means for accomplishing them.

Thus all the changes which have occurred in Tanzanian diplomatic history have concerned questions of strategy and tactics. In order to maximize national independence, non-alignment has been supplemented by self-reliance. The diversification of the direction of trade, sources of aid, and the nature of export crops has been coupled to the nationalization of the commanding heights of the economy, a greater focus on domestic resources and activities, and extensive programmes of socialism and rural development all of which are designed to increase the Tanzanian capacity to resist the adverse effects of external conditions on national independence. In addition, the guidelines to foreign policy and national planning have been strengthened in order to minimize the negative effects of external transactions by providing a framework for co-ordinating external and internal resources.

As changes in the international system have caused a shift from physical to psychological aspects of force as instruments of foreign policy emphasis has moved from the physical mastery of other states to the shaping of their ideas, from the tangible to the intangible factors power, from the use of force to the use of propaganda, argument, and other non-military means of influence. As the importance of force has declined, power has increasingly become the art of subtly making one state see the world the way another sees it and making it behave according to that vision.⁴⁹ On the continuum from coercion to persuasion a shift in the direction of the latter is obvious. As this shift has taken place the importance of a strong political will in the achievement of foreign policy goals has increased. This new situation favours the new states of Asia and Africa. They lack the ability to exert influence over others in the direction of compelling the victim to accede to their demands. But given a strong political

will, they possess the ability to at least prevent others from forcing them into actions incompatible with their national interest.

FOOTNOTES

1. Julius Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity* (Dar es Salaam ; Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 19, 120, 121, 145, 225-27, 267.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 221.
3. Source : Central Statistical Bureau, *Employment and Earnings in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam : Government Printer, 1966).
4. *Afro-American Dialogue : Background Papers*. First Conference, Nairobi, Kenya, 1968, p. Pickett/3.
5. Julius K. Nyerere, *Tanzania Ten Years After Independence* (Dar es Salaam : Government Printer, 1971), pp. 48-49.
6. Henry Bienen, "Military Assistance and Political Development in Africa," a paper prepared for the Working Group of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society of the International Sociological Association Conference, London, England, September 13 to 15, 1967 pp. 8-9.
7. Sources : *The Military Balance, 1968-1969* (London : The Institute of Strategic Studies, 1968), pp. 52-59 ; Geoffrey Kemp, "Arms Traffic and Third Conflicts," in *International Conciliation*, No. 5777, March 1970 ; *Southern Africa in International Relations*, a monograph of the Africa Bureau, London, 1970.
8. For a detailed account of the nature of the colonial monetary system of Tanzania, refer to : W.T. Newlyn and D.C. Rowan, *Money and Banking in British Colonial Africa* (London : Oxford University Press, 1954).
9. Sources : United Republic of Tanzania, *Background to the Budget* (Dar es Salaam : Government Printer, 1964) ; United Republic of Tanzania, *Statistical Abstracts* (Dar es Salaam : Government Printer, 1964).
10. *Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 1969-1974, Vol. IV : Survey of the High and Middle Level Manpower Requirement and Resources* (Dar es Salaam ; Government Printer. 1969), p. 16.
11. Also the destruction of the German economy by the war, the recession subsequent to the conclusion of the war, and the Great Depression made it difficult for German investors to maintain the level of their pre-war investment,
12. B.T. Chidzero, *Tanganyika and International Trusteeship* (London : Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 48.
13. Central Statistical Bureau, *Employment and Earnings in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam : Government Printer, 1966).
14. Harvey Glickman, "Traditional Pluralism and Democratic Processes in Mainland Tanzania," in Lionel Cliffe and John Saul, eds., *Socialism in Tanzania*, Vol. I. (Nairobi : East African Publishing House 1962), pp. 127-144.

15. Tanganyikan Government Press Release of March 7, 1964 available in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam.
16. Julius Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, op. cit., p. 96.
17. *The Reporter* Nairobi, July 3, 1964, p. 9.
18. M.J.H. Yaffey. "The Treaty of East African Cooperation : An Economic Commentary," in P.A. Thomas, *Private Enterprise and the Corporate Form in East Africa* (Nairobi : East African Publishing House, 1968).
19. *The New York Times*. New York, January 14, 20, 23, and 24, 1964 ; *The New York Herald Tribune*. New York, January 14, 1964.
20. *The New York Times*, June 3, 1964 ; *The Guardian*, London, June 5, 1964.
21. *The New York Times*, June 15, 1964 ; *The Times*, London, June 17, 1964, p. 7.
22. Source : Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam.
23. Note that the Cameroons Union in West Africa took place between a sovereign state, East Cameroons, and a former region of Nigeria West Cameroons.
24. West Germany invoked the Halstein doctrine which it usually applied to countries offering diplomatic recognition to East Germany. It calls for economic and other non-military reprisals against such states.
25. Only German Federal Government aid was involved. West German churches and state governments continued their aid programmes. Even the volunteer service project was not affected. And Federal Government aid started before February 1965 was not involved.
26. Julius K. Nyerere, *Principles and Development* (Dar es Salaam : Government Printers, 1966), p. 11.
27. For a more detailed discussion of this crisis, see T. Niblock, "Tanzanian Foreign Policy : An Analysis," in *The African Review* Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 94-98.
28. Cf. *The Nationalist*. Dar es Salaam; August 18, 1964 ; *The Standard*, Dar es Salaam, August 21, 22 and September 1, 1964.
29. Timothy Shaw, *The Foreign Policy of Tanzania, 1961-1968*. Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of East Africa, Makerere, 1969, p. 218.
30. Tanzanian Government Press Release of January 13 1966.
31. *The Standard*, June 30 1966 ; Tanzanian Government Press Release of October 15, 1966 ; Official Reports of the UN General Assembly Plenary Meetings 1437, 1450, and 1627, and Fourth Committee Meetings 1606, 1607 and 1615.
32. *The Nationalist*, March 13, 1970, p. 1.
33. Sources : Ministry of Finance, Dar es Salaam ; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Overseas Development Administration *British Aid Statistics, 1966-1970* (London : HMSO, 1972).

34. Julius K. Nyerere in "It's a Plan for the People," *The Standard*, May 29, 1971, p. 1.

35. "Its Full Steam Ahead for Freedom," in *The Nationalist*, Tenth Independence Supplement, December 9, 1971, p. 61.

36. See Julius Nyerere, "Why We Recognised Biafra," in *The Observer*, London, April 28, 1968, p. 10.

37. Refer to the *Tanzanian Government Statement on the Recognition of Biafra* (Dar es Salaam : Government Printer, 1968), p. 5.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-9.

39. Tanzania argued that by convention such appointments required prior constitution among the three governments before being announced. No such consultations had taken place in this case.

40. The two Tanzanians are John Malacela, the then East African Minister for Communications, Research, and Social Services; and Iddi Simba the Chairman and Director-General of the East African Development Bank with headquarters in Kampala.

41. The Ugandan Government Statement of October 26, 1971, in *The Uganda Argus*, October 27, 1971, p. 1.

42. *Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, October 8, 1972 p. 1.

43. Karl W. Deutsch, "Autonomy and Boundaries According to Communications Theory," in Roy F. Grinker, ed., *Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behaviour* (New York : Basic Books, 1965), pp. 278-297.

44. Okwudiba Nnoli, "External Stimuli and National Planning in Tanzania," in *The African Review*, Vol. 1 No. 3, January 1972.

45. Julius K. Nyerere, *Ujamaa* (Dar es Salaam : Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 36.

46. Julius K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism* (Dar es Salaam : Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 24.

47. *Ujamaa, op cit.*, p. 35.

48. R.H. Green, "Power and Self-interest : Reflections on the Parameters for Progress Toward Independent International Economic System" (Mimeo), 1969, p. 4.

49. Stanely Hoffman, "Perceptions, Reality and the Franco-American Conflict," in John C. Farrel and Asa P. Smith eds., *Image and Reality in World Politics* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 57-58.

Dr Sydney E. Mgbefiofor

The Dilemmas of the Nigerian Intellectuals

The intellectual in our context will refer to that person whose superior ability to reason, understand or perceive relationships and/or differences developed through exposure to formal or informal education grants him general recognition as a member of the intelligentsia. He is not new in society, having constituted some form of power throughout the history of man. His impact on society seems to be most recognized long after his death. There is little doubt that he is behind most of the big changes that society has witnessed from the very distant past. His role continues to remain behind the scene.

The success of any revolution depends, in a large measure, on the ability of the revolutionary leaders to attract mass support of the people. This is where the intellectual can only play behind the scene roles and leave the forefront to politically astute leaders. The atmosphere accompanying any significant social changes is most conducive for implementing other changes which ordinarily could not have found support independently. Moments of revolution create problems and opportunities which great statesmen could only have dreamed about. Any important changes delayed could be impossible to implement afterwards as soon as people lose the revolutionary impulse. Why are changes most opportune at this stage may be linked to the loss of what normally is termed "democratic" principles. To talk of upholding the principles of "Greek democracy" at the moment of revolution would be double talk because a revolution in itself is an anti-democratic way of doing things. Nigeria, one of a number of developing countries, has been unnecessarily concerned over western democracy at a time when she should have discarded it and developed what her own democracy should be—of the poor, of the workers, of the land-

owners, of the rich, or of everybody. The latter is a myth at this stage because any government is a representative of a particular interest group and cannot speak for all. Irrespective of where one is, those who belong to the group in power represent the first class, those merely outside—second class, while those in opposition to the system represent the third class citizens. Nigerian intellectuals will have to recognize that they should align themselves to one group. Up till now, they have represented only themselves. The lack of development in Nigeria now is not the fault of only the politicians but that of the intellectuals for failing to make responsible alliance from which they could get across the vital proposals for development. No great power which we know of as ever born in a period of great democracy. The launching of growth everywhere has been under autocracy. Nigerian intellectuals should therefore not feel guilty of being a part of any undemocratic launching of progress. Torn between ideals and reality, the determinant of intellectual maturity will be, for our own purposes, the successful practical application of the knowledge they have acquired. To be over concerned about upholding the principles of democracy, whatever it really means, at the stage of development which Nigeria has found herself in would surely be an impediment to progress. The intellectuals should stand for progress. For a nation that is fighting for social and economic survival, rigid democratic principles could be counter-productive. Democracy may even be very expensive. I dare put it as a luxury. Concern over democracy now could be likened to the wisdom of a person whose house and belongings are worth hundreds of Naira but who decides that the protection of this property could be best assured if sophisticated protection devices running into thousands of Naira were installed. The reasonable question would be—should protection not have relevance to the worth of the property? Agreed that some might argue that value varies with individuals, however we do realize that there must be a way of comparing values. To have an effective comparison, the worth has to be reduced to a common system—monetary, or any other value we might decide that is better. It therefore follows that our worst fears of anti-democratic governments could only materialize if we neglect to provide the populace with certain basic material

welfare for which they would willingly fight to retain. The South Viet-Nam government's collapse, despite the cry echoed in the remote villages about preservation of democracy, demonstrates that people do not fight for democracy blindly. In the United States, the economic problems generated by the U.S. adventures in South-East Asia greatly threatened the democratic principles which U.S. is said to be guarding for the entire Western World. The Watergate related criminal activities emanating from the presidency shows exactly how far democratic principles could be compromised. It does appear that lip service was paid to the concept sold to Nigeria. Democracy does not exist anywhere for long. Richard Nixon's law and order administration typified a drowning man's last efforts to keep the lid on a secret even if he knows of no rescue attempt. If I were to classify democracy and economic progress, at best, as far as Nigeria's status is now, I would place the economy first and democracy second in order of priority. At our present stage, it does appear to me that using the cause and effect analysis, that economic progress is the cause while undemocratic principles typified by the military government would be the effect. Nigerian intellectuals have not clarified this relationship. The failure to muster courage and put first things first is the fault of the intellectual. He cannot escape the blame.


Nigerian intellectuals specialize in various fields. Yet any closer examination of their areas of involvement would reveal that they seem to have come from a single school in a large university were there are several schools. In a way, the intellectuals are not totally responsible for this state of affairs. Nigerian elementary and secondary schools never offered them much opportunity to diversify. Therefore, there are too many specialists in some fields while a few in other fields. Nigerians proceeding further for higher education did not have the final say as to the areas they would specialize in. Scholarship offered by foreign countries in a way determined their areas of specialization. Therefore Nigerians got into fields not because they would enjoy performance in those fields after graduation, not because Nigeria so much needed specialists in those fields, but simply because there was an opportunity there. After graduating, the intellectuals discover that their areas of

specialization may have no future in Nigeria. They could either accept any position anywhere in Nigeria or proceed abroad where there may be greater opportunities in their areas of specialization. For those who are most anxious to remain in Nigeria, the choice is simple—get into any available position. I hasten to add that this phenomenon is not unique to Nigeria. However as a developing country, it is more acute than in the developed countries. The dilemma of the Nigerian intellectual is how to make his contribution to Nigeria when his field of specialization either does not have a future in Nigeria or has a future if only the policy makers could realize the importance.

Most Nigerian intellectuals are the straight-jacket types. They are lawyers, physicians, historians, engineers. It does not seem evident that the engineer could be helped by exposure to law, or that a physician could be helped by exposure to administration. Very few intellectuals have been farsighted enough to combine complementary fields such that the physician who is in charge of a hospital complex knows something about medicine and administration. For the engineer, the law degree or diploma is a tool. He could be a member of the bar, but to him the law training serves the same function as English language does for a philologist of Russian. Such specialists are in greater demand in the developed countries these days simply because they ensure a greater degree of centralization of authority. There is every effort to cut down on decentralization because it leads to so much inefficiency and introduces several bureaucratic tie-ups. By encouraging the intellectuals to acquire legal or management skills in addition to their areas of specialization, Nigeria could be cutting out the wasteful stage of one specialist for one and only one job. This significance is heightened by the earlier discussed view that areas of specialization of our intellectuals are more of results of chance than of planning. Therefore the policy of the existing bureaucracy to withhold recognition from intellectuals who possess additional tools does create a serious dilemma for such intellectuals. Continuation of such a policy could mean continuation of the wasteful use of the intelligentsia in Nigeria due to poor management, and encouraging the most able Nigerian intellectuals to reside abroad.

There used to be a struggle within the academia as to how the degree of doctor of philosophy should be classified. Teachers, regretting the absence of a professional degree, and envious of lawyers and physicians, have made serious efforts to have the Ph. D. be recognized as the professional degree for teachers at all levels. This could mean greater economic benefits for them. Unfortunately it is a consensus that the Ph.D. is not a teacher's degree but an academic research-oriented degree. In all professions it does represent the pinnacle of academic achievement. Since in Nigeria most of the intellectuals with this terminal degree are found in the universities, there is a wrong impression among civil servants that the only place for such intellectuals to work is in these universities. It is a reality that in the Nigerian universities, very low-level research is being undertaken at present. Extensive research has never been considered the highlights of the university professor's responsibility. How does one therefore justify sending research-oriented intellectuals to the universities when research is not the primary function of these institutions? In most developed countries, the defence department and the commerce department patronize the universities with grants to enable research to be conducted for them. This does justify the large number of intellectuals with the Ph. D. degree employed by these universities. The universities are therefore more like research institutes. In the Soviet Union, intellectuals of such order are found under the umbrella of the gigantic institution called the Academy of Sciences of the Republics and the Soviet Union. Here research, pure and applied, is the only business.

Due to lack of concentrated research in Nigeria, it would have been expected that scattered government agencies would be engaged in some sort of research on their own. Each ministry of the state and of the federal government should have had a number of intellectuals to provide the type of sophisticated analyses supported by intensive research which such a ministry should need. Unfortunately, it has not been so. It must be realized now that ministries must no longer remain a place where experienced people in methods and procedures should say the final words. There is need for strong policy-makers to become permanent components of these ministries. Nigerian intellectuals should be utilized even at the local levels in



order to upgrade the quality of work and apply scientific methods in improving the productivity of these local agencies. State Governments ought to make the services of these intellectuals available to the public at large as a first step towards raising the level and quality of products from the small businessmen. The Nigerian intellectual should be keenly involved in the working of the legislative assemblies. Every federal and state legislator should be encouraged to have some intellectuals in his staff to provide him with the kind of scientific analysis of events before he votes on any bill or introduces any bill. This will surely professionalize the legislators and encourage meaningful debates of the proceedings in these legislatures even beyond their halls. The present state of the Assemblies is reminiscent of the U.S. state legislatures during the 19th century when political bases, wielding tough political machines, could get away with anything they committed. The exclusion of intellectuals from all levels of government is responsible for the present poor quality of Nigerian life. The dilemma of excluding the Nigerian intellectual from those areas where his knowledge is most needed while forced by absence of choice to compete for positions in the universities with little on-going research must be reviewed as soon as possible.

In Nigerian universities, faculty members, being the intellectuals. Should have three primary responsibilities: Teaching, Research and Administration. The type of mix-ups of these responsibilities will have to depend on the special capability of the individual faculty member and on his training or exposure. Lecturers would have the primary function of teaching without being overburdened with research or administration. Professors and senior lecturers must be assessed by the product of their research rather than by teaching. Administrative positions at the top-level must belong to those whose training and exposure show that they are able administrators. They should not be exposed to one single discipline and should possess a law degree or a degree in administration in addition to the Ph.D. in any one area offered at the university. The higher administrator should be the most important intellectual since the success of the entire team will depend most on

his ability. Exceptional research-oriented faculty members or lecturers possessing good rapport with the students must not be "rewarded" by moving them to administrative positions because excellence in one area does not usually mean excellence in the other. The position of the administrator is too serious to be delegated to one who will have to undergo apprenticeship for years in that position and who will at best utilize primitive instinctive techniques of management. While this is going on, morale could get so low that strengths in the university structure might opt to leave the university. When this does happen, these intellectuals will most likely be offered more lucrative positions in other universities in the developed countries. The end-result is that even when the "apprenticed" administrator gets to learn his trade—which is like being left-handed at an old age—he has shambles to try to keep together. If out of frustration he never makes it, he finds that he no longer can pick-up from where he had left his distinguished career in teaching or research. This therefore is too expensive an experiment for both the institution and the individual faculty member whose career is ruined, at least temporarily. The administrator *must* be one with formal exposure to law or administration. The practice of having a faculty member with Ph.D. in Physical Chemistry but lacking an exposure to administration or law become the Dean of the School of Natural Science simply because he has spent ten years in the field, must not be encouraged because it simply creates a bad atmosphere for all others to function. At the same time, utilizing a Ph.D. holder in mathematics to teach remedial mathematics for nursing majors would be a waste of talent. So, even at the only place where society feels that the intellectual belongs to, there is a dilemma.

Successful management requires three basic attributes : Technical, Human Relations and Conceptual Ability. The percentages of which ability necessary for any level of management varies, depending on what level of management the intellectual is engaged in. For the first-level (lowest) supervisor, about 50% of the supervisor's ability should be technical, 40%, of Human relations ability and 10%, conceptual ability. This is because he takes instructions from

those above him. For the mid-level management position, the percentages change to 30%, 35%, and 35% respectively. For the top-level manager, it should be 15%, 25% and 60% respectively. These percentages should not be taken rigidly. It would be wrong to base all levels of management solely on technical ability as is currently the case. For entry level position, technical ability should be the most important. Assuming that all our intellectuals enter from the first level, it does appear that there should be opportunity for them to acquire further education to prepare them for higher positions where other abilities are needed. Unfortunately since the terminal degree in a single area is regarded as the pinnacle, there has been a misconception that the intellectual does not require any more exposure outside of his specialty. This has worsened the dilemma of the intellectual whose degrees in Engineering, Law and Administration convey the impression that he is confused. Such an unusual combination becomes a handicap as recruiters ponder what he is : an engineer, a lawyer or an administrator ? Such is naive. There is complementarity in higher education. The greater a stature an intellectual should command must have a bearing on the complementarity of his educational exposure. Too narrow and unbuttressed education is dangerous and wasteful for Nigeria.

Another dilemma centers on the belief among intellectuals that one's level of education should be the balance scale for measuring the weight of the pay-check. This is a result of the indoctrination whose roots can be traced to the colonial past. That there is little or no correlation between economic value of an individual and his level of education is clearly visible in the developed countries. Education has no direct economic pay-off. To measure one's success in the economic ladder on the basis of years of exposure to formal education is a wrong application of education. As put forward convincingly by Professor James O'Toole of U.S.C. Graduate School of Business, "The most constructive thing that can be done to improve the relationship between the worlds of work and education is to stop implicitly and explicitly selling education as an economic investment and instead make students and parents understand that education is a goal onto itself but not automatically a formula for economic escalation".² Therefore if Nigerian intellectuals

continue to be dissatisfied with their incomes and feel that society owes them so much, there will continue to be transmitted to generations this unhealthy feeling. The dilemma of the relationship between education and economic worth of the intellectual may have to be resolved by some kind of bargaining between the particular intellectuals and their employers. This is the accepted method rather than entertaining a perpetual grudge.

The most pressing problem of the Nigerian intellectual has to do with his limited access to publishing firms where his works are to be published. It is recognized that most of the textbooks from the elementary school level to the secondary school level currently in use in Nigeria are not reflective of Nigeria's culture. They still bear the foot paths of colonial history and propagate colonial values and colonial views of the Nigerian society. The first step in the direction of full independence should have been the re-editing of these textbooks to reflect Nigeria's aspirations and past history. References should be made to events concerning Nigeria. I do not know how much concerted effort have been made by Nigerian intellectuals to have this rectified, but the result seems a long way off the desired goal. The history and culture of an independent country must not be left to her former colonial masters to research into. The history of the Second World War written by the Americans greatly differs from that written by the Soviets. They interpart their roles differently. Authorship of books read by Nigerian younger students is a very important matter.

Creativity has to be encouraged not only among the intellectuals but among the entire segment of the society. Books are the accepted and most permanent way of getting changes instituted in every society. Most of our intellectuals are unable to share their experiences or research results with colleagues and society as a whole because of the problems over publications. In the developed countries, advanced publications are heavily subsidized by independent organizations or by the government. This encourages their intellectuals to continue to search for the unknowns. Nigerian intellectuals living abroad are still faced with this same dilemma as those at home. Both have to write on matters of sufficient

interest to the host country to have their works considered for publication. Even then, there are usually heavy editings that ultimately have an impact on the nature of subject-matter to be discussed. It is not unusual that things that would appeal to the host country are things that tend to confirm the stereotype of Nigerians which colonial and reactionary press have been painting for long. For self-respecting Nigerian intellectuals at home and abroad, publication abroad is not attractive because one could either be a disgrace to one's people or write on topics that would be beneficial only to the host country. A group of publishers in the U.S. belong to what is generally known as the "Vantage Press". It is almost always easier to have works published by them. However, due to their limited access to large markets, these publications never receive wide circulation. The "Vantage Press" groups usually demands that authors subsidize the publication to cover initial costs. Subsidy ranges from \$5,000—\$10,000 depending on the volume of work to be published. The eventual outcome is that the author suffers a loss of thousands of dollars because insufficient number of his books are sold. The only sure sales are those the few libraries anxious to stack their shelves with books on anything. To request that an author suffer financial losses to have his works published discourages publication and this in turn discourages research. Any intellectual who does not carry on some sort of research soon becomes a non-intellectual in reality.

In view of this handicap that threatens to destroy the Nigerian intellectual, it is imperative that the Governments come to his rescue. The first alternative could be to provide subsidy for such publications after a review of the work is made by a team in the ministry of education, for example. The government should, in this same option, take the responsibility of distributing the works within Nigeria at a price most Nigerians can afford. The second option would be to socialize publications and have only accepted works published at government expense with the author participating in the sharing of whatever profit is realized from the sales. Preference should be extended to Nigerians at every walk of life to publish their experiences. Socialized Press played a major role in the

transformation of the Soviet Society from backward peasants to enlightened industrial workers.

Serious scholarly works take several years of intensive work to complete and usually require limited prints because of the few interested people. This is especially where government intervention is most needed. Nigerian intellectuals need to have more scientific journals covering various activities in the government, private sector and the universities. Initial textbooks for specialized courses could be prepared from a careful edition of some of these articles. In the developed countries, scientific journals play major roles in coordinating activities of the various scientists. With Nigerian government's publishing firms, the avenue would be wide open. The intellectuals will then be the necessary media to communicate among themselves.

Books and journals are as important to the development of the human resources of the country just as roads are necessary for the development of the material resources. Economic development is tied to the development of an educated public. As a communication link, publications are more important. The politicians will have to yield this time. They need to bury the age-long antagonism with intellectuals at least, for now. Even though the intellectuals are not elected and do not represent any other group other than themselves, the country cannot develop without their active participation. Nigerian intellectuals will have to realize that good administration is crucial for their survival as a part of society. They must be held accountable to the public for the privileges they enjoy. There will always be political bosses who will continue to engage in compromises of principles, rely on public opinion polls for direction because they are less concerned with "truth, pure and simple" than with votes. Fortunately, at this crucial time, Nigeria apparently has enough intellectuals for the present stage of nation-building. The special dilemmas of these intellectuals, when added to the general dilemma world-wide dictate that the collective power of the people as represented by the government must be asked to intervene decisively and promptly.

Dr Sydney E. Mgbefiofor

FOOTNOTES

1. Jhon F. Kennedy, *The Profession of Politics*. Quoted from Herzberg and Pomper, *American Party Politics* (N.Y. : Holt, Rinhart and Winston, Inc.) p. 111.

2. *The Washington Post*, May 18, 1975. p. C-1.

Non—Tariff Barriers in Trade between Developing and Developed Countries

The ability of the developing countries to sustain reasonably satisfactory growth rates depends among other things on their capacity to earn sufficient foreign exchange.

The share of the developing countries (LDC) in manufacture and semi-manufactures which constitutes the most dynamic sector in the international trade is exceedingly small and a breakthrough is possible only through a massive expansion in their exports. This conclusion was established by the trends in the World Trade observed during first half of 1960's. During this period the export of primary commodities fell down (raw materials slowest growth rate i.e. 3% per annum) while fuel and food highest rate of expansion (11% per annum) whereas performance of manufactured exports was well above overall world average (specially non-traditional items like chemicals, machinery and transport equipments showed highest growth rates compared to traditional items like textile, timber products which showed comparatively slow growth rate). This trend has changed very much since then but during this period a number of other restrictions have been imposed in the import-export market. It is perhaps obvious that the importing countries are most of the time at a higher level of technology and income than the exporting LDCs so that the importing countries are able to introduce a number of restrictions on the trade mainly in the form of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Let us see how these affect the trades specially from the developing countries point of view.

Tariff Barriers

Industrial products of developing countries face several restrictions in the market of developed countries. An important set

of restrictions relates to various forms of Tariffs which are levied on manufactured imports from developing countries. This causes the price rise of the goods and thus reduces the export market. In other words a reduction of the Tariff barriers on the industrial exports including that of processed primary products is bound to increase the export specially from the developing countries.

This problem was discussed in detail during almost all the UNCTAD meetings. These meetings did recommend that high priorities should be accorded during the negotiations to grant maximum reduction and wherever possible elimination of duties to manufactures and semi-manufactures of export interest to developing countries.

These views were introduced right from the first meeting of the UNCTAD. The Kennedy Round Negotiations in the frame of the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade also pursued some of these ideas influenced perhaps to some extent by the views expressed at UNCTAD. The results of the negotiations fell short of expectations especially in relation to the developing countries. The major hurdle was the *effective protection of processing* of the goods. This was reduced in some cases but is still substantial. Special Tariff concessions in respect of a number of semi-manufactures such as lumber, essential oils, leather, plywood, jute yarn and copper and manufactures like certain kinds of prepared and preserved foodstuffs, jute fabrics, bags and sacks, carpets, diamonds, sports and travel goods were granted to developing countries as a result of Kennedy Round Negotiations.

Since then many developed market economy countries liberalized Tariffs in the form of abolition, reduction, suspension or reclassification (of Tariffs) on a number of goods of export interest to developing countries. Some of the items are base metals, oriental carpets and rugs, fabrics of jute and other textile products, cricket and photo equipment, extracts, essences and concentrates of coffee and tea, processed cocoa and so on.

There have simultaneously been progressive elimination of Tariffs on trade among the developed market economy countries

of EEC and EFTA on preferential basis. This agains further caused a reduction in the ability of developing countries to compete on equal terms in these markets as against preferred suppliers. Their dis-appointment was voiced at the meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee on June 30, 1967.

Non-Tariff Barriers

Among the non-tariff barriers the quantitative restrictions constitute the most serious obstacle to the expansion of developing countries manufactured exports. Other non-tariff or para-tariff barriers include surcharges on imports, internal charges, border taxes, government purchase policies, anti-dumping regulations, arbitrary customs—valuation procedures, industrial standards licensing regulations, rules imposing technical requirements and many others.

Efforts have been made for quite some years under the aegis of IMF & GATT for the removal of these and other non-tariff barriers. The quantitative restrictions were originally imposed in the wake of bilateral trade agreements among West European countries in the immediate post war period. The abolition of bilateral trade agreements among these countries provided an additional justification for removing quantitative restrictions in respect of third countries.

The question of non-tariff barriers was also discussed at first UNCTAD and the guidelines in this respect were finalized. The Resolution asked the developed countries not to raise existing tariff and non-tariff barriers nor impose new tariff and non-tariff barriers on exports of developing countries. The developed countries were also asked to accord high priority to removal of quantitative restriction on manufactures and semi-manufactures of export interest to developing countries. However, these recommendations were not implemented.

Member countries of the EEC (have) practically dismantled quantitative restrictions on non-agricultural products on intra community trade. The elimination of restrictions on intra EEC trade has meant a rise in the non-tariff barriers in respect of exports

of third countries especially those of developing countries.

The developed countries agreed that there was some justification in the developing countries feeling concerned with the adverse effects on non-Tariff barriers on their exports. They assured that they had imposed only a few or no restrictions on products of export interest to developing countries. They further explained that the removal of restrictions on some other items was a little difficult since it involved the interests of some industries and trade unions.

In the EEC group of countries—there is almost every type of non-tariff restrictions. Most generally used barriers are : internal taxes, discriminate quantitative restrictions and licensing, variable levies, discriminatory system of evaluation for duty purposes and health and sanitary regulations. Recent studies show that environmental controls will be increased by developed countries in a wide range of products i.e. in the field of—

- (i) agriculture, forestry and fisheries,
- (ii) mining,
- (iii) construction, and
- (iv) manufacturing.

The effect of export of such commodities may be more drastic than those arising from health and sanitary regulations for example—

- (a) Bans on the imports of fruits and vegetables containing traces of DDT and other pesticides.
- (b) The steps taken by OECD countries to ban or control of phosphatic detergents towards reducing eutrofication of inland waters.
- (c) The guidelines issued by the World Bank on “Environmental Health and Human Ecological Considerations in Economic Development Project” is also a pointer in this direction (World Bank—May 74).

Some examples of non-tariff barriers are : (See also Table I on page 57).

1. *Absolute prohibition of certain products.* This mainly depends upon the government policies of the importing countries e.g. US Government has completely banned the import of opium. This type of barriers are not quite common and are equal for every country.

2. *Health and Sanitary Regulations:* These are the prohibitions due to mainly disease oriented environmental pollution and ecological developmental aspects. Some of the importing countries put this prohibition on the health and sanitary grounds as these would determine the development of foreign trade of both polluting products and those resulting from pollutive processes. In this agricultural products including those of vegetable origin are likely to suffer most e.g. fruits and vegetables, textiles, coir, dairy products and so on. For example, prune import in the US was stopped by US Food and Drugs Administration. Some other items are fish, fruits, vegetables and nuts. However, it has not so far been the practice to relate such restrictions directly to environmental reasons. Several of these have been resorted to for protecting their national industries.

3. *Use of Carriers Regulation:* Some of the countries put in this regulation which in a way reduces the cost of imported goods. They put in a condition that the imported goods will have to be sent through their own carriers. Obviously the exporting country has to bear the expenses of transport according to the rates of the customer country. This in turn reduces the transfer of their currency to the exporting country and so the exporting country gets lesser amount of foreign (exchange) currency.

4. *Packaging and Labelling Requirements:* This factor will arise out of environmental consideration. Different types of requirements in respect of materials are specified for packing [depending on the contents and the range of packing by countries. The trade problems may be due to—

- (a) the technical requirements for labelling and packaging, and

- (b) the labelling and packaging instructions because the technology, on which the export products of the developing countries is based, is different from that used in importing country—and no allowances are made for such technology lag.

Thus there is a need for international harmonization in all these fields, which may become directly relevant to ecological or environmental markets.

5. *Customs Matters* : This presents valuation systems adopted by certain countries. These have caused difficulties and should be removed. A harmonization of customs valuation procedures is very important e.g. the prevalent system of valuation for customs purposes include :

- (a) Specific values fixed without reference to imported prices.
- (b) Prices prevalent in importing countries e.g. in the USA imports of a range of chemicals are assessed on the basis of American Selling Prices (ASP).

Although efforts are being made that chemicals from other countries may break the monopoly (through Kennedy Round Negotiations and Multi-lateral Trade Negotiations (MTN's). If the ASP continues the custom duties on the imported chemicals would be prohibitively high since the cost of chemicals produced in USA, on which ASP is calculated, would have increased significantly due to the principle enunciated by EPA that "Polluter Pays". There are other systems of valuations on imports of iron and steel, textiles, which would have a similar effect.

6. *Preferential Trade Barriers* : The burning example is the preferential trades among the countries of EEC and EFTA. Such countries as a rule give preference to these countries in trade irrespective of the price of the goods. This preferential trade barrier figured almost every time in the UNCTAD meetings. Some of these countries as a result of discussions during the meetings have, to some extent, reduced slightly this preferential trade but not eliminated it. This is a point which still needs attention specially

from the developing countries trade point of view.

7. *Laws*: This is a very important factor which causes barriers in the trades. These laws could be in terms of standards, specifications, or in terms of environmental laws. the latter being very important in the trades from the developing countries. This in fact has now become a very specific question for study after the UN Human Environment Conference in 1972. This aspect later on was discussed in a number of meetings of Trade & Development Board's Committee on Manufactures (of UNCTAD).

These meetings raised the question arising out of the recommendations (103-106) of the Stockholm Conference (1972) relating to the impact of the emerging environmental policies of developed countries on the export possibilities for manufactures and semi-manufactures of the developing countries.

The recommendation of Stockholm Conference was that international bodies like GATT, UNCTAD should monitor and asses the emergence of Tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade as a result of environmental policies, identification of major threats to export specially those of LDC's and their character and severity and remedial actions that may be taken. In addition, it asked the member Governments to ensure that their countries do not invoke environmental concerns as a pretext for discriminatory trade policies or for reduced access to market.

The application of standards of different countries create difficulties for the developing countries in exporting their goods. The main problem is that the specifications vary from country to country. In addition, there are a number of other problems like prescription of standards based on manufacturing proceses followed in the importing country. This creates losses to the exporting LDC due to economies of scale or voluntary standards becoming mandatory in various countries regarding the quality and for protection of consumer interest or the regional arrangement with an element of discrimination against outside countries and so on.

With the increase in the exports of manufactured goods in

place of primary raw materials from the developing to developed countries, the barriers arising from standards specifications followed in other countries will soon begin to be felt in the trade in India also.

A sub-group on Technical Barriers to Trade under the MTN (under UNCTAD) is engaged in the formulation of a Code of Conduct on standards. This code also includes the provision of technical assistance to developing countries and the establishment of focal points for providing answers to all the reasonable queries of a technical nature.

The standards should be arrived at after mutual consultations with the developing countries through the appropriate agencies of international organisations.

A good monitoring system is necessary for ensuring that the pollution standards are not made use of as a mechanism which works against exports from developing countries.

New barriers which seem to be in the offing and are still to be identified, are likely to be imposed or have been imposed or introduced by some developed countries are measures which might increase cost of production as a result of implementing environmental measures.

According to the latest regulations of GATT, the developed countries have taken on new commitments to accord high priority to the reduction or elimination of barriers to the products of interest to developing countries. Still no solutions seem to have been actually implemented in this regard.

In the sphere of removal of trade barriers specially erected for environmental and other reasons, the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) has not been able to establish a special group for identifying such problems and seeking solutions to them.

The group on Tariffs has identified the high tariff rates which are already prevalent on the items of export interest to developing

countries such as India e.g. peak tariffs on India's traditional export items such as cotton textiles, jute manufactures, coir products, carpets, etc.

The group on Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB's) has identified a number of barriers. Work is still going on in the GATT and UNCTAD in preparing and updating an exhaustive inventory of such NTB's.

About 28% of the imports of the developed market economy countries were subjected to NTB's in 1968 whereas the share of developing countries in the imports of manufactured, semi-manufactured items of developed countries was 16.5% but their share of imports subject to NTB's was 21% the same years.

A study by the International Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT) on the NTB's in Japan & EEC's with reference to some of the Indian commodities (tea, coffee, tobacco, spices, cashew, kernel, coir and coir products, leather and leather products and cotton textiles) chosen for study are subject to one or more NTB's in these countries.

Table I

<i>Non-Tariff Barriers</i>	<i>Items</i>
(i) Packing and labelling requirements.	(i) fish (ii) prepared fruits/nuts and fruit juices (iii) certain textile items such as garments, handkerchiefs, ties and clothings.
(ii) Health and sanitary regulations.	fish, fruits, vegetables and nuts, fresh prepared or preserved.
(iii) Voluntary export restraints.	Cotton textiles, jute fabrics, leather and leather manufactures, coir products.

- (iv) Customs valuation and other procedures.
 - (i) Chemicals, dyes, drugs and medicines, rubber products.
 - (ii) Electrical apparatus and instruments.
- (v) Quantitative restrictions.
 - (i) Fruits, vegetables, vegetable oils and other allied products.
 - (ii) Cotton textiles ;
 - (iii) Jute manufactures ;
 - (iv) Coir manufactures ;
 - (v) Unmanufactured tobacco ; and
 - (vi) Footwear.

Zambia (8° to 18° S ; 22° 40' to 33° 40' E), a land-locked country in South-Central Africa, supports a population of 4,056,895 (Census—1969) within an area of 753,000 km². (i.e. 5.46 persons to the km².). This country, came at the end of 19th-century under the European Colonization and the so-called modernisation under the connotation of the imperial powers was experienced late in this part of Central Africa, which achieved independence in 1964. Railway line with Copperbelt makes a unique feature of corridor development as north-south axis in the middle of the study area. This development has successfully drawn economic contours affecting large number of urban and rural settlements. The present administration of 'One Party Participatory Democracy' has 8 provinces, 53 districts, 273 chiefs' territories and 32,472 villages (Fig. 1). Only 22.4 per cent of the land is under permanent settlement while 40 per cent comes under the control of planning and extension services. Large areas are covered by water bodies, game parks and forest reserves while low-lying areas are infested by *tsetse flies* which discourage human settlements (Fig. 3). Further, the distribution of human settlements is also affected by the different tribal and colonial settling processes. This paper attempts to analyse such processes which ever affected the Zambian Settlements and the present study is divided under following heads : (A) *The Great Migration and Settling of Peoples* ; (B) *Tribal Settlement Organisation* ; (C) *Colonial Settlement Organisation* ; and (D) *Tribo-Colonial Settlement Organisation*.

The Great Migration and Settling of Peoples

Prior to the migration of 'Luba' and 'Lunda' from Zaire after 1500 A.D., a few pockets of Zambia were occupied by 'Pre-Bantu Societies' such as *Bathwa*, *Bushman* and *Pygmies* around the lakes, swamps and rivers and their culture is referred to as '*Nachikufu*

*Culture*¹. Their ancestry goes back to the late-stone age. The rock-shelters, remains of skulls and burials, bark-clothes, bows, arrows and spears provide evidence of these societies.

There is no record to trace the existence of centralised states or chieftainships before '*Luba-Lunda-Dispersal*' (Fig. 2). Perhaps the peoples of Zambia then lived in small independent villages with suitable local resources, but the kinship ties were much stronger than the tribes of later centralised states. After 1500 A.D., the migration and settling in Zambia can conveniently be divided into three phases : (i) 1500-1800 A.D., the period in which the migration from the north was significant ; (ii) 1850-1900 A.D., the period during which external threats were dominant ; and (iii) 1900-1964 A.D., when the European and Indian settlements emerged on the Zambian scene. The settling process in the area under study was evident with respect to (a) political organisation, (b) tribal administration, and (c) inter-territorial relationships, all indicating various stages of maturity of the settling process under 'tribo-territorial frame-work'.

(i) First Phase of Settlement : 1500-1850 A.D.

This phase records the great migration from the *Luba* and *Lunda* kingdoms (Fig. 2). There are stories of conflict in the royal families of these two Katangan principalities. Many scholars have indicated the then growing population and diminishing resources in those areas which forced peoples to diffuse². As a result, the 'hop-and jump' pattern of spreading to the areas where best resources were available and the centralised states patterns came into existence which seems to have been inherited from the place of origin, but they were modified according to local conditions. This ultimately formed the mosaic of chieftainships in Zambia and later Colonial Government firmly fixed their local boundaries. It appears from history that the chiefs were either of royal blood or prominent men and women or those who welded some authority as headmen.

'It is fairly clear that those Zambian tribes and chieftains who claim to come from '*Luba*' originated in different places and at different times'³. It is interesting to note that *Bemba*, *Lamba*, *Soli*,

these two branches, the *Ngonis* continued to raid and disturb neighbouring settlements. They assimilated peoples; created regiments; formed semi-autonomous villages and forced the weaker tribes to accept their overlordship and to pay tributes.

The story of the slave trade reveals that the Portuguese and *Swahili* peoples of East African origin together with their allies were closely linked. They were responsible for depopulation; knowingly weakening kingdoms such as *Kazembe (Lunda)*; and unknowingly causing kingdoms such as *Bemba* to flourish. They were probably the first to comprehensively explore the natural and human resources of Zambia and were the main agents to develop the commerce of the slave trade. For their interest *Swahilis* did not hesitate to create tribal wars and supplied guns and gunpowder to the chiefs, and finally settled in *Ndola Rural District* and in Northern Zambia. The names of their allies such as *Chikundu*, *Yeke* and *Mambari* occur repeatedly in the settlement history of pre-colonial Zambia.

The study of one of the *Swahili Reserves* in *Ndola Rural District* registers the nature of colonization of this period. Earlier settlements of *Swahilis* were at the present site of the National Monument in *Ndola City* but were later pushed eastwards near the Zaire border (Fig. 2). The *Swahili* villages are in the north of this *Reserve* and can be identified by their Arabic names. The chief's headquarters shifted to the present site in 1931. Prior to 1945 only northern area was under settlement and after releasing more land to the *Swahili Chief*, his *Reserve* was expanded to the present extent. However, in 1964, the Chief was promoted to 'Senior Chief' and no further villages were created. Some of the old villages of the northern densely settled area shifted to the newly southern expanded part of the *Reserve* but the village organisation remained the same. This *Reserve*, apart from *Swahilis*, consists of *Lamba*, *Lala* and *Swaka* villages. *Swahilis* are Muslims but there is a considerable number of Christians within this territorial unit, even in the chief's headquarters. Since five generations they are settled in Zambia but unfortunately they are still regarded as foreign elements.¹³

(iii) Third Phase of Settlement : 1900-1964 A.D.

Europeans were also attracted by the mineral and natural

resources of Zambia. *Lochner*, an European representative of *Cecil Rhodes*, was first to get the concession for minerals in 1890 A.D. which sowed the seed of Colonial (European) settlements in Zambia. Though the European colonization originated from *Barotseland*, settlement started from *Chipata* (formerly *Fort Jameson*), *Livingstone* and *Mbala* (formerly *Abercorn*).

Europeans, as in Kenya, settled on the highlands—free from tropical diseases. The area lying both sides of the railway line upto *Copperbelt* became a zone for European settlement. Farms and towns developed along it which continued to attract European population including Afrikaaners and Boers. Their large commercial farms are still responsible for racial distribution of population and scarcity of land in this favoured zone. Roads, postal and telegraphic services were extended to it which developed as an well integrated settlement system on the tribal landscape. The administrative posts, known as *Bomas*, and missions which sprinkled throughout the territory connected themselves to this settlement system making a corridor in the erstwhile Northern Rhodesia.

This corridor not only attracted Europeans but also the Africans. Money-economy and urbanism induced them while hut-tax compelled to seek employment at the railway line and this human drift also became a part of labour circulation in Sub-Saharan Africa. The European migrants had tendencies for settling and holding land, thereby making maximum profit out of the situation, while the African migrants were temporal with economic targets and reciprocated the financial duties to their original homes. Land was still considered to be the security and every urban African maintained it in the village of their origin. This ultimately developed chains of migrants and a new urban based social system spread over the territory. However, money-economy and local source of employments were limited to Indian enterprises in rural areas.

Indian community in Zambia probably owes its presence to historical accident. Whenever the British Government needed soldiers, railway workers, estate workers, traders or clerks, cheap skilled Indians were brought in. It was felt by the British Govern-

ment that to import European labour be expensive and Africans then were not sufficiently skilled for their purpose. The first migration of Indians took place in 1904 in *Fort Jameson* and with the Europeans, they settled in *Livingstone* (1905). From there they diffused into Zambia, excepting *Western Province (Barotseland)*. They settled in big towns and also made shops in the remote rural areas to serve the African population.¹⁴ The bush culture of the retail business still prevailing in the big towns has grown out of this.¹⁵

These migrations which colonized Zambia, brought into two types of settlement organisations. The Africans were permitted to organise the settlements through their social agencies and tribal customs while the Europeans and their settlements organised themselves maintaining little relations with the tribal settlement organisations. Such organisations also developed into hierarchical arrangements of tribal and colonial settlements in the pre-Independent Zambia.

Tribal Settlement Organisation

In Zambia, the traditional village system, as in most part of Africa, was influenced by a particular clan or tribe, which took over a certain territory (mostly nebulous) out of seven major tribal regions and emerged as the power elite which then had clean domination over a chief's area.¹⁶ Zambian society was never segregated in social classes though 'tribute labour' existed, rather it developed a social homogeneity in a tribal area which had in the past naturalized foreign elements through marriage. The ruling tribe or clan was the only corporate political group in the territory and others were non-significant. The dominant tribe or the chief's tribe dominated the political authority over the tribal area and the settlements falling within it. In most cases members of the royal clans were made the headmen of the village.¹⁷

In the process of settling in Zambia, most probably on virgin lands, the clans had their separate territories or areas, but later, owing to the increasing pressure of population on land and limited natural resources, they were forced to diffuse. Meanwhile the terri-

tories of the weaker tribes shrunk and intermixture of population took place. This ultimately resulted in the fading away of the territorial character of the clans.

The territorial, political, administrative and social set up of the tribal settlements are arranged through (a) Paramount Chiefs, (b) Senior Chiefs, and (c) Chiefs. These traditional rulers still hold the land and exercise political authority over it, though they may not always be treated as the 'lords of land'. *Lewanika*, the kingship of *Barotseland*, had a different pattern of administration through appointed officials, while the political control over people, land and settlements was approximately the same. The nature of such tribal authorities in political, social and administrative set up of Zambia has largely been retained even after the independence.

Moreover, Zambia consists of varied geo-political orders. It varies from acephalous societies such as *Tonga*, *Futwe* or *Luvale* to highly politically organised societies such as *Lozis* or *Bembas*. The manipulations of the chiefs' prestige directly depends on the size of the capital, the dimensions of the area ruled and the number of people under them, the latter being the most important factor. 'Africa as a whole, consists of centralised political organisations of the Lozi or Bemba types or inter-lacustrine examples which are deviation from the norm. The models we should have of the norm of indigenous political organisation are non-centralised systems such as we find in Northern Rhodesia among the *Plateau Tonga* and the *Luvale*.¹⁸

The fugitive kingdoms have always recognised their superiors and paid tributes in the form of moral and military support. The tribute paid were not only the political necessity but a sign of respect. The demonstration of political power depends on (a) such tribute collection, (b) receiving tribute labour, and (c) raiding the territories. The traditional-tribal hierarchy of settlements could clearly be seen by the flow of tributes. This created a traditional arrangements in the organisation of settlements. Such hierarchy of settlements contributed to essentially organising the area of a tribal region. Further, the 'subject tribes' also attached themselves to this arrangements and hence developed a number of traditional hierarchical arrangements of settlements of the past and even in present-day Zambia.

Though the polity varied from highly centralised administration to indirect rule, yet at village level the headman, who might be head of an extended family system or a man or woman highly placed in society, was recognised throughout Zambia. Zambian history clearly reveals that the external agencies connected with the trade of slave or ivory or cattle had little to do with the holding of land. Whenever the village shifted or diffused there was no change in the village administration of headman who continued to hold their rights over land. Any change in the polity at the top hardly affected the village administration or constitution and the village always remained as a basic unit.

The Europeans were largely responsible for developing the present territorial structure. Tribal wars were common and vague boundaries were put in a state of coma which still persist¹⁹. It should be noted that indirect rule in Africa, as in India, was an easy apparatus for foreign administration though the people were against it. After independence the whole framework was dissolved in India, whilst in the African countries the system was neutralized. The chiefs of Zambia were the backbones of African Local Government which looked after tribal affairs and the administration of rural areas, although the nature of the local governments were different to that of other African countries under the Crown²⁰.

Colonial Settlement Organisation

The Europeans introduced a settlement system that was divorced from the pre-colonial pattern. It was entirely based on a new system of money-economy and exploitation of natural wealth of the area. Both, the tribal and colonial patterns existed side by side with a clear difference in shape, size and growth of settlements which demonstrated apartheid policy of landuse, economic activity and population distribution. The vital problem of Zambia is to interweave the contrasting tribal and colonial settlements. There is no denying that the Europeans wanted to maintain Northern Rhodesia as a white-man's country and indeed they were successful in creating a 'little England' in the mining areas.²¹

In 1924, the British Colonial Office took administrative control from the British South African Company (BSAC) and the North Charterland Exploration Company (NECE), with the exception of *Barotseland*. The country was divided into two types of land: (a) *Crown Land*—for European settlements; and (b) *Reserves*—for Native settlements²². The small number of European settlers got over sixty per cent of land. In early forties, it was felt that the *Reserves* were getting overpopulated and in 1947 a new category of land was carved out of the *Crown Land* which was granted to the Natives. This was the *Native Trust Land* which also came under the African customary laws and not for further expatriate development unless it was in the interest of all the races²³. This reduced the area of the *Crown Land* to about eight per cent only along the railway line and around *Mbala* and *Chipata*. 'In practice European settlement was virtually excluded from *Native Trust Land*'²⁴. *Barotseland* remained a protectorate under the Crown and its land was not divided (Fig. 3, inset).

It was recommended that NCEC be declared the *Sasare Mining Area* along with the other four European settlement areas as *Crown Land*. Out of 10,000 sq. miles only 140,326 acres remained under *Crown Land*, 3,631,489 acres under *Native Trust Land*, 2,218,240 acres under *Native Reserves* and 409,945 acres as alienated land²⁵. Thus the *Native Reserves* amounted to 19.2 per cent, *Native Trust Land* to 56.3 per cent and *Crown Land* to 7.7 per cent of Zambia's total area²⁶. These different types of areas enhanced different settlement patterns which are still conspicuous over Zambian landscape.

The *Crown Land* was strictly for Europeans while Indians were allowed in some specific *ghetto* type areas or behind the shops in so called '*second class trading areas*'. The Africans in these areas were either labourers or houseboys, or employed in business or offices. The towns were segregated in racial classes of Europeans, Africans and Indians. The physical spacing and structure of the houses clearly showed the racial pattern of the towns. The oldest towns, *Fort Jameson (Chipata)* in 1902 and *Livingstone* in 1905, were planned keeping in view of the needs of the European population

only and based on early English town-plans *i.e.* the grid-iron pattern. The industries, business and other tertiary and administrative activities concentrated in these areas which encouraged and accelerated the development of the *Crown Lands*. A parallel pattern of urban-industrial and sophisticated settlements developed along with the so called '*rural ghetto*'²⁷ and presented a very pathetic picture, though the Europeans always claimed that the African interests were safeguarded. There was virtually no development in the *Reserves* except for a few missions their schools and clinics which were of course with a different motive and the government was least concerned with it. Apart from this, the colonial policies were imposed in foreign soil which created distress in the *Reserves*. The hut-tax was largely responsible for sprinkled and diffused settlements in Zambia. In remote areas, the hidden villages were also due to fear of the hut-tax and slave trade.

However, the cities, towns missions and European farms were added to the settlement pattern during the colonial period. Although most of the urban settlements evolved in the beginning of the twentieth century, they could only attain form and develop economy in the thirties. These settlements even developed a par-excellence position in the tribal network of settlements. Of the larger towns, with the exception of Ndola and Kafue, all are sited alongside the mines. Towns, such as *Lusaka*, *Livingstone* and *Chipata* developed due to their geographical position as service centres. Including the mining towns there are number of abandoned towns and rural district headquarters, which existed around 1900 A.D. Such settlements have a long history of debacle, rejuvenation and redevelopment. These settlements sowed the seeds of the first urban settlement in Zambia (Fig. 1).

Tribo-Colonial Settlement Pattern

Along with the introduction of money-economy, labour migration and extension of trade and administration to the rural areas the tribal and colonial patterns were forced to integrate and compromise. With all the colonial policies for isolated development these patterns were induced by each other. The mission settlements in



the *Reserves* and shanty towns on the *Crown Lands* are examples of such integration. The former settlements, which are about two hundred in number, are the most naturalised form of settlements evolved during the colonial period. These settlements, such as *Mbershi* (*Luapula Province*) or *Sefula* (*Western Province*), run schools, rural health centres and hospitals and have become the nuclei for a number of native settlements. They have a future to become towns and service centres in the *Reserves* or *Native Trust Lands*.

The industries based on exploitation of natural resources also attracted settlements, however, they were temporal in nature. Greeks, who once settled on both sides of Lake Mweru, made settlements based on fish industry. Similar to the mining settlements, these settlements were also linked with the economics of production. The increasing significance of the railway line contributed to the settlements at the railway halts which were at regular interval. The towns like *Monze*, *Mazabuka* and *Lusaka* also developed due to the railway line.

The most significant settlements in the tribocolonial settlement pattern are the 'administrative posts' or 'forts'. English, Germans and Portugueses made their forts in Zambia. Such settlements, named as forts, do not have any fortified nucleus and resemble with ordinary administrative posts, commonly known as '*Bomas*' in Zambia. However, there is a long list of abandoned *bomas* which developed in the early twentieth century but were deserted in few years owing to (a) unsuitable location; (b) unhealthy condition; and (c) failing in competition with new settlements along the railway line or with more economically feasible points.

Such settlements do not make any geographical region or zone. They are distributed throughout the territory. Some of them have come under the control of town planning laws and they play a valuable role in integrating the two diverse settlement patterns inherited from the colonial period. Integration of the country, promotion of rural development and diffusion of innovation hinges on these settlements.

Foregleam

It is quite evident that legacies of the past cannot be diluted within a short span of post-Independence period. The Government efforts for raising standard of living in rural areas is attempting for the development of agricultural growth poles. *Intensive Development Zones* are created in different provinces for an integrated agricultural infrastructure. Other agricultural growth poles are inspired by the Land Use Services, Project Division, Tobacco Board and private organisations. To support such pockets of developments or for the intensification of the tribo-colonial pattern, co-operatives are established at every level and administration is tuned for rural development. The landmark in this connection is equating the councils of rural and urban areas. The *Rural Council* of a district is now organised through *Ward Development Committees* and *Village Productivity Committees*. This will lead to economically organised settlements which are at present more socially knitted. The attempts are made to remove the functional and natural hazards in successive *National Development Plans*. Large areas affected by *tsetse flies* are cleared every year. Electricity, roads, postal, health and educational services are extended deep into the rural areas. The whole system is to integrate the diverse settlement patterns. This will ultimately transform the present settlement pattern according to the Zambian national philosophy of *Humanism* and *Co-operative Development*. There lie great potentialities in Zambia for a much closer rural settlement fabric and sound economic progress than what exist today.²⁸ However, stipulation is necessary at every step while the goals hinge on how rational, effective and timely efforts are made for the transformation of the Zambian settlements.

FOOTNOTES

1. Clark, J. Desmond, "A Note on the Pre-Bantu Inhabitant of Northern Rhodesia", *The Northern Rhodesia Journal*, No. 11, 1950, pp. 42-52. Also see "The Stone Age Cultures of Northern Rhodesia", *South African Archeological Society*, Cape Town, 1950, p. 10.

2. Langworthy, T.C., *'Zambia Before 1890'*, Longmans, London, 1972, p. 21.

3. Roberts, Andrew, "The Age of Tradition", in Fagan, B.M. (Ed.), *'A Short History of Zambia'*, Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 21.

4. *Ibid*, p. 25.
5. Langworthy, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
6. *Ibid*, p. 95.
7. Mainga, Mutumba, '*Bulozi Under the Luyana Kings*', Longmans, 1973, p. 7.
8. *Ibid*, pp. 15-21.
9. Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
10. Mainga, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
11. After the death of *Ngoni* leader *Zwengendaba*, the succession dispute started and the *Ngonis* were divided in two hiers: (1) *Mpenzi* and (2) *Mbelwa*. Latter section, the winner one, settled in *Mbala* district about 1850 and they also settled in Northern Malawi. *Mpenzi*, after staying for sometime in Tanzania, finally settled in *Chipata* district.
12. Langworthy, *op. cit.*, p. 92.
13. Muhone, Bill, "What's in a Name? A Lot Says Chiwala", *Zambia Daily Mail*, 28.2.1974.
14. Vyas, C.L., '*I Have a Point*', The United African Press Ltd., Nairobi, 1971, pp. 88-95 and Rodney, Walter, '*How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*', Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, London and Tanzania Publishing House, Dar-es-Salaam, 1972, p. 109.
15. One could see houses of Indian architecture in remote Zambia. These houses have shops in the front and courtyards at the back. Idols of Gandhi and calanders of Indian film stars could also be seen in rural areas.
16. The seven major tribes are *Nyanja*, *Bemba*, *Lozi*, *Tonga*, *Luanda*, *Luvale*, and *Kaonde*. It may be noted here that philologists have used the word '*Bantu*' to describe these linguistic groups, inhabiting Africa with common characteristics, though the *Bantus* in West Africa and various linguistic groups of Zambia are different. The term *Bantu* is imposed on Africans to denote a social group especially by Afrikaaners. Therefore to denote a social group in Zambia the phrase '*Bantu-speaking*' is more appropriate. It is believed that the Bantu-language originated in the border area of Nigeria and Cameroons in West Africa and during the last 2,000 years it has diffused to cover one-third of Africa.
17. Watson, W., '*Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy*', Manchester University Press, 1971, pp. 18-19. *Kalolo* also instituted one *Makalolo* family in each village of the *Lozi* country (*Bulozi*). *Vide* Fagan, B.M. (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 126-7.
18. Apthorpe, R. (Ed.). '*From Tribal Rule to Modern Government*', Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, Lusaka, 1966, p. VII.
19. For example in *Mwinilunga* district (in 1930) of *Ndembu* people, 'formerly the sub-chiefdoms seemed to have quite firmly established, but today

the political boundaries have been greatly altered and in the interest of centralised recognition has been withdrawn from "redundant" chiefs and several areas have been amalgamated', *Vide* Turner, V. W., '*Schism and Continuity in an African Society*', Manchester University Press, 1972, p. 12. Conversely in Mbala district of Mambwe peoples Watson records, 'There are sixteen traditional chieftancies, thirteen of whom have chiefs of the royal clan, but the British recognized only three chiefs, all of them royal', *Vide* Watson, W., *op. cit.*, p. 18.

20. Apthorpe, *op. cit.*, p. v.

21. Kay, G., '*A Social Geography of Zambia*', London, 1967, p. 29. '*History About Zambia*', Zambia Information Service, No. 6, p. 6. Bradely, Kenneth, "Company Rule of the British South African Company", *The Northern Rhodesia Journal*, 1961, v. VI, pp. 446-453.

22. Kay, *op. cit.* p. 38.

23. Siddle, D. J., "Colonial Land Rights", in Davies, D.H. (Ed.), '*Zambia in Maps*', University of London Press, 1971, p. 48.

24. Kay, *op. cit.*, p. 39.


25. '*Statement by Northern Rhodesia Government on the Report by the Land Commission on the Area Acquired by Government from North Charterland Company*', Government Printers, Lusaka, 1944.


26. Recorded from Kay, G., "Land Apportionment in Northern Rhodesia", *The Northern Rhodesia Journal*, v. IV, 1959. p. 39. *Crown Land*—16, 270 sq. miles; *Native Reserves*—54,350 sq. miles; *Native Trust Land*—171,150 sq. miles; *Forest Reserves*—225,400 sq. miles; *Game Reserves*—9 per cent and *Barotseland Prot*—46,000 sq. miles. Ten per cent of the land was useless for agriculture and only 4.5 per cent of the *Crown Land* was alienated upto 1957. See also Kaunda, K.D., '*Take Up the Challenge.....*', Zambia Information Service, Lusaka, 1970, p. 47.


27. Siddle, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

28. Jauhari, A.S. and Nag, P., "Rural Development in an Under-populated Developing Country of Africa: Zambia" in Singh, R. L., and et. al. (Eds.), '*Geographic Dimensions of Rural Settlements*', National Geographical Society of India, Varanasi, 1976, p. 261.

ZAMBIA . MAJOR TRIBES







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India and Africa

(A QUARTERLY CHRONICLE

January-March 1977)

Indian Envoys in North Africa Meet

A conference of heads of Indian Missions in West Asia and North Africa opened in New Delhi on January 11. In the inaugural address the Prime Minister asked the diplomats to project the tremendous strides made by India in the economic and technical fields. It was necessary to do so as to correct the perspectives of the people abroad and project the image of India as a dynamic country moving forward. The conference of 21 envoys follows a similar conference of heads of missions in countries south of the Sahara held recently.

The Prime Minister said that India has shown that it is possible to reach a high level of development with the country's own efforts. Some countries were jealous of India's progress and of the fact that India has provided an alternative model to other countries. This had not been liked and it was, therefore, that there had been misrepresentation of India's position.

Underlining the importance that India attached to North Africa, the Prime Minister said that there should be a constant effort to improve this cordial relations. Besides the historic and geographic link, the economic relations are rapidly developing. It was important to project India's image as a country which has emerged as an industrial nation developing by its own efforts and in cooperation with other developing countries.

The Minister of External Affairs also spoke about the importance of North Africa in India's external relations. This meeting should help in future policy projections and in maintaining a dialogue with missions, he said. The heads of the Indian missions discussed

various international issues as well as domestic developments. (January 12, 1977)

India Calls for full UN Support for Botswana

Mr. Rikhi Jaipal, India's permanent representative, speaking to the Security Council on Botswana's complaint against stepped up border incursions by the racist regime, said that African States like Botswana which had border with hostile regimes must be given full support and assistance by the UN. Mr. Jaipal said that Botswana has an extremely vulnerable position as it was hemmed in on all sides by the forces of racism and white supremacy. "Botswana is virtually an oasis of legality surrounded by a vast hostile desert of illegality". He said, "it is more than a frontline state. It is in fact a state behind the enemy lines of racism. Its situation, as indeed of Lesotho, entitle them to special consideration from the UN and specially from the Security Council. There is no doubt that as the citadels and strong holds of racism come increasingly under attack, Botswana will be at the receiving end of further retaliations and reprisals and it is therefore the collective duty of the UN to bolster its economy and buttress its security."

Indian Representative characterised the attacks in Botswana as acts of aggression intended to harass and destabilize Botswana which had been obliged, on humanitarian grounds, to grant asylum to refugees fleeing from racial repression. As the UN stood against racism, it should protect the victims of racism and support those who granted asylum to refugees from racism. (January 14, 1977).

200-Mile Sea Zone Notified

India on January 15, notified a 200-mile exclusive economic zone into the seas from the coastline. India will have exclusive jurisdiction to exploit fishery resources, petroleum and natural gas, mineral chemicals and plants and set up off shore terminals and make other economic use of the zone. No person, including a foreign government, will explore or exploit the resources of the economic zone without obtaining a licence or letter of authority from

the Government of India. The measure is expected to help the government take measures against smuggling in the contiguous zone which extends into sea outside the territorial water upto a distance of 24 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of territorial water is measured.

The Government of India has established Coast Guards to guard the economic zone. (January 15, 1977)

Help to Algeria in Setting up Steel Plant

The Steel Authority of India on February 22 agreed to make available technical know-how and other assistance to Algeria for the setting up of a steel plant in that country. This decision was taken at a meeting in New Delhi between the president of the National Steel Society of Algeria Mr. S. Bentoblal and Mr R.P. Billimoria, the SAIL chairman.

Mr. Bentoblal specially sought the assistance of MECON to undertake feasibility studies and design of steel plant in Algeria. He evinced keen interest in the Indian offer of setting up a steel plant in Arab country, operate the plant for a specific period and also train its local personnel for operation. (February 22, 1977)

Drugs Knowhow for ARE

Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticels Limited and Arab Company for Drug Industries and Medical Appliances have signed a protocol in New Delhi on Feb. 8 by which India will provide technical assistance for manufacture of antibiotic, synthetic drugs, chemicals and drugs based on petro-chemicals and medical appliances. The Arab Company is a joint company with equity participation by 13 Arab governments. Under the agreement India will provide technical assistance for the establishment of a 240-tonne antibiotic plant.

Indian technical assistance may be required for manufacturing of synthetic drugs and basic pharmaceuticals in the Arab Countries and optimum utilization of existing production facilities of the Al-

Dr Vijay Gupta

Nasr Company of Egypt. Indian team will visit Cairo and examine the scope of manufacture of such chemicals and determine the extent to which petro-chemical-based intermediates and chemicals could be utilized in India.

Arab countries have also sought Indian assistance for production of medical appliance and surgical instruments. (Indian drugs worth Rs 450 million were being exported every year to a number of countries including advance ones, (February 9, 1977)

India and A.R.E. sign New Agreements

India and Egypt have agreed to set up joint working group to explore the possibilities of collaboration in science, humanities, engineering and technology.

The group will consist of professors and academicians of the two countries. The agreement was reached under an executive programme for 1977-79 signed in Cairo at the conclusion of the visit to Cairo by an Indian delegation led by Mr. B.N. Tandon, Additional Secretary, Department of Culture. The Egyptian delegation was led by Mr. Ali Shanbi El Hadidy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Under the agreed programme both sides will offer scholarships for post-graduate, post-doctoral and research studies. They will cooperate in rural social development including exchange of experts, literature and other material. (February 4, 1977)

Guinea School named after Mahatma Gandhi

The Revolutionary Educational Centre, Conakri, the capital of Guinea (West Africa) which is the oldest and biggest school in Conakri has been renamed after Mahatma Gandhi. In a letter to the Indian Ambassador in Conakri, the president of the Council of Administration of the School, which has over 1700 students on its rolls, has informed the Ambassador that the Council has been very happy to rename the school after Mahatma Gandhi whom he described as one of the greatest historic figures of our time and cham-

pion of the independence not only of India but also of the whole of Asia and Africa. (January 1, 1977)

Indo-Libyan Relations

The Indian Ambassodar to Libiya, Mr Homi Telyarkhan, has said that India will be ever glad to assist progressive developing countries like Libiya in a spirit of co-operation. Mr. Talyarkhan said that India was waging a war against want and was succeeding in it and at the same time supporting causes of the oppressed people in different parts of the world to gain their liberation. A non-aligned India believed in cooperation with all but dependence on none.

While praising the progress, since revolution, made by Libya in various fields like agriculture, industry and social services Mr. Talyarkhan said India always stood for goodwill and friendship for all and for peaceful solution to world problems so that nations could live in conditions of constructive coexistence instead of confrontation. (February 27, 1977).

Mauritius Lauds India for Helping 3rd World

Prime Minister Seewoosagur Ramgoolam lauded India's role in assisting the 3rd world countries in their economic development and strengthening the forces of freedom.

He was speaking at a largely attended function organized in his constituency Triolet to felicitate him on his recent victory in the general elections. India is a great democracy he said and expressed the hope that it would make further progress in all spheres. (January 14, 1977).

India Pledges \$10,000 for Liberation Conference

India has pledged financial assistance to meet the cost of convening an international conference in support of the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, struggling for independence from the diehard minority racist regimes at Salisbury and Pretoria.

In line with her traditional policy of supporting freedom movements in Africa, India has pledged 10,000 dollars. The Mozam-

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bique Liberation Conference venue was suggested by African Liberation movements. It is their desire that it should be held in a front line African state. (February 3, 1977).

India Leads Team Against Namibia Exploitation

A three-nation mission headed by India is being sent by the UN Council for Namibia to Ottawa to seek the cooperation of the Canadian authorities to persuade the Canadian Companies operating in Namibia not to be parties to the economic exploitation of Namibia. It is reported that several concerns have developed a vested interest in perpetuating South African hold over Namibia and are extending financial and political support to the racist Pretoria regime.

The other member of the delegation are from Botswana and Mexico. (February 18, 1977).

Indian and Nigerian Shipping Companies Sign Agreement

The Government of India has permitted Scindia Steam Navigation Company to have a tie-up with Nigerian Shipping Company—Equitorial Carriers LTD. Scindia's shares in the new venture will be 40 per cent to be contributed partly in cash and partly by the sale of a ship. Sixty per cent share will be held by the Nigerian firm. (January 20, 1977).

Indian Consultancy Services for Nigeria

The Metallurgical and Engineering consultant of India (MECON) has won a Nigerian contract for rendering consultancy and monitoring services for setting up two direct reduction-based integrated steel plants in that country. The plants will have a one-million tonne capacity each. (February 1, 1977)

Loan from Indian Bank to Tanzania

The Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) has sanctioned a loan of rupees twenty million to Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO) of Tanzania to import from India machinery and equipment to set up a number of small scale industries

there. The credit agreement for loan was signed in Bombay on January 13 by IDBI Chairman, Raghranj Bhalla and SIDO Director General, B.P. Mramba.

A significant feature of the arrangement is that the beneficiaries on both sides, India and Tanzania, will be the small scale industries. SIDO has already entered into a contract with the National Small Scale Industries Corporation of India for purchase of the required machinery and equipment for plants to manufacture items like Khandsari sugar, man-made paper, vegetable oils, bolts and nuts, screw and rivets, bicycle parts and components, buttons, porcelain insulators and stationery items.

The IDBI has already provided an export credit of rupees 48 million to the Projects and Equipment Corporation of India to finance the export of railway rolling stock to Tanzania. India has also sanctioned a credit of rupees fifty million directly to the Sugar Development Corporation of Tanzania for a new sugar project.

So far IDBI has granted credits totalling 1930 million rupees to more than 40 countries which had enabled India to book export orders of engineering goods worth 3600 million rupees. (January 13, 1977).

Indo-Tanzanian Joint Shipping Company Planned

Tanzania and the Shipping Corporation of India (SCI) are planning to form a joint shipping company in public sector with a total paid-up capital of about one million dollars. The paid-up capital may be on 50 : 50 basis or 51 : 49 basis to enable Tanzania to hold majority share.

The new company when it comes into being would start functioning with the help of only one ship which the SCI would sell at the market price. The Ship Desh Deep, a product carrier built in 1959 of 12,170 tonnes (8,93 GRT) will be altered to carry cattle from Tanzania to West Asian Gulf ports.

Most of the developing countries are becoming increasingly aware that India had developed sufficient competence and expertise

in shipping and it is profitable to have joint collaboration ventures with Indian Shipping. (February 4, 1977)

Uganda seeks Aid to Set up Industries

Indian Minister for Industry on his return from a visit to Uganda told Indian press that Uganda had asked for India's assistance in setting up industries. He said Uganda was convinced that India's expertise and know-how was particularly relevant for its development. It had sought Indian help for industries like mini-pulp and paper plants, engineering work-shops, the manufacture of spirit from molasses and the production of fan belts and V-belts. The two countries had detailed discussions on the promotion and development of Uganda's small-scale and medium scale industries and the rehabilitation and modernization of old sugar mills and textile plants in the country.

Uganda formally sought Indian help in establishing four estates for small-scale industries. (January 1, 1977)

Amin Congratulates Morarji Desai

Ugandan President. Field Marshal Amin sent a message of congratulations to the Prime Minister, Mr. Morarji Desai saying that he was sure that under the wise and dynamic leadership of Mr Desai "India will continue to contribute very effectively towards world peace, international cooperation and understanding." President Amin hoped that his government would maintain the policy of ensuring that Indian Ocean which was the link between Africa and Asia, was kept a sea of peace.

He stated that his intention was to work for strengthening already existing excellent relations and cooperation between his country and India. (March 30, 1977)

India Asks UN to Act on Zimbabwe

Indian representative Mr. Rikhi Jaipal speaking at the UN Security Council said that all the acts of the Smith regime were illegal. Under its very existence and the manner in which it came into being

was itself an act of aggression against the people of Southern Rhodesia if not against the UK. Mr Jaipal said in Indian opinion the council should condemn the Smith regime's acts and demand respect for the territorial integrity. He pledged the support of India to any action designed to liquidate the illegality that prevails in Southern Rhodesia and to provide the assistance needed by Botswana to repel the attacks of the illegal Smith regime. He asked the UN Council to act quickly to ensure early end of the Rhodesia African's suffering. (January 15, 1977)

Book Reviews

Helge Kjekshus, The Elected Elite : A Socio-Economic Profile of Candidates in Tanzania's Parliamentary Election, 1970, Research Report No. 29, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1975, pp. 40.

Tanzania, under the dynamic leadership of President Julius Nyerere, has committed itself to socialism. President Nyerere, in his numerous writings, has spelled out in clearest terms his concept of socialism which, in his view, may be best suited to the interests of Tanzania. Socialism or, for that matter, any 'ism cannot be brought about in any country simply by the efforts of one man who happens to be at the helm of affairs or even by the select group of politicians who frame and lay down the contours of a policy for their country. The policy, as laid down by them, is a mere scrap of paper or merely a cherished goal till it is implemented in the true spirit. The stage of implementation of a policy is probably more impor-

tant than the stage of laying down a policy. During this implementation stage three categories of elites play important role—the legislators, the bureaucrats and the party men of all cardes down to the grassroot level, since every policy ultimately passes through these three hands. If these persons are not themselves wholeheartedly committed to, and prepared for, socialism, there is every possibility that a given policy, after it is implemented; might lose its original shape and become the very negation of the original policy. The legislators who make laws to give effect to socialistic ideals, the bureaucrats who apply those laws and the party cadres who ensure the involvement of masses and carry the message of socialism to every nook and

corner of the country—all of them, in case they are, not committed people, may make serious deviations from the original policy and thereby defeat the intentions of the policy-makers. Therefore, the attitude of various groups of elites through whose hands the policy has to pass for implementation is a material factor. It must be treated as part of the whole system. A study of these elites would, therefore, reveal how far they are equipped to bring about the *'ism* to which the country has committed itself.

Unfortunately Helge Kjeskhus, in his study under review, draws up the socio-economic profile only of candidates in Tanzania's parliamentary election held in 1970. He focusses his attention on the recruiting field and background characteristics of a specific section of the state elite in Tanzania, namely, the Members of Parliament and concerns himself primarily with showing socio-economic relationships through the data on the recruitment process. It would have been far more useful if he had broadened the

scope of his research and included within its scope other important groups of elites also, namely, the partymen and bureaucrats for the reasons mentioned in the foregoing para.

As it is, the study aims at discovering the differences in the socio-economic characteristics of the self-selected candidates who believed that they were qualified by merit, status or otherwise to become accepted as constituency representatives on the one hand, and those of the nominees of the National Executive Committee (NEC) of TANU and of elected M.P.'s on the other. From these differences the author goes on to discover the recruitment pattern, the values operating in the selection process and the requirements for political leadership. The author, in addition, tries to discover relationship between background variables and elite attitudes in Tanzania, particularly with reference to socialism.

Although limited in scope, the study brings out certain interesting revelations. For

example, the author finds that the candidates and the elected M.P.'s differ from the general public whom they represent in respect of their general characteristics particularly in respect of their educational attainments and their salaried employment. Of great importance is the finding that nearly all of the candidates in the sample taken had had their school education prior to the educational revolution of 1967 which means that they had already imbibed the values of the petty-bourgeois class. But the author simply guesses that the evil influence of the rejected school system might even have been super-imposed by a counter-ideology like socialism as a result of adult education classes, national service and political seminars. However, he did not probe this matter deeper and evidently made no effort to discover whether or not the candidates or elected M.P.'s has indeed undergone brainwashing.

In the economic sphere also the author comes to the conclusion that there is economic inequality between the

electors and the elect, which is bound to be reflected in the views of the people's representatives. It goes without saying that such people, as the author himself admits, are not likely to favour the masses. Thus, if the work of building socialism rests in Tanzania in the hands of the educated and economically prosperous class, socialism there may remain a far cry for a long time to come.

On the whole, the data presented by the author is of great use for the students of behavioural politics but in order to draw full benefit from his labours, research scholars will have to make similar background studies of other members of the State and Party elites in appointed or elected positions. If and when a comprehensive study is carried out of the remaining two categories of strategic elites also, the data accumulated by the author can be put to better use. In any case, the efforts of the author, in the limited field that he worked, are really commendable.

S. C. SAXENA

Martin Igbozurike. A Review of "Problem-Generating Structures in Nigeria's Rural Development". Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala.

The book under review is a story of an economy which although has been emancipated from the colonial rule of one of the Western powers still wants to follow the Western way of development. It wants to test the fact that underdevelopment is not the original state of poor nations but a "product of structural dependence incorporated into the capitalist system". The author has analysed the rural underdevelopment of Nigeria in the context of the history of colonial rule and the forces released through the contemporary world economic system and class structures. This book conveys a message applicable to any underdeveloped economy that development "is a process of socio-economic and political transformation of problem generating structures in such a way that the masses are meaningful participants in, as well as sharers of, its costs and benefits".

The hypothesis that rural economy can develop by com-

mercialising the agriculture sector has been tested through the responses received in a sample survey from five categories of agricultural population, viz., pure peasant, subsistence-cum-cash crop farmers, peasants in trade, cash crop farmers in trade and pure cash-crop farmers. In the statistical computation the problems generated by the economic structures, which are inherent in the modes of production and distribution and conditioned by the farmers' material possessions, have been taken as dependent variable for testing the hypothesis. The economic structures enveloping the Nigerian farmers have been incorporated as independent variables. The different aspects of problem awareness, problem-articulation and problem-solving actions of farmers have been analysed in relation to the degree of commercialisation. The finding of this empirical enquiry has brought home the fact that foreign-market-oriented-commercialisation of agriculture is not a way to

the progress of a nation. The more commercialised the farming, the greater the benefit which goes to somewhat better situated farmers, whereas the poor farmers lag behind. Naturally, therefore, the socio-economic status of farmers has a large influence on the effects of agricultural commercialisation by increasing the gap between the haves and the have-nots.

The methodology used in this book is systematic in the sense that it has taken historical facts in the background which have created dichotomy between urban and rural sectors of Nigerian economy and has exposed the fallacy of quick growth by modernisation. The statistical technique is of immense value to those interested

in quantum analysis. However, it would have been more appropriate for an understanding of underdevelopment of Nigeria if the agricultural sector were set in relation to other sectors of the national economy and if the different size categories of Nigerian rural population were analysed, even briefly, somewhere in the book. On the whole, the book provides a truer insight into the nature of paradox of plenty and poverty in an under-developed economy. It is true, therefore, that an "attempt to make our farmers into what we know to be a farmer in the industrialised West is to court socio-economic and political disaster, which the Third World and Africa in particular cannot afford."

Ishwari Prasad

Per Christian Endsjö, Natural Resource Projects for Economic Development: Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1974, pp. 245, tables 22, illustrations 7, Bibliography.

The work under review is an attempt towards the analysis of forest investments in Nigeria. The author himself spells out the objective of the study in the introduction as "to examine the present strategy for primary forest invest-

ments in Nigeria in the context of the established development objective of the country". A part of Africa has been traditionally famous for its forest wealth and 'the exploitation of natural resources has a long history' in this continent. It

resulted in a considerable growth in economy but this growth may not necessarily be forging a structural change in the economy. The study has been divided into seven chapters.

Chapter I introduces the Nigerian forestry and industries based on forests and examines its role in the context of the total economy of Nigeria. About 10 per cent of the total area of Nigeria is under forest reserves which is economically significant. The direct contribution of forestry sector to gross domestic product has been 4 to 5 per cent. The contribution is likely to increase with the addition of one more plywood plant to the three already existing plants by the mid-seventies.

In the second Chapter, the author has attempted to focus on the national objectives and goals, towards the achievement of which the national efforts are directed. Nigeria, like most of the developing countries, witnessed the widening of the gaps between rich and poor and the disparities have been accentuated in spite of

some attempt to planned development. High rate of growth does not mean a guarantee towards the achievement of a more egalitarian society.

Chapters III and IV have been devoted to work out a proper methodology for the project evaluation. The author has examined various models for project analysis and did the exercise of cost benefit analysis for Nigeria giving special attention to the conceptual development of the social cost of capital. The project should be viewed not only with the objective of economic efficiency for optimized economic growth, but also with a view to generating employment for the unemployed in the country.

Having developed a framework of analysis in the form of a model incorporating two-dimensional objectives (economic efficiency for optimized growth, generation of employment), the author proceeds to evaluate the Gmelina Pulp and Paper Project in the Western State of Nigeria. It was planned in 1964 and the tree

species *Gmelina arborea* was selected to be planted as the source of raw material for the pulp plant with an annual production capacity of about 40,000 tons kraft pulp.

The sixth Chapter has been devoted to examining the scope of agri-silviculture in an integrated way rather than of two conflicting sectors coming into competition and one growing at the cost of the other. The system can efficiently be adopted by following the principle of multiple-land use where forest crops are raised in close association with the agricultural crops. To give the programme an economic viability, establishment of a national pulp market is of utmost significance.

In the concluding chapter, the author comes out with the development strategy for Nigerian forestry and prescribes that it should be based on the assessment of its contribution to national development. The forward and backward linkages be clearly identified and established. Owing to

long gestation period, the forestry is at an advantageous position in developing the forward linkage, but the backward linkage is quite weak. Carrying it from labour intensive to capital intensive activity, it is very unlikely that even a substantial demand is going to augment the domestic production of complex machinery used in forestry. To sum up, the 'present analysis of the economics of forest plantations are based on the social cost of labour, which was counter-balanced by an objective weight on unskilled labour in order to make sure that the projects are appraised in a way that is relevant to the development effort of Nigeria.'

The work is a welcome addition in the very sparsely available material dealing with the problems of economy in the developing countries, though it gives a partial understanding of the existing forest resources and its utilization in Nigeria itself as it focusses attention on the forestry in only the Western State.

M. H. Qureshi

Ramachandra Pradhan, United Nations and the Congo Crisis, Manas Publications, New Delhi, 1975, pages 258, Price Rs. 56/-

The United Nations Congo operation (1960-64) was a unique undertaking, in the sense that, unlike other peace-keeping operations, it had to deal in the Congo not only with problems concerned with international relations (which could have been the Congo vs. Belgium in this case) but also to take up the problems of the preservation of territorial integrity and political independence of a newly born state, in addition to the problem of bringing back within the jurisdiction of the integrated state of Congo areas which had seceded from the mother-country in the initial stages of its independence. As in the case of other African countries, there was a sudden, sporadic and diffused kind of national movement in the Congo—the only difference between the other countries and the Congo being that the nationalist movement here was even more sporadic and diffused than in other African countries—under a half-educated, immature, inexperienced and

divided leadership. Belgium had exercised, during its period of domination, a kind of “benevolent paternalism” in the Congo, the primary objective of which was to keep the Congolese “economically satisfied, socially content and politically ignorant”. While the Congolese lived in fairly good economic conditions, and there was also a widespread primary and secondary education, the Belgians had deliberately obstructed the growth of higher education, and kept the administration completely centralised under their control. The result of this halting progress in the development of higher education was the emergence of a half backed class of *evolves* (defined as people who ‘evolve’ through education from a purely tribal way of living) who organised in themselves several associations, with social overtones in the beginning, and a certain degree of political consciousness in the later years. The Belgian response was in the form of administering to the Congo-

lese constitutional reform in instalments but in the late fifties, the nationalist movement got accelerated faster than the Belgians were prepared for, and, despite the existence of several political parties based on tribal lines and lacking in national consciousness, the country was declared independent on June, 30, 1960.

Independence brought to the Congo not the heaven of freedom but a series of national crises. Not used to much discipline, the Congolese elements in the army revolted against their Belgian officials. Under the pressure of the *Force Publique*, the Government of the Congo tried to remove the Belgian officers from the army, with the result that Belgium re-entered the country with larger military forces—all this happening within ten days of the declaration of the Congolese independence. Two days later, on July 12, the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo requested the United Nations to intervene. On July 14, with the passing of a resolution by the Security

Council calling upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of Congo and deciding to authorise the Secretary General to provide military assistance to the Government of the Congo with a view 'to meet fully their task', there started a drama, largely tragic and partly interspersed with trivial, comic incidents, which drew the United Nations forces deeper and deeper into the internal political troubles of the country. The United Nations had to change its policies and postures from time to time, partly under the pressure of major powers but mostly due to developments in the Congo, and ill-equipped as the United Nations forces were for dealing with a complicated situation of this kind, the political tangles became more and more complicated. Belgian withdrawal was secured, but Katanga, a province situated in the south-east of the Republic, decided to secede. Prime Minister Lumumba appealed to the United Nations to bring back Katanga into the Congo by using its forces. Dag

Hammaraskjold, the Secretary General, however, thought that this would amount to interference in the internal affairs of the country, and was, therefore, beyond the powers given to him by the Security Council resolution of July 14. The Congolese Government, however, took a different view of the resolution, and Lumumba went ahead with his plans to frustrate Tshombe's efforts to consolidate the secession of Katanga. In the meantime, sharp personal differences had emerged between President Kasavubu and Lumumba and, taking advantage of a conference of African states held at Leopoldville on August 25-31, supporting the U.N. action in the Congo, Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba.

With the dismissal of Lumumba by Kasavubu, a constitutional crisis of great magnitude developed, and an emergency session of the General Assembly, followed by discussions in the Security Council, resolved to widen the authority of the U.N. forces in the Congo. In the meantime, Lumumba had been

murdered and the Belgians had started giving full support to the secession of Katanga. Armed with greater powers, the U.N. forces resolved to bring about the secession of Katanga to an end and take up the task of building up a new nation in the Congo. While there was a discussion within the United Nations, on the extent and the limits of the new powers assigned to U.N. forces the Secretary General, Hammaraskjold, who was inclined to take a moderate view of the new mandate, died in a plane crash, and U. Thant, the new Secretary General, was called upon to take up the responsibility of handling this complicated affair. The circumstances, however, forced U. Thant to assume greater powers, and he was able to bring an end to the secession of Katanga. But the troubles did not stop here. The country continued to remain in a stage of civil war, and the U.N. forces had to take up the responsibility of maintaining law and order in the country for a long time. It was a task the United Nations had never been called upon to face either before

or after its Congo operation. If the United Nations had been in a position to evolve a consistent and strong policy from the very beginning—towards which it was forced by circumstances to move in subsequent years—the situation could, perhaps, have been handled more effectively. But, passing through the fire of every crisis, the United Nations was ultimately able to emerge successfully in the whole affair, and set up a new nation on its feet. In a situation in which the General Assembly and the Security Council were torn by pulls and pressures of major powers in different directions, the Secretary General was able to evolve for himself a clearer line of action, which incidentally involved larger executive powers for him.

Dr. Pradhan has handled this complicated problem in an extremely able manner. His analysis of political developments in the Congo from one stage to another, and of the U.N. responses to each stage, is sharp and incisive. He has been able to analyse and assess, correctly as well as

critically the impact of the United Nations operations on the political development in the Congo and highlight major issues—like the basic objectives of the U.N. mission, the extent of its success in realizing them and of the factors and forces that militated against its successful working. He has also discussed, briefly but effectively, the impact of the operation on the process of nation-building in the Congo, on one side, and the working of peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations, on the other. The role of major powers and the contribution of Afro-Asian countries in the resolution of the conflict have been briefly but succinctly dealt with. All the major sources, primary as well as secondary, have been consulted by the author, that a first rate study of the U.N. operation in the Congo has emerged. Dr. Pradhan has discussed, almost at each stage and in a fairly objective manner, the various view points, interpretations as well as decisions taken by the different parties involved in the crisis. All those who are interested in the study of the

problems and processes connected with political development, African politics, the working of the United Nations, and the changing character of international politics in the

first half of the seventh decade of the century, generally described as the African decade, are likely to find this piece of research of great advantage.

S.P. Varma

Dr. Bojana Tradic,, *Nesvrsta Nost U Teoriji I Praksi Meduna Rodnih Odnosa* (Non-alignment in Theory and Practice of International Relations). The Institute for International Political and Economics, Belgrade, 1976, pp. 416.

It is natural for the scholars of Yugoslavia and India to show an abiding interest in the study of non-alignment. In Yugoslavia, the name of Dr. Bojana Tadic, the author of the book under review, comes only after Prof. Leo Mates, regarding the study of non-alignment. The book, therefore, is bound to invoke considerable interest amongst the students of international politics.

Dr. Tadic offers a very extensive survey and analysis of non-alignment both as a concept as well as a movement. She has studied the subject in its various dimensions i.e., 'as a system of ideas', 'a form of foreign policy orientation' and an 'international movement', covering a long period

since its origin upto the present day. The genesis and the growth of non-alignment has not been looked at through a narrow perspective but in its continuous interaction with the larger environment of international politics as a whole.

Particular emphasis has been placed by the author on the impact of non-alignment on the three vital aspects of international politics namely, Peace and Security. De-colonization and Development. In this context Dr. Tadic has refrained from following the course of analysis adopted by many other scholars of the subject when they sound euphonic and conclude that non-alignment was the single most important force that

brought about relaxation in international tensions, achieved decolonization and focussed world attention on the problems of economic development. She has rightly portrayed non-alignment not as the decisive, but a very important catalytic force which "encouraged, precipitated and occasioned changes" in international political and economic relations. The study underlines that in playing such a role, non-alignment movement used the means of moral strength, political means of struggle and sources of real or potential elements of economic strategic power. The manner in which the development and contribution of non-alignment have been surveyed and assessed, clearly reflects the author's firm grasp of the complex issues of *realpolitik* in international relations.

An equally extensive and meticulous treatment is given to the genesis of non-alignment. Here, however, the study lacks a bit of its vigour and depth. It is interesting to note that non-alignments interaction during its initial phases with the processes and structures

of socialism, decolonization, economic inequality and under-development, cold-war and the United Nations have been neatly worked out. But Dr. Tadic's this welcome exercise leaves several questions unanswered. For instance, while attempting a sort of class analysis of the non-aligned movement, she discovers a "historical identity" between the objectives and interests of non-alignment and socialism. This is true but mainly at the level of rhetorics alone. Otherwise how can one square this preposition with the fact that any number of reactionary and conservative regimes adopted and successfully pursued the course of non-alignment. Similarly the often loudly talked about linkages between cold-war and non-aligned movement need a serious reconsideration. For it is a fact, not properly recognised, that non-alignment as a *movement* started towards the end of the fifties when cold-war had already reached its saturation mark and the movement grew in number and strength since the sixties which had witnessed a sharp decline in the cold-war situation.

Dr. Tadic makes a valid point that the non-aligned movement emerged out of regional movements. The two had natural affinities and yet the former constitutes an anti-thesis of the later in the sense that it is more broad based and universal. In this context, the author should have gone into the complex question of how and why the non-aligned movement parted ways with the Afro-Asian movement and the two became so hostile as to confront each other in 1964. A closer scrutiny of the developments between Bandung Afro-Asian Conference (1955) and Belgrade Non-aligned Summit (1961) from the realistic perspective might provide interesting clues to the narrow and pragmatic national interests of the non-aligned stalwarts like India, Egypt and Yugoslavia as also to role of Soviet

Union in precipitating non-aligned movement as a separate and broader constellation in international politics. This might also help us in understanding the present controversy over the question of criteria of non-alignment and its so-called incompatibility with the entity of Third World as was evident during Algiers and Colombo Summit Conferences.

To raise the questions as above is only to admit that the study by Dr. Tadic is absorbing and thought-provoking. On the whole, the study is comprehensive in facts and refreshing in analysis. Based on extensive sources it presents all the relevant details about the past non-aligned summits where the movement took shape and grew.

S.D. Muni

Eno J. Usoro, *The Nigerian Oil Palm Industry* Dr. Ihadan Social, Science Series, Ihadan University Press, 1974, pp. 153.

Like the economies of many African countries the Nigerian economy (excluding mineral oil in the last decade) has largely been dependent on the exportable crops. One of

the export products which served the country well in the past was palm products. However, during the last two decades the poor performance of palm products exports have



adversely affected the growth rates of agricultural exports. This disappointing performance of palm oil products exports, irrespective of the impressive magnitude of investment in the industry by the eastern Nigerian states over the last two decades, constitutes a development problem which has adverse repercussions on the national economy in general and on the economy of the palm oil producing eastern states in particular. In the period 1955-65, despite substantially increased investment in plantation development, the major reduction in producer prices below the 1949-54 level led to the diversion of export output to the domestic market and the diversion of resources, especially labour from the industry.

The central theme in this study, which is based on the Ph.D. thesis of the author is the analysis of policy measures taken within three distinct historical periods extending over sixty-three years, which are divided into 1906-38, 1935-54 and 1955-65. The first period commences when Sou-

thern Nigeria was created ; the second period covers the Second World War and post-war years, while the third period extends from the introduction of self-government until the 1966 military coup.

The importance of the palm tree to the Nigerian farmer because of its various local uses, and also because of the income he obtains from export production and local sales of palm products, gives the tree a very prominent position in the social and economic life of the farmers. Palm leaf-ribs are used in building, the leaves in thatching, the fibre in rope making...palm-wine obtained by the tree, the palm-oil is a valuable source of vitamins in the indigenous diets. The dead palm is a valuable source of timber for use as pillars and beams, local fuel for cooking, and making breeding platform for such edible fungi as the 'mush-room'. The social significance of the palm tree arises not only from the palm wine drunk at social gatherings but also from local customs which govern the

various uses of the tree's products.

It is no exaggeration to say that any cessation of the trade in palm products, or even any considerable diminution, would lead to such a collapse of the local economy as to result in three or four million people being reduced to famine conditions.

The early export trade in Nigerian palm products originated as a result of demand in Britain for vegetable oil seeds needed for industrial raw materials during the period of industrial growth. Palm products were increasingly used as inputs in the manufacture of such products as soap, margarine, cooking fats, candles and lubricating greases. British imports of palm products was a major factor in "British West Africa being dragged into the vortex of modern international economic mechanism and.....a co-operator in the economic commonwealth of the world." (P. 8).

In 1885, William M. Lever, of the Marseyside (near Liverpool), established a soap-manufacturing industry. The

need for soap in order to attack industrial dirt was vital and the discovery by the French scientist Chevreul that palm oil was vital help for the manufacture of soap transformed the entire trade, commerce and industry of Nigeria. United Africa Company (UAC) set up huge plantations in Southern Nigeria dispossessing the peasants of their land and becoming the largest employer of rural proletariat. UAC also created chains of middlemen and their sub-agents for purchasing palm oil and kernel at very low prices.

Thus Nigerian economy was linked with UAC economy and it was made dependent on the growth of exportable crops. Infrastructure was developed to suit the requirements of the export oriented economy. Improvement in infrastructure was supplemented by more effective administrative control.

According to the author, during 1906-38 there was an increase in the volume of trade due to expansion of harvesting acreage. The colonial policy

during this period was focused on research, on processing, on cultivation and improvement in communications.

During 1939-54, particularly during post-war period, the overseas demand for palm products increased substantially. This increase coincided with the technological development, price stabilizations and the opportunity created by the absence of competing countries from the world market. The high annual increase in export output which was associated with the guaranteed high producer prices, although accompanied by the introduction of cultivation incentive, caused a decline in export output.

Looking at the material which the author has collected we would say that it is a good chronicle of development of palm oil industry. The main weakness of the book is that Usoro has stuck to behaviouralist tradition and has not analysed the causes of the changes which the palm industry underwent and the impact of the changes on the society as a whole.

No study, of changing economic situation of a country, is complete without going into the various aspects which led to such changes. We find that Usoro when dealing with the objectives of government policy during 1949-54 is over-worried to find out whether post-war-development dominated British colonial policy was for price stabilization or accumulation of export profits for development purposes. He unfortunately expresses no concern for the underdevelopment process which this policy had started.

Similarly he fails to go into the real motives of the British Government in following the policy of appointment of Nigerians to the Market Development Board. The real motive, which the author does not mention, was the establishment of a new relationship between the metropolitan country and the colony—a code and periphery relationship—where exploitation was possible through an African middle class instead of white bosses. And that in following this policy the British govern-

ment tried to create an image of honest trustees. Their slogan, directed to mislead the Nigerian elite, including author, was "gradual political transition from full colonial status to internal self-government" (p. 96). They implemented the above slogan by creating a middle class with vested interest in palm industry, the products of which were

largely acquired by British industry.

The book, nevertheless, is of vital importance for students of Nigerian economy and also for all those who intend to make a deep study of Sierra Leone and Benin palm oil industry. The book should be acquired by all libraries of African studies.

Vijay Gupta

Daniel D.C. Don Nanjira : *The Status of Aliens in East Africa—Asians and Europeans in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya*—Praeger Publishers, N. Y. 1976, pp. 230.

This book deals with a very sensitive relationship among the various major communities in the East African setting. The East African 'triangle' is around tensions between the natives and the Europeans and Asians. Asians migrated to East Africa under persuasion and coercion exercised by the British masters. After migrating to East Africa, the Asians settled down to various professions and in due course of time became quite prosperous businessmen and bankers. The prosperity of European settlers was linked with their natural association with the foreign rulers who had come to ex-

ploit East Africa. After liberation of East African colonies from the British rule, the natives naturally wanted to eliminate local collaborators of imperialism. This has led to inter-community tensions. The author of this book examines inter-community relations in East Africa and adopts a 'human relations' approach to this complex phenomenon. He examines legal position of various communities in East Africa and offers suggestions for dealing with the problem. His prescriptions would not remedy the situation.

The author puts his fingers

correctly on factors which conditioned the response of natives towards the colonial rule. He correctly points out four main causes of the negative African response of colonial rule in East Africa. They are : (1) European colonial policies and practices had included restrictions on the movements of the Africans, the loss of their stock, and the closing of forests to them ; fines imposed on Africans for the slightest trespass ; excessive and inhuman physical abuse of the Africans ; summary dismissals of the Africans, after they had done dirty work ; and encouragement of disrespect among African youth for the traditional and customary ways of African life, (2) The Euro-Asian struggle for dominance was in complete disregard of

African interests and aspirations, (3) The overall position of aliens in East Africa was continually improving, (4) The position of Africans vis-a-vis the position of aliens in the region was deteriorating.

But instead of following this analysis he goes into the details of law and governmental action in relation to status of aliens. The author quotes the British responsible for British pass-port holders. The issue is not legal but human. The Asians and Europeans in East Africa cannot be integrated in the legal milieu because they are identified as an exploiting group. This is the crux of the situation.

C.P. Bhambhri

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
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Theophile Obenga : “Africa in Antiquity”

It is not possible to understand the culture of Africa today, unless one goes back to its roots in the antiquity. Palaeontological and archaeological data give the lie to the theory of an occupation of the continent by outsiders. On the contrary, there is sufficient scientific data to prove that the birth place of man was in Africa; that there is a cultural unity of black Africa; that the first manifestation of African (Negroid) culture is indeed to be found in the Egypt of the time of the Pharaohs, and that there is a biological, ethnic and even anthropological kinship between the ancient Egyptians and the other peoples of the continent.

Africa owes a great deal to the work of scholars like Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Camille Aramourg, R.A. Dart and L.S.B. Leakey who contributed enormously to the theories that Africa is the birth place of man.

Professor Leakey's discovery of a human cranium in 1959 in the Olduvai Gorge gave fresh impetus to the search for man's origins and ancestry. Leakey's man named the *Zinjanthropus* was estimated to be 1,750,000 years old. Subsequently, in 1967, a French team discovered a jaw bone at Omo calling it *Paraustralopithecus aethiopicus* and dating it between 2,500,000 and 3,000,000 years. Prof. Brian Patterson's (University of Harvard) discovery in 1971 of a fragment of a jaw at Logotham in Kenya dating 5,500,000 years, further established the fact.

All the presently available evidence points to Africa—alone of all the continents—as being the continent where the most ancient remnants of the human species are to be found, indicating the presence of what evolved, after mutations and transformations lasting centuries, into *Homo Sapiens*. It is of no less significance to mention that there is no discontinuity in the biological evolution of man on

the African continent. In fact, there is an effectively continuous chain from the Australopithecus to the Neanthropians.

There is also evidence to show that the Negroid people from the Upper Paleolithic to the Neolithic era were not only spread throughout Africa but had also moved into Europe. One need only mention, in this connection, the Negroids of the Grotto of Children in Grimaldi (near Menton), described by Professor René Verneau (1906);

—the armorican neolithic Negroids discovered at Pointe Congual and Toul-Bras (Brittany) by Professor Georges Hervé (1930);

—the Swiss neolithic Negroids : the skeletons of Chamblandes (Lausanne Museum), two neolithic craniums found near Lausanne by Professor Alexandre Schenk (1903);

—the Italian neolithic Negroids : skeletons from the caves of Sanguineto and Matta;

—the Negroids of Moniat (Belgium) discovered by Prof. Rene Bailly (1928);

—the Negroids of Muge, 80 kilometers to the north-east of Lisbon, described by Professor A.A. Mendes Correa of the University of Porto ;

—the negroid craniums of the mesolithic burial places of the cave of Fatma-Coba in Crimea, and of the Upper Palaeolithic structure of Markina Gora in the region of Voronej (USSR).

There is reasonably sufficient evidence to prove that the negroids of the Paleolithic era spread and occupied parts of western and eastern Europe. Such an overflow of the black race pre-supposes that the Negroes or Negroids enjoyed a high degree of civilisation in their own region. In other words, Africa, which was the birth place of negroes, can also be said to have contributed to the formation of the present Europoid races. In Africa itself, the region of the Great Lakes and the valley of the Egypto-Nubian Niles seems to have been the point of departure for cultural elements which profoundly united different regions of black Africa.

It is possible to identify a number of cultural centres of ancient Africa, with the help of documents from archaeological sites of historic and proto-historic interest. Among the more important of these sites are those of the Nile Valley, the Egypto-Nubian complex, the Western Sudan, Nok in Nigeria, Nitereso in Ghana, the fortified cities of Sao in Zimbabwe, the rock-carvings of Senegambia, Mali, Nigeria, Ethiopia and South Africa, the Nubian metallurgical centres, and the temples and pyramids of Egypt. In other words, one comes to the inevitable conclusion that, in antiquity, African civilisation had spread to all the four corners of the continent, and that the cultural unity of Africa dates back to the very origins of African civilisation. The civilisation of ancient Egypt represents the full flowering of these Negro-African civilisations of ancient times.

The work of Cheik Anta Diop has proved conclusively that the ancient Egyptians were Negroes. Every Greco-Roman writer of antiquity, who has been in the Nile Valley, has spoken of the black race of ancient Egyptians. Herodotus, who lived some four centuries before Christ, had been in Egypt. Book II, Euterpes of his Histories is dedicated to ancient Egypt. In describing the inhabitants of Colchide or the Colchis region of Asia Minor on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, Herodotus comes to the conclusion that they were Egyptians. He cites three reasons for this conclusion, "First of all, they were black-skinned and have fuzzy hair". He goes on to say that it is only the "Colchideans, the Egyptians and the Ethiopians who practise circumcision from their origins. The Phoenicians and the Syrians of Palestine acknowledge themselves that they have learnt this practice from the Egyptians". Furthermore, their whole way of life and their languages are similar.

It is interesting that in describing the colour of the skin, Herodotus uses the Greek word-adjective which clearly indicates 'completely black' and not the words which could have signified 'brown black' etc.

Regarding the practice of circumcision, it is noteworthy that the Assyro-Babylonian civilisation has no traces of this custom. In black Africa, circumcision rites have always been in vogue as part of

an immemorial tradition. In fact, it emerged in ancient Egypt—as in black Africa today—as an ethnic trait based on an identical coemogony.

The testimony of Herodotus is further strengthened by another Greek historian, Diodorus of Sicily, author of “Historical Library” written in the first century B.C. Regarding the links between Egypt and Nubia, he writes “The Egyptians are only an Ethiopian (Nubian) colony.....” A reference to the original text in Greek makes it clear that Diodorus, after speaking to Egyptian priests and Nubian messengers, came to the conclusion that Egypt had been originally colonised, in successive stages, by people coming from the Upper Nile, which in turn proves that the civilisation of the Upper Nile pre-dates that of the Delta region. Diodorus goes on to state that this explains the cultural and other affinities between Nubia and Egypt, and provides several concrete examples of the same. Above all he confirms what Herodotus had said much earlier, describing the Nubians as “black-skinned, flat-nosed, and with fuzzy hair”. No doubt the Egyptians, who Diodorus claims were only Nubian emigrants must have had the same physiognomy.

The testimony of Herodotus and Diodorus—who had lived in the Nile Valley—on the subject of the black race of the Egyptians and Nubians, has not been contradicted by any other Greco-Roman author. Above all, the evidence of the ancient Egyptians themselves lends strength to our theory.

The etymology of the word “Egypt” itself is most interesting. It is of Greek origin, not derived from the pharaonic language. It stems in reality from the Greek word for “black vulture”, no doubt a reference to the people, the land and the river. This seems to be confirmed by the hieroglyph for Egypt in the Pharaonic languages which stands for “Black land”.

In a sarcophagus of the XI dynasty (2100—2000 B.C.), two Egyptologists found the mummy of a priestess of Hathor, an Egyptian goddess. The name of the priestess in the Pharaonic language signified negress. Since this was unusual, the cranium was sent to England for

anthropometric examination and it was discovered that the priestess did indeed belong to a negroid type.

Queen Ahmes Nefertari, wife of King Ahmosis (1580—1558 B.C.), is also represented in several monuments of the age as a black woman. The anthropologist Ernest Chantre did a study of the mummy of this queen which remained extremely well-preserved. He describes her various facial characteristics, gives dimensions of her cranium, and comes to the conclusion that she could have belonged to the Ethiopian or Nubian group. Furthermore, an examination of the subsequent rulers of Egypt indicates that the right to the throne was that of women by blood relationship, which points to the prevalence of the matrilineal system which is common in black Africa.

Jean Francois Champollion, known as Champollion the Young, was the founder of Egyptology, and in his *Letters ecrites d'Egypte et de Nubie on 1828 et 1829*, he analyses various ethnographic tables of the Egyptians. These clearly bring out the fact that the Egyptians looked down on the Europeans; that their skin colour was different from that of the Europeans or the Asiatics; and that the Egyptians and Nubians were considered similar.

The ethnographic tables also suggest that different races were under the protection of different gods. The falcon god Horus is exclusively for the protection of the Egyptians and the Nubians. It is significant that this same falcon god reappears in the civilization of Zimbabwe and ancient Mali. The emblem of Pharaonic sovereignty was noticed by Ibn Batuta who, in his book *VOYAGE DANS LES PAYS DES NOIRS*, said that he saw in Western Sudan, a silken parasol in the form of a dome "surmounted by a golden bird, as big as a sparrow-hawk". He had visited the area between 1352 to 1353.

A study of the links between Nubia (land of Kush) and Egypt will help throw further light on this subject. It is true that the ancient Egyptians spoke about the land of Koush (Nubia) as the "vile Koush", and of the Cushites as detestable individuals. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the Egyptians were racially

different from the Cushites. People from neighbouring countries, even when racially of the same stock, have harsh words for each other and even go to war. But the Egyptians never displayed any racially-tainted hatred for the Nubians, as they did in regard to the Semites for example. The warning was clear : If an Egyptian woman had sexual relations with an ass, great misfortune would befall her, just as much as if it had been a Syrian. Neolithic sites like those of Fayoum, Merimde, Badari and Khartoum, bear testimony to the close links between Cush and Egypt.

It is in the field of comparative linguistics that the most promising insights into a basic cultural unity of Africa are to be discovered.

Ancient Egyptian is the language which transmits to us today the intellectual experience of the inhabitants of ancient Egypt of the days of the Pharaohs, namely cosmogonies and rural myths, astronomy, mathematics, medicines, law, literature etc. The most ancient hieroglyphic texts (first dynasty) date back to about 3000 B.C. Taking into account spoken coptic, which existed in Upper Egypt upto the seventeenth century A.D., the Egyptian language has lived a total of about 5000 years. It has of necessity evolved, but the basic stability remains, as my own research and that of others proves. Champollion the Young asserts that "the ancient Egyptian language does not differ, in any essential, from the language commonly called copt or cophte".

The modern languages of black Africa relate to the present African languages, and may be called, in general, "negro-African". In making a comparison between Egyptian and negro-African, we have taken the "mbosi" (embosi) as illustrative of the latter, the references to other negro-African languages only providing supplementary proof. It is the language spoken by the Mbosi people in the north of the Congo. Having spoken the language since childhood, the facts mentioned are well known to me.

The Egyptologist F. Lex has spoken of Hamito-semitic languages just as the linguist J.H. Greenberg talks of Afro-Asiatic languages. The

former seeks to designate one genetically related family of languages spoken by the descendants of Ham (the blacks) and of Sem (the Semites), the two sons of Noah. Both attempt to prove their theories by pointing out seeming similarities in words and grammatical forms, but objectively speaking, the similarities do not lead us to the conclusions stated. Egyptian is not a semitic language as these two professors would have us believe, nor is it genetically related to the semitic and berber languages. The seeming similarities can be explained by chance or borrowing.

The word for 'water' for example is similar in Egyptian (mw) and in the semitic languages : Arab (mâ, mah), Hebrew (mayim), Syrian (mayiâ), Ethiopian (mae), Assyrian (mou). Berber dialects transcribe water as "aman". But negro-african languages also have very similar equivalents : mbosi (maa), lingala (mai), yoruba (omi), samo of Upper Volta (mun). There are also similarities in ancient Egyptian, the semitic languages and in mbosi for other words like oil, which suggest that the semitic languages borrowed words from Egyptian.

In other words, the evidence for the Hamito-semitic family, or the afro-asiatic, is virtually nil. These are artificial agglomerations of languages from which Egyptian should be excluded. In fact, it belongs to the cultural universe of the negro-african.

Eminent scholars have already studied ancient Egyptian. To name only a few, Rémy Cotteville-Giraudet, Cheik Anta Diop, Liliane Homburger, Father G. Hulstaert, J. Olumide Lucas, Jane Tercafs and Father H. Trilles. The last three seemed to be content solely with the method of external resemblances. This method is often used, but is obviously unscientific. Indian readers will be interested to note the similarity between the Egyptian word for 'day' which is SU, whereas the word in Valaf (a Senegalese language) for morning is Suba, the same as in Hindi. Such stray similarities cannot be held to prove a genetic relationship between languages.

Leaving aside Cotteville-Giraudet, the other three scholars have been able to prove through their research that ancient Egyptian

and modern negro-african languages belong to the same linguistic type. My own research in respect of ancient Egyptian and mbosi strengthens this conclusion. For example the verb 'to be' has the same basic root form 'i' as in other bantu languages, as also in coptic and ancient Egyptian. However, by using the comparative and inductive method one can also prove that the relationship between ancient Egyptian and negro-african languages is not only typological but also genetic, and in fact substantiates the view that Egyptian is the Sanskrit of the languages of black Africa.

It is not possible, within the compass of this article, to treat this subject in any detail. For the purposes of this article, I would only touch on a few features of my analysis of this aspect of my theory.

In Table I, there appears, for example, a list of words in ancient Egyptian and their equivalents in mbosi. The similarity in the physiognomy of the words is striking. There are also morphological similarities. Consider, for example, the formation of plurals in ancient Egyptian as shown in Table II. One notices that the feminine in ancient Egyptian is denoted by the letter "t". Certain bantu languages have preserved this element. For example, in Hausa, "ita" means "she", "ta" means "the" (feminine). Also, several negro-african languages have the suffix "-w" or "-ou" for the formation of the plural of substantives as in ancient Egyptian e.g., the Ewe language of Togo and Ghana has "ati" (tree) forming its plural as "atiwo".

Structurally, the grammatical formation of the past and future tenses in Egyptian and mbosi are identical. Take the following examples :

Ancient Egyptian

Mbosi

ii n i (I have come)

i mi yaa

ma n l nfrw k (I have seen your beauty)

i mi taa ongonondo a no

The word "mi" corresponds with "n" in ancient Egyptian, and is similarly placed in relation to the other parts of the sentence. A similar use is made of "li" or "le" or "la" in mbosi, and of "ka" in ancient Egyptian to denote the future.

Such a concordance can only be explained by a common linguistic tradition, which has been lost in the course of history, but survives nevertheless in a tangible and real form in languages which are genetically related. A phonetic analysis is the most instructive part of the comparison. Chance cannot explain the similarities in this field which have been elaborated at length in my work on the subject.

All these similarities—in lexicology, morphology, and phonetics—indicate, in terms of comparative linguistics, that ancient Egyptian and the languages of black Africa have a common origin and heritage, which for want of a better name may be called negro-egyptian. What is also of interest is that such evidence has no parallel if Egyptian is compared with other languages.

It is also essential to highlight the psychic characteristics which are identical in the traditions of ancient Egypt and in those of black Africa. It will be realised that the spirit, the thought of Pharaonic Egypt is an integral part of the negro-african cultural universe in its totality, as will be evident also from the intimate links between the Egyptian and mbosi logic and ontology.

In the Egypt of the Pharaohs, when a man died, the women would cut their hair, or undo and let down their hair. This was done in imitation of Isis who cut a tuft of her hair when she heard of the misfortune that had befallen on her husband. This same custom remains intact among the Mbosi till today. It is believed that this action liberates the essential force or the vital fluid which is within one, and thus liberated, this power helps strengthen the soul of the deceased. Likewise, it was for the benefit of the deceased that Egyptian women would unfasten their robes, loosen their breasts and bruise them till they bled. Then they would cover themselves with powder and ashes, white being the sign of mourning. These same signs of mourning can still be found very much alive among many negro-african communities today, where white is considered the colour of death.

There are also other similarities in ontology.

In Pharaonic Egypt, "douat" signified the nether world, the world of the dead, which is likewise conveyed in mbosi by the word

“doua”. As a verb it connotes “to pass from one shore to another”, and implies in songs of a mythical character, the idea of lower regions. I reproduce two verses from the ritual chant of the Twins, with a word by word translation in English :

Nga bvare o ngandi
(I the pirogue it has stopped)
Abaa le doua
(Men paddle !)

My great aunt, Martha Ilongo Ibe, interpreted these verses as follows : “The boat is temporarily stopped by forces which are more or less numerous and hostile, but one has to go ahead, one must—towards peaceful regions, rich in food of all kinds.”

The Egyptian word “ouaab”, “ouab”, “waab” expresses the idea of a mysterious transformation ; it implies regeneration by “baptism” into the other world, within the primordial ocean. In mbosi “ouaa”, “waa” signifies “to be pure, renewed, regenerated, purified”.

Once the process of regeneration is terminated at the end of a certain number of ceremonies, the dead Egyptian becomes “khu”, namely a spiritualised form of the deceased, the intelligence which has broken the bonds of the body. Transformed thus into luminous, glorious souls (akhu), the deceased acquire transcendental powers which will make them come closer to the solar boat.

In negro-african, the following similarities are of interest :—

Language

ewe	kú	death
yoruba	ikú	death, morality
teke	kwa	to die
mbosi	leku, iku	death
fang	ku	to illuminate in the dark.

There was thus a common concept of death in black Africa and in ancient Egypt, namely, in the sense of a passage from the terrestrial

state to the luminous state. In mbosi, the word "okwe" indicates, strictly speaking, the deceased, who after a certain time, becomes a spiritual being with transcendental powers. Cheikh Anta Diop was right when he said that a single human life-span would perhaps not be enough to exhaust all the kindred links which exist between Egypt and the black world, since it is so true that it refers to one and the same thing (*Nations nègres et Culture*", C.A. Diop).

Yet another branch of human knowledge which provides an insight into the common origin of African culture and civilisation is in the domain of mathematics. Certain concepts of arithmetic in ancient Egypt are well known, e.g., the decimal system of numeration, duplication as a means of multiplication etc. Many negro-african communities reveal identical systems of mathematical operation, and the similarity has been analysed with special reference to Mbosi in author's work "*L'Afrique dans l'Antiquité*" to which the reader is referred for more details.

A comparative examination of the systems of writing is most illuminating in the context of the general burden of this article. The pre-historic scripts of Africa are almost beyond deciphering. One has, therefore,—for the purpose of this study—to confine oneself to the scripts of the historic period, and amongst these special attention has been paid to the following :

AROKO	— Among the Yoruba in the south of Nigeria
GICANDI	— Among the Kikuyu in Kenya
NSIBIDI	— Among the Efik in the district of Calabar in South-east Nigeria
MENDE	— Among the Ko, Kpa and Sewa in South Sierra Leone
TOMA or LOMA	— In northern Liberia
VAI	— On the outskirts of Monrovia
MUM	— In West Cameroons

A detailed study of these scripts has been attempted in author's another publication, along with a comparative analysis with ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs. Nsibidi pictograms are startlingly similar to

those of Egyptian pictograms. Such a structural resemblance in the form of the pictograms provides clear evidence of the intimate links in the distant past between Egyptian and Nsibidi. My analysis leads me to the conclusion that there must have been a common origin for all these graphic systems, since all of them present such striking analogies with Egyptian hieroglyphs. Such analogies cannot be explained away by chance.

A further examination of the graphic signs of the five West African scripts—Nsibidi, Mende, Toma, Vai and Mum—provide further evidence of their inter-relationship and their links with ancient Egyptian.

In 1974 (28th January to 3rd February), a seminar was held in Cairo under the auspices of UNESCO where some twenty specialists came together to discuss the settlement of ancient Egypt and the deciphering of the Meroic language. This seminar marks a veritable turning point in the history and the thinking of African studies. The final report is explicit in its conclusions, which state inter alia : "The Egyptian cannot be isolated from his African context, and the semitic does not account for his birth ; it is, therefore, legitimate to find his parents and cousins in Africa".

* * * *

Africa is at the moment the only continent which can trace human genealogy to the limits of the Quarternary and Tertiary periods. Pharaonic Egypt belongs to the past of the blacks of Africa taking into consideration the language and ethnicity of its inhabitants. This ancient Egypt was itself derived from a nilotic cultural complex of which it was a vast flowering. The Greeks of antiquity considered Egypt the only country to enjoy a solid reputation of science and wisdom. Greek savants like Thales, Pythagoras, Plato and others journeyed to Egypt. Egypt thus contributed considerably to the civilisation of the world. From the Nile Valley, men and women went in successive waves of migration to the four corners of Africa. Since Neolithic times, nubian pottery reached Egypt as also mountainous Sahara through the Savanna land of Barh-al-Gazal and Chad.

Between Pharaonic Egypt and pre-colonial black Africa, common cultural elements are so numerous, so varied, so pertinent and of such a nature that they can only suggest a common origin. In Egypt and in black Africa there are identical customs : the matrilineal system ; the rite of circumcision ; concepts of creation of beings from a pre-existing basis (cosmic egg) ; colleges of initiated and initiator (College of Thot and of Dahomey) ; identification of the initiator with the gods of the village community ; wearing of the sacred beard known as the "false beard" ; wearing of the panther's skin (sacred costume) by officiating priests ; ceremonies and royal rites (ritual putting to death of kings ; weaning of kings) ; similar agrarian legends and dramas ; identity of graphic signs (meroitic and demotic ; hieroglyphics and negro-african graphemes) ; identity in operating systems (decimal system and duplication instead of multiplication) etc. There is a single linguistic basis—the negro-egyptian. It has been definitely established that the Egyptian (ancient Egyptian and coptic) and the modern negro-african languages are genetically related.

What is required is intellectual courage on the part of Egyptologists and Africanists to view the history of the black peoples of Africa honestly and realistically. What Africa needs is the psychological liberation of its people, the renewal of their confidence in themselves based on a re-appraisal of their historic conscience, the establishment of their modern national culture contributing to the benefit of negro-african languages. The social future, towards which the people of Africa tend, is not in contradiction with their vision of a world essentially characterised by an egalitarian and communal ethic, as Julius Nyerere teaches us.

In order to break the chains of slavery, the African peoples have chosen the path of African unity. African unity cannot take place objectively and solely on the basis of the unity of sentiment, for the peoples of Africa belonging to a single cultural community. African unity is as much as political, economic, juridical unity, as a cultural unity. The knowledge of the diverse components of our cultural heritage must play a decisive role in the establishment of African unity.

African unity alone will enable us to adapt ourselves, in the most convenient and the most total manner, to modern life. The basic problems—scientific, technological, economic and military—will not be validly posed and solved except at the level of a federal state. Diplomatically, our complaints and recommendations on the present fate of our brothers of South Africa will not be heard unless they emanate from a powerful federal government. Kenneth Kaunda knows this better than anyone else.

African unity alone will guarantee the security, dignity and the existence of the African people as a whole.

Perhaps the African community, rich in its cultural heritage, and fresh with the tinge of a modern humanism, will contribute in demonstrating to man—in serenity and optimism—that destiny must be met by man henceforth, free of all the “arriere mondes” which make of a man a semi-man, which in reality he is not.

TABLE I
Similar Words in Ancient Egyptian and Mbosi

<i>Ancient Egyptian</i>	<i>Mbosi</i>
b'i (palm)	bya (palm tree) bia
bw (place, region)	(e) be (id)
ba (soul, spirit)	ba (full, with integrity, or possessing spirits)
bin.t (evil)	(e) bena (infirmity, flaw, defect)
bn.t (harp)	(i) bina (dance)
m or mi (take-imperative)	mā (id.)
me.t (mother)	maa ; moo (id.)
mn (to remain, to be firm)	masna (that which is fixed for ever, solidly established)
km (black)	(i) kama (to be black)
rmt (man)	(o) lomi (husband, man)

<i>Ancient Egyptian</i>	<i>Mbosi</i>
kkw (darkness)	(e) koko (evening, evening darkness)
ktt (a little, a few)	kiye (id.)
ska (to work, to cultivate)	(i) saa ; (i) saka (id.)
'sa (to be rich, numerous, many)	saa (id.)
s (man ; someone)	(o) si (someone from ; man)
š (lake, pond)	(o) saa (marshy place)
pss (to divide, share)	(e) pasi (half)
ii (to come, to arrive)	(i) yaa (id.)

TABLE II
Formation of Plurals in Ancient Egyptian

<i>Singular</i>		<i>Plural</i>	
t-maaou	—the mother	n-maaou	—mothers
p-chere	—son	n-chere, n-chreou	
t-cheere	—daughter	n-cheere	
p-son	—brother	n-son, n-sneou	
t-sone	—sister	n-sone	

Samarendra Kundu : **Southern African Liberation
and India**

The birth of the Organisation of African Unity fifteen years ago was an event of outstanding importance for the African people and for the international community. It had for us in the Indian Sub-Continent a particular significance as Africa is our sister continent, many member-states of which are linked to us by the Indian Ocean and all the members of which belong to the fraternity of the non-aligned group. We were particularly happy that the affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocks was solemnly enshrined as a guiding principle in the OAU Charter.

The Organisation of African Unity has a solid record of achievements during the last fifteen years of its existence. Its contribution to the liberation struggle in the African Continent against colonialism, racial discrimination and economic exploitation is well known. In fact as against 31 members of OAU when it was founded, its membership has now swollen to 49 members. (The liberation movements in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa are now converging and acquiring such momentum that before long the last vestiges of colonialism and racialism would also be eliminated. The Father of our Nation, Mahatma Gandhi, started his non-violent crusade against racial discrimination in South Africa at the turn of the last century before he began his long and arduous struggle to lead the Indian people to freedom. It was India which first came to the United Nations to internationalise the campaign against racial discrimination. Indian Government assures African brethren people of its full support and help not only in their liberation struggle against colonial rule but also against the monstrosity of racialism and apartheid which is a crime against humanity and a scar on the conscience of the international community.)

The two most important items on the African agenda for 1978 are the questions of Zimbabwe and Namibia. As regards Zimbabwe, the Organisation of African Unity has recognised Patriotic Front as the main liberation movement. We are glad to know that the leaders of the Patriotic Front are displaying necessary flexibility and are prepared to negotiate on transitional arrangements leading to majority rule in Zimbabwe. We in India are in constant touch with Frontline States and Patriotic Front on this important matter. Political, economic and diplomatic pressure has to be maintained for convening the all parties conference where a consensus could be reached on transitional arrangements, leading to elections on the basis of one man one vote and setting up of majority rule on the basis of Anglo-US proposal. We have unequivocally condemned the so-called internal settlement reached in Salisbury. We would like unity to be forged amongst nationalist leaders in Zimbabwe so that effective pressure is brought on Smith and his followers for establishing authentic and genuine majority rule. Should, however, the latter not see the writing on the wall, the intensification of armed struggle for bringing about independence and freedom in Zimbabwe would become inevitable, and in that case Patriotic Front would be entitled to receive fullest possible cooperation and assistance from all members of OAU and other supporters in the non-aligned and developing world.

The obduracy of the South African regime has been the single most important factor in preventing a negotiated settlement of the Namibian question. We deplore and condemn the recent South African raid into Angola when innocent civilians and SWAPO refugees were killed. One cannot forget the fact that this dastardly act was perpetuated right at the time when SWAPO was willing to resume negotiations on the basis of five-power proposals. SWAPO has made several concessions and has shown a flexible approach on the matter as against South African approach characterised by unreasonable demands and unacceptable conditions. The international community is unanimous in asking for the withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia. If a peaceful and negotiated arrangement cannot be found, then there would be no alternative for SWAPO, the only liberation movement in Namibia, to intensify its struggle. India would continue

to render support to SWAPO so as to enable it to achieve its genuine goals and objectives.

We also intend to observe anti-apartheid year in India and are in the process of finalising the programme of various activities which would be undertaken in this connection. No fight in the defence of human rights can be considered complete unless the affront to human dignity and equality as symbolised by apartheid is done away with.

We in India note that OAU has made tremendous contribution not only in bringing about emancipation of African territories which were under colonial yoke but also in the other set of its purposes as stated in the OAU Charter which refer to coordination and harmonisation of general policies of its member States in the field of political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, health, nutritional, scientific and technical cooperation.

Unfortunately, of late, OAU has been confronted with various regional problems. What is more disturbing is that lack of effective timely action has, in certain cases, resulted in foreign military involvement which would render the task of OAU more difficult if not impossible. If intra-African disputes are not resolved early, African unity would get weakened, the attention would be deviated away from the real issues in Southern Africa and the Non-aligned movement as a whole would get adversely affected. This is too grim a prospect and we should bend our energies so that the present situation is not let adrift. We believe that the purpose and principles as embodied in the OAU Charter are as valid today, if not more, than when conceived 15 years ago. We should like to express the hope that there would be a renewed thrust in the policies and actions of the member States of OAU for promoting unity and solidarity amongst themselves. There is also the supreme need at the present moment for strict observance, implementation and upholding of the principles enshrined in the OAU Charter by the African States with a view to avoid prospects of external military involvement in the continent of Africa which is threatening to undermine their real sovereignty and non-aligned status. In this connection, I would particularly like to refer to the principles embodied in the OAU Charter relating to respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its

inalienable, right to independent existence, and concerning peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration. The OAU principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of States needs to be adhered fully in actual practice.

India and OAU members have been cooperating together with other developing countries in the Group of 77 in their efforts to bring about a new international economic order. India believes that an important element of this cooperation is the building up of collective self-reliance among developing countries. We should examine carefully how this cooperation can be given content while finalising the strategy for the third development decade. India attaches a great deal of importance to the speedy and full implementation of the action programme for cooperation among non-aligned and developing countries as worked out in Non-aligned and U.N. We attach a great deal of priority to the expansion of our relations with OAU and its member States in educational, cultural, scientific, economic and technological fields. We would be hosting the Non-aligned Centre for Science and Technology in India. We would be happy to cooperate with OAU in ensuring that Africa derives maximum benefits from its cooperation with India and other non-aligned countries in this vital field where we have something to offer because of our large reservoir of scientific and technical manpower.

Jean—Baptiste Tati—Loutard

The Poto-Poto School of Painting—Congo

The Poto-Poto school of painting represents natural art, nascent oxygen, born of the soil and of a people who had preserved their individuality and their own genius. The paintings have a freshness and originality. The style is characterised by schematic and rudimentary forms. The school has influenced painters of whole of Franco-phone Africa. In this paper an attempt is made to record the developments of Poto-Poto School and its very styles.

Before dealing with the Poto-Poto School of Painting, we feel it necessary to place on record the historic role of de Mouko Gaspard in the cultural life of the Congo in the field of painting. As far as we know, de Mouko Gaspard was the first painter in Central Africa who, in the forties, was able to live by his art. He hailed from the Cameroons; and had to settle in Brazzaville during the Second World War.

De Mouko Gaspard was a landscape painter and an excellent portrait painter. He did many portraits of famous men of the post-War period. Among the better known ones are those of General Charles de Gaulle, and of the deputy Jean-Felix Tchicaya, dating back to 1948. The tradition that he created continues to live till today.

The painter Fylla spent a few months in his workshop. Kitsiba and Malongo too were in contact with him. Although it is not possible to speak of a significant influence on these three Congolese painters who developed on the fringe of the Poto-Poto school, one must admit that the example of a man, completely devoted to his art, must have strengthened their artistic vocation. Besides, he had a very charming personality. He was elegant, very exuberant, and led

a rather liberal life. He changed his clothes often, and wore thick-soled shoes. It was a kind of social phenomenon. De Mouko Gaspard had to leave Central Congo in 1950. The painter Fylla met him in Bangui in 1951. In 1972, Kitsiba met him in the Ivory Coast during a rather difficult period.

The use of the word "school" has never seemed more inappropriate than in the case of the Poto-Poto school of painting. This, of course, is due to the fact that one does not learn how to become an artist. It is only the revelation of a personality which has come into contact with reality.

Pierre Lods was aware of this when he called it the Poto-Poto "Centre of African Arts". He had conceived of the school as a centre where the personality of an artist could evolve, having got the idea one day when he caught his servant Ossali using his paints. The story has often been told, and the following is Pierre Lods' own version :

"I will never forget Ossali's joy when, after an absence of two days, I discovered him painting blue birds on an old survey map of Oubangui. The birds, in the form of knives in outline, looked droll and disturbing. They were as impressive as the most beautiful African masks.

"I had never before seen anything like this in African art, but there was no doubt that they were negro in the impact of their shock, grandeur of conception and magic.

"The next day, using oils, Ossali painted a red mountain against a black background. At the top, a palm tree was formed by five red strokes, like an open hand, and repeated below twice.

"The paint brush swept up black paint which was mixed with red. When I drew his attention to what seemed a clumsy error, Ossali replied, 'But it's more beautiful like this.' He was right. We had the most mysterious of African mountains replete with life and death, dream-like and alluring.

"That was my first lesson in 'silence' and in 'respect'. Later it was one of the principles of my method."

A group of Felix Ossali's relatives and friends soon gathered around him to paint under the admiring eyes of Pierre Lods, who trained them in his workshop. This went on for several days. Lods did not dare disturb them for fear of breaking the enchantment. His emotions were so strong, that he was moved to tears before what he said was a "breath-taking flowering of inspiration, a paradise of colour, joy and song". He was too excited to sleep: "and, to calm myself down," he explained, "I promised to devote myself to saving this art, at least its essential spirit and to help adapt it to modern African life." The sudden and fortuitous explosion of the talent of Ossali's companions led to the beginning.

Pierre Lods lived on the fringe of the colonial society of his day. He had no class prejudices, his life with the underground forces during the French Resistance having demonstrated the hollowness of the class structure. He did not have any racial prejudices either. Thanks to this, he was receptive to what an old fisherman of the Sangha region was able to teach him about "another way of looking at the world". He learnt the life of the Africans, living in Sangha for about a year with the singers, hunters, fetishists and fishermen, while on a scientific mission that took him through Ogoue, the Cameroons and northern Congo. Among other things, he had to undertake a study of the Ouessou pygmies.

In Brazzaville, Lods received moral support from other artists like Roger Erell, the architect of St. Anne's Cathedral in the Congo, and the Parnassian poet of African life, Roger Frey.

When he returned to France in 1949, he took Nicolas Ondongo along with him because his mother needed a black servant. Lods returned to Brazzaville, filled with a desire to create something.

One day, as he was walking with Ondongo towards Moungali, he came upon, what is now the site of the Poto-Poto school. The place was covered with trees and inhabited. The mayor's representative rented it out to him. At the instance of Lods, Gloria, the

architect, constructed for him a carpentry workshop, specialised in producing lounge chairs. Thus, Lod's initial idea was not to set up an art centre. He had to find a way to earn his living. It was then that he employed Felix Ossali as his servant, which was to lead to the revelation which proved a turning point in the life of the young French painter.

The first students were those brought by Ossali and Nicolas Ondongo. Lods also recruited some, such as Zigoma and Ouassa. Many were called like Ikongo, Ngolengo, Cickasso, Moukala, Bandila, Thango, Gotene, Letolo, Elenga, Ilok, Okola, Dekoto, Ouassa, Ngasuke, etc. Lods only kept those who really had an artistic temperament, and who showed some aptitude. Bela Borkemas, originally from Chad, was a student of Desfosses from Elisabethville (present-day Lubumbashi). He came to the Poto-Poto School in 1956.

Lods worked among young Congolese apparently of the same age as himself, "with his old bicycle and short trousers". He dealt with them as comrades. "I was their friend. We were on familiar terms with each other, and a few years later, when I bought a second-hand car and installed a telephone in my workshop, Ossali told me: 'Now that you are a director, you should wear long trousers'."

Lods was convinced that the Africans had something to say, a kind of revelation to make, and the alert European had to be watchful about—if not help—this revelation. That is why he was not a master but a guide, to the young Congolese who worked in his tiny workshop. At the Centre of African Arts, there was no discipline imposed, nor were there courses to follow. Everyone worked freely, according to his own inspiration and time-table. Lods insisted only on this inspiration being drawn from the tales, legends, traditions and the reality of the soil. He ensured that all material was readily available: drawing paper, canvas, paint brushes and tubes of paint. Nevertheless, those who visited the Centre, looked on him as a teacher. When a student had finished a painting Lods would intervene to show him the technical faults; he would offer advice on the use of colours, showing each one the colours that best suited his style of

painting. In spite of the freedom he gave to all, he preferred that they would not use, side by side, colours like green and yellow, purple and white, and blue and black. Before using oils, one had first to paint in gouache.

Lods himself painted landscapes and scenes of African life. He did portraits from models. However, he did not seem to have encouraged the Congolese painters to start portrait painting which he must have felt was out of place in African tradition. He decorated the backdrop of St. Anne's Cathedral in the Congo. His pictures are now rather rare in Brazzaville ; "The Wild Horses" can be seen in the Hippie Club, and "The Black Dancer" in the Pam-Pam restaurant. The painter Nicolas Ondongo has kept a painting from 1955 and an abstract painting, a veritable riot of colours.

Most of Lods' students were in poor circumstances. Many had not even finished their primary school education. They were "boys", fishermen, and often even unemployed, and they were completely without any background of painting. Lods did not try to give them any training for fear of seeing them affected by external influences. This attitude explains the reservations of Guy Leon Fylla regarding the utility of the French painter's work. In an unpublished interview, he said : "It (the work) was a good thing in itself, but I feel it was badly conceived. In his anxiety to create a pure African art, Lods did not teach his students the basic painting techniques he knew. So, when he went away, he left behind artists who were inadequately developed, unconscious of their art, and incapable of explaining it. For the last 20 years, every exponent of Congolese painting abroad has belonged to the group of independent painters. None of them was a student of Lods."

Since its inception, the Centre of African Arts has shown tremendous vitality. The absence of any formal teaching immediately led to the production of a large number of oil paintings. The first exhibition was held from the 14th to 19 August, 1951, barely three months after the opening of the Centre, in the V.I.P. room of the Grand Conseil d'AEF, under the auspices of the Press and the Social Affairs Services of the General Government. On this occasion, the

Centre of African Arts was described by Lomani Tchibamba in the journal "Liaison" (No. 14 of August, 1951,) in the following words : "The young people who visit the Centre of African Arts of Poto-Poto have a modest workshop and painting material at their disposal. The Centre seems to be a haven where the musings of youth can be heard...". The General Government bought all the works which were exposed.

In June-July 1952, the Galerie Palmes, Place St.-Sulpice in Paris sponsored an exhibition of African painters from Poto-Poto. The air of freshness with which these paintings were imbued, attracted visitors to the exhibition. Seeing the grinning, black silhouettes, portrayed on canvas without any trace of perspective, they must have felt that this was genuine "primitive art". Marcel Lucain, conservator of the French Overseas Museum wrote an enthusiastic article in the "Cahiers Charles de Foucauld". He spoke of a "natural art, nascent oxygen, born of the soil and of a people who had preserved their individuality and their own genius".

In 1953, Leopoldville (Kinshasa), in its turn welcomed an exhibition of painters from Poto-Poto. The painters Zigoma, who took part in it, recalls that there were only gouaches, roughly ten per painter.

In 1954, the Centre of African Arts, entered the English-speaking countries. An itinerant exhibition was held in South Africa—in Pretoria, Capetown, and Johannesburg - sponsored by Mrs Sacco who has collected many paintings from Poto-Poto. It created a deep impression. Mr Battis, Director of the Pretoria Art Centre agreed that the Poto-Poto School was "the most important art happening in Africa today." Two years later, the Johannesburg exhibition collected almost 200 canvases, carefully selected by Pierre Lods.

In 1955 and 1956, the Tibor de Nagy Gallery and the Museum of Modern Art in New York, welcomed paintings from Poto-Poto. They were considered to have an avant-garde style, something which their authors did not suspect. They provoked comparison with the surrealist paintings of Miro and Klee. The comparison was not

unfounded. Some of the paintings by Ossali and Zigoma seemed to emerge from a dream or from the subconscious. All this was sponsored by the American Committee for Free Culture.

Several Congolese painters won overseas professional awards on behalf of Central Congo at the Eighth National Exhibition of Labour in Paris in September, 1955. Among the winners were Nicolás Ondongo, Felix Ossali and Jacques Zigoma.

In 1956 the German people were able to see something of Congolese painting thanks to the Rudolf Hoffman Gallery. A year later, the Alexis Forel Museum in Morges (Switzerland) sponsored an exhibition of these paintings. The same year, the exhibition in the Pedagogic Museum, 27 Ulm Road, Paris proved a great success. It was jointly sponsored by the Governor-General, Paul Chauvet, French High Commissioner in Equatorial Africa, and the Inspector General Louis Cros, Director of the National Pedagogical Institute. The exhibition was opened on Saturday, 5th October, 1957, at 11 O'clock, by the Minister for Overseas France, Mr Gerard Jacquet.

In December 1961, the Congolese painters once more attracted attention at the Tenth Labour Exhibition. Ondongo received a diploma and a gold medal. A year earlier, a special event took place at the Poto-Poto School. Pierre Lods left for Dakar, invited by President Leopold Sedar Senghor to train young Senegalese painters. Mrs Edith Gandelin was named Director of the school.

How was the Poto-Poto School able to survive till then? During the first years of the Centre of African Arts, in the time of Lods, the sale of paintings in the city was forbidden. A gouache then cost about CFA 2000, half of which went to the painter and the other half to the Centre's funds. The General Government provided a three-monthly subsidy of CFA 300,000, which was reduced by almost half after 1960. After independence, this subsidy was reduced progressively, until in 1968 it was stopped altogether. The painter Zigoma says that in 1960, there were very few good paintings in town, and their sale was difficult. Inspired by the management system introduced by Lods, the painters of Poto-Poto set up a co-operative in

1962 under the management of Nicolas Ondongo who lived within the school premises itself.

After Lods, the Poto-Poto School continued to organise exhibitions, but these became less regular than before. Following the Revolution, many exhibitions of Congolese painters have been held in the Socialist countries, especially in USSR, Yugoslavia and Rumania.

The Poto-Poto painters celebrated the twentieth anniversary of their school in 1971. On this occasion, an exhibition was organised with sixty-eight paintings. The names of the most loyal painters could be seen in exhibition's catalogue—Ondongo, Zigoma, Iloki, Ngavouka, Bela. Many of the painters from Poto-Poto have left. Ouassa has been living in Yaounde since 1966, Thango is in Kinshasa, Moukala in Abidjan and Ossali died in Bengui. Some of them gave up painting like Elenga, and some have found occupations that have made them give up painting. For example, Bandila became a soldier, and Okola a pilot in Air Afrique.

The painting school of Poto-Poto now has a new generation of students who are being taught by old painters—Zigoma, Iloki, Ondongo. Among the better painters of this new generation are Ntota, Crispin, Ombala and Bouila.

II. The Styles of the Poto-Poto School

There are many styles at the Poto-Poto School—sometimes even by the same painter. This happens in the case of Zigoma. Those that seem to me to be the most representative are the following :

The "Mickey's" Style

This style begun by Felix Ossali is characterised by schematic and rudimentary forms. Forms are reduced to the essential, and made expressive through the fantasy of movements, and hence the name "Mickey's"—a reference to the animated drawings of the American cartoonist Walt Disney. They are mostly small drawings presenting traditional African life in scenes of hunting, fishing, marketing, war and dance.

This art style has often been compared with the cave art of Tassili and of South Africa. A space teems with people without the third dimension.

“Mickey’s” were very popular in 1951 and 1954. It is this style that has made the Poto-Poto Painting School so well-known in the world. Something of this pictorial graphism is still to be found among painters like Gotene whose art is not unrelated to cave art. One need only see the painting “The Caravan of Women Porters”, and “The Young Girls’ Theory” in the cave of young girls (Ravine of Tsisale) to be convinced.

The Poto-Poto painters must have thus unconsciously linked themselves with prehistoric African art.

The Surrealist Style

The use of the word “surrealist” here indicates the tendency of an art freed from usual forms. Painters such as Max Ernst Miro, Tanguy, Dali and Klee had no influence on the young Poto-Poto painters who were unaware of them especially during the first year of the Centre of African Arts. However, they did abstract art when they wanted to withdraw from the outside world and project on canvas what they saw within themselves—their dreams. This happened with Zigoma in the case of “The Eyes of the Forest” and in “Nocturnal Souvenirs of the Forest”. In Ossali’s case too, he presents in “The Equatorial Forests”, monsters who seem to have come straight from a nightmare.

The Naturalist Style

This style is extensively represented in the Poto-Poto School. It is a kind of familiar narrative of Congolese life. Ondongo and Zigoma are the main exponents of this style of painting.

One notices also a style that is semi-figurative and semi-abstract, the recognizable elements usually being masks, and bird heads. Paintings of this kind are often the work of Iloki and Ouassa.

Conclusion

In spite of his limits Pierre Lods' teachings bore good fruit as in the case of Gustave Moreau at the Beaux-Arts School in Paris, at the end of the XIX century. By his method of individual encouragement, the latter produced many great artists like Matisse Marquet and Rouault, who developed their personal tendencies.

In 1957, Frank Mac Ewen, ex-Director of the Rhodes National Gallery of Salisbury opened a "workshop-school" on the model of the Poto-Poto School. By 1966, almost 70 adults worked there following their own inspiration and time-table.

The Poto-Poto Painting School belongs for ever to the cultural history of the Congo.

(Translated from the original in French by Jacinta M. D' Souza.)

Dr. Ladipo Adamolebun

Co-operation or Neocolonialism— Francophone Africa

According to ex-President Charles de Gaulle, the desire of France at the independence of her former African colonies¹ in the late 1950s and early 1960s was to establish an effective framework for mutual co-operation between herself and the individual states.² The details of these co-operation agreements were spelt out in a series of bilateral agreements (*infra*).

About twelve years after each of these states had signed numerous co-operation agreements with France, some of the states began to denounce the agreements as 'neocolonial'. According to the leaders of these states, the agreements are neocolonial because they have allowed France to dominate their countries economically, culturally, militarily and politically despite the formal accession to sovereignty. Whilst the French Government did not admit the charge of practising neocolonialism it has accepted the request of the states concerned for a review of the existing cooperation agreements. It is significant, too that the other states whose leaders have not spoken of neocolonialism, have also reviewed or are in the process of reviewing their cooperation agreements with France.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the 'special relationship' (another label customarily applied to the relationship between France and tropical Africa) which was recognized by all concerned at the beginning as 'cooperation' only to be denounced later on by some as 'neocolonialism'. Was there a cooperation phase which later degenerated into neocolonialism? Or did cooperation and neocolonialism co-exist all along? Why did the denunciation of cooperation come when it did? What is the new pattern of relationship and what are the prospects for the future?

The Independence Cooperation Agreements

Between 1959 and 1963, a series of cooperation agreements were signed between France and eighteen Francophone African states. With the exception of Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire which were former Belgian colonies, the other states involved were former French colonies : Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Togo, Dahomey, Nigeri, Chad, Cameroun, Gabon, Congo, Central African Republic and Madagascar.


In most cases, the agreements signed covered the following fields : economic, financial, cultural, technical and military.³

In the economic and financial fields, these States agreed to become members of the franc zone in order to benefit from the advantages of a well-established convertible currency, the French franc. Furthermore, the presence of the states in the franc zone was intended to facilitate the economic and financial assistance which France promised to make available to each state. This economic and financial aid was, in actual fact, the responsibility of an institution called the *Fonds d'aide et de coopération* (FAC) created in 1969.

The dominant subject in the socio-cultural field is education with special reference to the teaching of French and the expansion of French culture. To this end, the agreements signed dealt with the supply of teachers at all levels of education, the award of scholarships for technical and higher education and the supply of funds for the expansion of primary, secondary, technical and higher education. In all this, adequate provisions were made for the teaching of French accompanied by the spreading of French culture.

Cooperation in military matters were intended to assist each state (excluding Mali and Upper Volta) to build up its national defence through the provision of training facilities and military equipment. The agreements also provided for French military assistance in case of threat to national sovereignty.

Because of the peculiar circumstances in which Guinea became independent in 1958, the cooperation agreements that she signed with



France in 1959, 1961 and 1963 were not as comprehensive as those described above. Although these agreements covered practically the same fields (with the notable exception of a military cooperation agreement), the agreements were repudiated almost as soon as they were signed. Thus, for example, after agreeing in 1959 to remain in the franc zone, the Guinean government went ahead in March 1960 to create a national currency which automatically meant a unilateral withdrawal from the franc zone. The only area of sustained Franco-Guinean cooperation was in the field of education where the Guinean government accepted a considerable number of French teachers until 1968.⁴

Unlike Guinea, the other states were very enthusiastic about their cooperation agreements with France. In almost every case, the agreements were regarded as essential to the consolidation of the newly-won national sovereign status. It was perhaps for this reason that none of the states bothered about what France intended to gain from the agreements. Of course, the French Government could not have been oblivious of its own interests. Far from it. As General de Gaulle later admitted in his memoir, the cooperation agreements were also intended to benefit France :

...it could be seen that the change from colonisation to modern cooperation now has a great chance of being successfully carried through in such a way as to bring to France not only a reduction in costs (of maintaining colonies) that have become unjustifiable, but also fruitful promises for the future.⁵

To sum up, then, the cooperation agreement signed between France and the Francophone African states between 1959 and 1963 were intended to benefit the two sides involved. With the exception of Guinea, there was mutual agreement on this point and each side was committed to remaining faithful both to the letter and the spirit of the terms of the agreements.

Long Live 'Cooperation'!

Throughout the 1950s, the cooperation agreements *appeared* to have been scrupulously respected on all sides. The French budget

for cooperation increased year after year (see Table 1 below), there was rapid expansion in educational development and French technical assistance personnel was made available at the request of the African states.

Table 1
French Cooperation Budget, 1963—1970

<i>Year</i>	<i>Budget</i> (in million francs; roughly 10 francs=£1 sterling)
1963	1,117
1964	1,061
1965	980
1966	1,052
1967	1,146
1968	1,150
1969	1,161
1970	1,120

Source : P. Decraene, 'La Coopération, Un esprit nouveau'
Le Monde (Paris), 5/3/75.

In the field of educational development, thanks to French financial and personnel assistance, primary school population tripled between 1960 and 1972 in the former French colonies. During the same period, secondary education population multiplied by seven and higher education population by twelve. The following Table sums up French technical personnel assistance both for education and the other public services.

Table II
French Technical Personnel Assistance 1960—1974

<i>Year</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Other Public Services</i>	<i>Total</i>
1960	2,416	7,666	10,082
1961	2,794	5,890	8,684
1962	3,233	5,320	8,553

<i>Year</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Other Public Services</i>	<i>Total</i>
1963	4,040	4,709	8,749
1964	4,675	4,508	9,183
1965	5,182	4,268	9,450
1966	5,517	4,372	9,889
1967	6,121	4,248	10,369
1968	6,502	4,167	10,669
1969	6,274	3,880	10,154
1970	6,671	3,659	10,330
1971	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1972	7,573	3,708	11,281
1973	n.a.	n.a.	12,000
1974	7,090	3,674	10,764

In the economic field, the Francophone African states have benefited tremendously from French aid either through FAC or through these States' special connection with the European Economic Community (EEC) promoted by France and institutionalized in what was called the Yacunde Convention.⁶ The bulk of external finance made available for the Three, Four or Five-Year Development Plans prepared by these states during the 1960s was from these two sources. It is significant to mention that most of these Development Plans depended on external finance for more than 60 per cent of the plan budgets⁷. In other words, French aid was of critical importance to whatever achievements the Francophone African states made in the 1960s in the fields of industrial, agricultural and infrastructural development.

Cooperation in military matters received the least publicity, for obvious reasons. There were, however, two occasions when the invocation of the agreements attracted international attention. The first was in 1964 when the President of Gabon who had been deposed by a military *coup d'etat* was restored to power as a result of French military intervention. The second occasion was the protracted involvement of French troops in Chad (1969—1972) to fight maintain its 'territorial integrity' in the 'guerilla' activities in some parts of the country. Other unpublicised activities included joint Franco-Ivorian

military exercises in Abidjan in 1967 and the use of French troops to maintain law and order in Dakar on a number of occasions, notably in 1968.

Finally, mention should be made of two eloquent testimonies to the flourishing state of France-African cooperation in the 1960s. The first was the launching of an 'operation Francophonie' in the mid-1960s by President Senghor of Senegal in collaboration with King Hassan of Morocco. According to these two leaders through *Francophone*, the cultural and linguistic ties binding France to all French-speaking states in the world were to be strengthened. For several reasons, very little had been done to translate this pan-Francophone idea into action at the end of the 1960s (*infra*).

The second important evidence that marked the 1960s as the Golden Decade of Cooperation was the regular (annual in most cases) pilgrimage of the African Heads of State to the President of the French Republic at the *Elysee* Palace. These visits were arranged (master-minded?) by the *Secrétariat général à la présidence de la République pour la Communauté et les affaires africaines et malgaches* (Secretariat General at the Presidency of the Republic for the Community and for African and Malagasy Affairs) whose head, Jacques Foccart, was reputed to have used every available means (including the assistance of the French *renseignements généraux*, meaning secret service) to ensure that no clouds existed over the horizon of Franco-African relations.⁸ At the end of every visit, the visiting African Head of State posed for a photograph with the French President and as he went out of the *Elysee* Palace, he would declare to the waiting press that the relations between France and his country were excellent.

With the departure of ex-President de Gaulle from the *Elysee* Palace in 1969, these visits began to lose something of their grandeur and within a few years, some of the African Heads of State began to express openly, both in Paris and in their own capitals, dissatisfaction with certain aspects of their countries' relations with France. This was the beginning of a new trend which eventually culminated in demands for the revision of the independence cooperation agreements. What exactly had gone wrong with these agreements?

Down with 'Neocolonialism'!

Besides the renunciation by Guinea of her cooperation agreements with France (*supra*), criticisms of those agreements were very muted throughout the 1960s. Both in Paris and in the African capitals, one often heard the shout 'Long Live Franco-African Cooperation'. Inside the African states, the only groups of people who did not share this cooperation euphoria were student organisations, some workers' organisations and some members of the emerging intellectual elites.

At this juncture mention should be made of the role played by the 'French mind-set'⁹ of the African leaders who signed the cooperation agreements with France. These leaders had been profoundly impregnated by French culture thanks to French policy of cultural assimilation and were, to a considerable extent prepared to see the world through French binoculars. This was partly responsible for their indifference to the extent to which France, too, stood to gain from the independence cooperation agreements. (*supra*)

The students, for their part, were largely free from the cultural handicap of their elders and were therefore able to detect the shortcomings in the cooperation agreements from the beginning. For example, they were critical of the military agreements which they saw as undermining national sovereignty. The Gabon episode of 1964 confirmed their fears. The French military umbrella was also regarded by the students and that section of the emerging national elite opposed to the ruling leadership as protecting the 'Ins' (those in power) against the 'Outs' (the aspirants for power). The students were also critical of the reliance on French educational philosophy (with emphasis on French culture) instead of the elaboration of a national educational philosophy aimed at developing the national cultural heritage. The recurrent student troubles in Dakar, Tananarive and Abidjan in the 1960s were partly caused by student agitation for a national educational policy. From the mid-1960s onwards, students began to resent the continued dependence of their states on French technical assistance personnel in areas where qualified nationals were either already available or could be quickly produced to

replace the French 'experts'. On this point students' organisations were joined by workers' organizations.

The criticism did not amount to any serious challenge of the *status quo* but the leadership in each state saw the criticism more as a challenge to themselves (which they were in a sense) than as genuine criticism of the existing bilateral agreements with France. On the other hand, developments in the external environment of these states—notably in France and in the world economic scene—from the mid-1960s onwards were combining to produce a situation in which the *raison d'être* of the independence cooperation agreements were being seriously undermined.

First, let us consider the developments in France that tended to undermine the cooperation agreements. No sooner had de Gaulle's Government succeeded in establishing France's economic cultural and political influence in Francophone Africa than it began to treat the subject of France-African cooperation as an ordinary routine affair deserving no serious attention. In 1965, the French military presence in Africa was drastically reduced (from 60,000 in 1960, the size fell to 27,000 in 1964 and to 6,500 in 1965) and from the same year onwards, the cooperation budget began to stagnate. (The apparent increases between 1966 and 1970 were largely 'eaten' up by increased salary payment and the decrease in the value of the currency).¹⁰ Whilst de Gaulle's successful decolonisation in Algeria won him world-wide praise and respect as the 'great decolonizer', Russia and China developed serious disagreements, the United States was wasting away its energy and resources in South-East Asia and Britain was prevaricating over Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Zimbabwe. In the circumstances, there was no 'great power' to challenge the established French influence and the Francophone African Heads of State, for their part, were quite happy to be associated with the prestigious de Gaulle whom one of them described as his 'father'.

With the departure of de Gaulle from *Elysee* Palace in 1969 and his death the following year, the cover provided by his venerated father-figure over the reality of a decreasing French attention to the

policy of cooperation was removed. As if to correct the situation two commissions were set up in quick succession in 1969 and 1971 to report on the organisation and functioning of the cooperation institutions (1969) and on the structure of French aid (1971). On the basis of subsequent events, these commissions did not succeed in enabling France to re-invigorate her cooperation policy in Africa. This failure was due largely to the fact that despite the work of these commissions,¹¹ the administration of the cooperation policy was shared between three separate administrative services—the Ministry of External Affairs, the Secretariat of State for Cooperation and the Secretariat General for the Community and for African and Malagasy Affairs. These services spent so much time in disputing tasks among themselves that in the end no coherent policy on cooperation ever emerged. And when decisions were taken, the follow-up could not always be guaranteed.¹²

It was just about this time that the deterioration of the terms of trade (especially the drastic reduction in the money paid to the producers of primary products) was forcing the leaders of the African states to examine more closely and critically the real worth of French aid. What they discovered was later summed up (in 1973) by President Senghor of Senegal as follows :

In Senegal, every year, we receive twenty billion francs CFA (as gifts, loans, investments etc), but twenty billion francs also leave Senegal in visible forms (salaries, profits, etc.). How much are the 'invisibles' worth? In any case, they exist and constitute a clear profit free of tax for Europe.¹³

As tangible targets of attack, some African leaders began to criticize the incompetence and ineffectiveness of some of the technical assistance personnel sent to them¹⁴ and the arrogance of some French capitalist interests who were openly refusing to allow the indigenization of small businesses and the Africanization of middle and senior level posts in their enterprises.¹⁵

All these developments were taking place against a background of serious academic studies which since the mid-1960s had been calling

into question the wide claims made for the aid of the industrialised countries to the developing countries. In regard to Francophone African states two studies by Samir Amin had brilliantly exposed what President Senghor officially confirmed in 1973.¹⁶

When, at last, in 1971, a number of African Heads of State began to denounce the existing cooperation agreements between their country and France as 'neo-colonial' and called for their revision, they were simply using a passion-inspiring term—'neo-colonialism'—to support a demand that by any objective standard was both reasonable and legitimate. Mauritania led the way, followed by Madagascar, Cameroun, Congo, Dahomey, Niger, Chad, Togo, Senegal and Ivory Coast. Naturally, the leaders did not use the same language but they were saying essentially the same thing.

Because of the confused state of the French services responsible for cooperation policy, the French Government was almost totally unprepared for the African demands for the revision of the cooperation agreements when they came. After all, Paris was able to disregard the African leaders who murmured some protests when they were involved in an automatic currency devaluation in 1969 without any prior consultation. Thus, when the late President Pompidou toured some African states in 1971 and 1972, he was completely unprepared for the open attacks against the cherished but badly-administered cooperation policy.¹⁷ Although he replied in defiant terms (notably in Lome), to what appeared as African ingratitude,¹⁸ he subsequently ordered a re-examination of the problem. Those who cried 'Long live Franco-African Cooperation' in the 1960s were now shouting 'Down with Neocolonialism'. Surely, something must have gone wrong somewhere and the idea revising the cooperation agreements was eventually accepted as both inevitable and necessary.

Towards a New Relationship

The procedure adopted for revising the cooperation agreements of those states who requested the exercise consisted of the establishment of a Joint Review Commission composed of representatives

of the French Government and of each state concerned. By March 1975, revised agreements had been reached with some states whilst a number of joint commissions were still at work. (See Table III overleaf.)

At the same time, a far-reaching re-organisation of the cooperation institutions in Paris was undertaken. The highlight of reorganization consists of assigning clear responsibility and authority in all matters related to cooperation policy to a new Ministry of Cooperation. This re-organization has led to the disappearance of the Secretariat General for the Community and African and Malagasy Affairs¹⁹ and the Secretariat of State for Cooperation. The first major task undertaken by this Ministry was to dispatch a 'mission of dialogue' to each of the Francophone African states to obtain first-hand knowledge of the needs of these states.²⁰ The objective is to enable the French Government to re-define its cooperation policy.

The present position, then, is that no new cooperation policy has emerged but the nature of the criticisms expressed by African leaders in recent years together with the contents of the revised agreements constitute some pointers to what the future policy could look like.

The highlights of the revised cooperation agreements include partial breakaway from the franc zone by Mauritania with a national currency called the *ougiya* and Madagascar whose national currency is called the *ariary*; the replacement of French by Arabic as the national language in Mauritania; and significant modifications in the existing agreements on military matters (Senegal and Madagascar) or total abrogation of defence agreement (Mauritania and Niger).²¹

On the basis of the existing revised arrangements, it appears that both sides are content with amending the independence cooperation agreements. Emphasis is still on bilateral agreements and the same broad areas are covered (with the notable exception of the total abrogation of military agreements in Niger and Mauritania) as was the case with the old agreements. Perhaps, there are

important reasons why both France and the Francophone African states are content with merely amending the existing bilateral agreements. But one wonders if France can successfully evolve a clearly-defined and comprehensive strategy on the basis of a series of bilateral agreements. And for the African states, is a mere tinkering with the existing arrangements likely to ensure for them maximum benefit from their relations with France ?

Conclusion

In the light of the above analysis, which term is more appropriate for summing up Franco-African relations : 'co-operation' or 'neo-colonialism' ? It is understandable that the French Government described the pattern of relationship established with the African states between 1959 and 1963 as cooperation. Given that French imperial rule over these states had been attacked for being exploitative and intended essentially to benefit France alone, it was logical that what was replacing it should seek to correct the alleged imbalance in the old relationship. Thus, the French Government proclaimed the policy of cooperation which suggested a clean break with the past : the exploitation of African territories by Frenchmen primarily for the benefit of France was, at least in theory, to be replaced by France-African cooperation for developing African territories for the benefit of the Africans with some advantages accruing to France.

In practice, it turned out that whilst the African states benefited more from the independence cooperation agreements than was the case during the colonial era, the advantages that accrued to France were much more substantial. The major explanation for this state of affairs was the fact that the exploitative economic framework implanted in these states under colonial rule was not dismantled in any of the states. Thus, whilst the continued membership of these states in the Franc zone guaranteed them the facilities provided by an internationally convertible currency, it also facilitated the transfer of profits to France by French capitalists whose investments were welcomed in the name of Franco-African cooperation. More importantly, the desire to encourage investments by French and

other European capitalists (especially the members of the European Economic Community) led these countries to accept the terms dictated by the foreign investors. As was the case under colonial rule, the African countries were encouraged to export primary products whilst importing manufactured goods from Europe. The French technical assistance personnel made available under the terms of the cooperation agreements prepared the investment codes as well as the development plans which institutionalized this perpetuation of the colonial economic system. In other words, the perpetuation of the colonial economic system was a prerequisite for the effective implementation of the cooperation agreements.

Another negative consequence of the cooperation agreements for the African states was that the implementation of the cultural and educational aspects absorbed them in the propagation of French culture and the adoption of French educational philosophy at the expense of developing their respective national cultures and articulating new educational policies.

Is it possible that the African leaders were totally unaware of these negative aspects of the cooperation agreements? The available evidence suggests that they were so preoccupied with the immediate question of establishing their new states that they were in no mood to subject the cooperation agreements to a cost-benefit analysis. The urgent task was how to solve the problems posed by the newly-won sovereign status and the cooperation agreements appeared to promise some solutions. And they were proved right to some extent. For example, none of the states could have succeeded in maintaining and improving the existing public services at independence without the support of French technical assistance personnel. Even Guinea which quickly began to renounce aspects of its agreements continued to accept French teachers until about 1968. France's financial assistance, too, proved critical for most of these States during the first year of independence: it was not until the late 1960s that Dahomey was able to balance its recurrent budget without reliance on French financial subsidy and Senegal's quasi-total dependence on revenue from groundnuts was made bearable for several years (until 1965) by the

fact that the French Government imported Senegal's groundnuts at subsidized rates.

To conclude, then, one could say that through the cooperation agreements the French Government succeeded in replacing the unabashed exploitation that characterized the colonial era by a subtle exploitative arrangement. It was partly because of the subtlety of new arrangement and partly because of the special circumstances in which the African leaders found themselves at independence (their 'French mind-set' serving as a useful underpinning) that the idea of a brand new cooperation policy was proclaimed by both sides to the rest of the world. When, after several years, the African leaders were ready to subject the cooperation agreements to a rational cost-benefit analysis, they found what had always been there all along—an exploitative arrangement in which the benefits accruing to France and the other industrialized Western European states were more substantial than those enjoyed by the African states.

A possible way out of this impasse could be a de-emphasis of bilateral relations with France by the African states. As an alternative strategy, these states should strive towards the emergence of strong regional communities (free from the nebulous Senghorian concept of Eurafrika) which alone can guarantee a genuinely mutually beneficial cooperation with France and other industrialized countries. This conclusion, too, is valid for Anglophone African states. Any bilateral relationship between an African state and an industrialized state is bound by the logic of prevailing economic arrangements to profit the latter more than the former. The increasing cooperation among the European countries within the European Economic Community raises the odds against the African states. Perhaps it was the awareness of this situation that contributed to the determination of the 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states during their negotiations with the EEC countries. The recent establishment in May 1975 of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is also a step in the right direction. Could this mean that henceforth African states, Francophone as well as Anglophone, will attach greater importance to multilateral agreements in their relations with the industrialized states? Perhaps.²²

Table III

Franco-African Cooperation Agreements

<i>Country</i>	<i>Date of Agreement</i>	<i>Present Situation</i>
Cameroon	13 November, 1960	Revised on 21 February 1974
Central African Republic	13 August, 1960	Revision in Progress
Chad	11 August, 1960	Revision in Progress
Congo (Brazzaville)	15 August, 1960	Revised on 1 January 1974
Dahomey	24 April, 1961	Revised in February 1975
Gabon	17 August, 1960	Revised on 12 February 1974
Guinea	January, 1959 1961 and 1963	Unilateral Renunciation by Guinea
Ivory Coast	24 April, 1961	Revision in Progress
Madagascar	27 June, 1960	Revised on 4 June 1973
Mali	2 February and 9 March, 1962	Significant Review since the mid-1960s.
Mauritania	19 June, 1961	Revised on 15 February 1973
Niger	24 April, 1961	Revision in Progress
Senegal	22 June, 1960	Revised on 29 March 1974
Togo	10 July, 1963	Revision in Progress
Upper Volta	24 April, 1961	Revision in Progress
Burundi	11 February, 1963	Revision in Progress
Mauritius	June 1970	Revision in Progress
Rwanda	20 October, 1962	Revision in Progress
Zaire	17 December, 1963	Revision in Progress

FOOTNOTES

1. This paper deals only with the relations between France and her former colonies in tropical Africa including Togo and Cameroon which were administered by France as trust territories of the United Nations Organization.

2. Charles de Gaulle, *Memoires d'espoir* Paris, 1970, pp. 71-72.

3. The details provided in the following paragraphs apply wholly to the former French colonies excluding Guinea and only partially to the former Belgian colonies. For a full-scale study of these agreements and their evolution, see E.M. Corbett, *The French Presence in Black Africa*, Washington, 1972.

4. For more details on Guinea's dissociation policy with France and on post-independence developments in general, see the writer's forthcoming study, *Sekou Toure's Guinea, An Experiment in Nation Building*, London, 1976.

5. de Gaulle f.n. 2 p. 87.

6. This refers to the association between seventeen Francophone African states and the Malagasy Republic in a quasi-free trade area with the European Economic Community signed in Yaounde towards the end of the 1950s.

6. S. Amin, *Neo-Colonialism in West Africa*, London, 1973, p. 270. Amin provides the following estimate of annual foreign contribution to investment funds; Togo, 83%; Senegal, 81%; Mali, 78%; Mauritania, 78%; Ivory Coast, 76%; Upper Volta, 72%; Niger, 72%; Dahomey, 64%; Guinea, 60%.

8. When, in May 1974, Mr. Forccart's Secretariat was abolished, he was described in the influential Paris daily, *Le Monde* (June 1, 1974) as the man who 'reigned in darkness for more than fifteen years, with his secret funds and agents, over Franco-African relations'.

9. This term was first used by Corbett in his *The French Presence in Black Africa* f.n. 3 p. 1.

10. See Table I on page 6.

11. Similar commissions had been established in 1961 and 1963.

12. G. Comte, 'La Cooperation en question', *La Monde*, (Paris), 13, 14, 15, and 16 November, 1973.

13. Quoted by Comte, f.n. 12.

14. Some of these attacks were unjustified as a few African leaders described as 'incompetent' and 'ineffective' French technical assistance personnel with left-wing opinions who were considered as dangerous elements. In response to the genuine aspects of the criticism about the quality of the technical assistance personnel, the French Government intensified its training programme at the *Cedtre de formation des experts de la cooperation technique internationale* in Paris.

15. Senegal is a notorious example; *La Soleil* (Dakar) November 5, 1970 and R. Cruise O'Brien, *White Society in Black Africa: The French of Senegal*, London, 1972 pp. 133-162.

Dr. Ladipo Adamolebun

16. S. Amin, *La Development du capitalisme on Cote d'Ivoire* Paris, 1967 and *Neo-Colonialism in West Africa*, f.n. 7.

17. In spite of the unexpected attacks on the cooperation policy, the late President Pompidou announced a write-off of Francophone African states' indebtedness to France totalling about 84 million Pounds (sterling).

18. There exists a school of thought in France (since the 1950s) called the cartierist school, which believes that the money spent by France in Africa (and other former colonies) was being wasted; it would be better spent in promoting development inside France. The idea of 'African ingratitude comes dangerously close to the position of the cartierists. The term 'cartierisme' was coined after the name of a French journalist, Raymond Cartier of the illustrated magazine, *Paris-Match*, who was prominent in espousing those views in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

19. Perhaps with the disappearance of this Secretariat General the term 'Community' which ceased to have any judicial meaning since 1960 will at last disappear completely.

20. Sixteen 'missions of dialogue' were dispatched to Francophone Africa between October 1974 and January 1975. *Bulletin de l'Afrique noire* (Paris), No. 816, March 26, 1975.

21. In Senegal, the size of the French troops was reduced from 2,250 to 1,300 towards the end of 1974 whilst the French base in Dakar became Senegalese property although the French will continue to be allowed to use it. In Madagascar, too, there has been a considerable reduction in the size of French troops in the Island. According to Niger's Supreme Military Council: 'The stationing of foreign troops on the territory of a country is an infringement of its sovereignty'; *Daily Times*, (Lagos), May 18, 1974.

22. Hopefully, the current disenchantment of several African Heads of State with Franco-African cooperation will make them consider seriously the alternatives of inter-African cooperation and of multilateral agreements. President Senghor summed up this disenchantment as follows in 1974: 'Faced with French disengagement and the ignorance of its public opinion which describes us [African Heads of State] as "Elysee beggars", we are obliged to think carefully and to seek a complement, if not an alternative, to French cooperation which is receiving less and less attention every year'. Source : *Bulletin de l'Afrique noire*, (Paris), No. 780, May 8, 1974.

Parbati K. Sircar : **Regional Development
through Cooperation :
Two Examples from
West Africa**

Regional development in Africa has taken many forms to encompass the diverse nature of problems it is supposed to ameliorate or solve. Many of these problems relate to the annual or seasonal deficiency of agricultural water supply or to the possibility of harnessing the water resources for multi-purpose development of irrigation, power, navigation, fisheries, and tourism. The Economic Commission for Africa has underlined the role of water resources in African development thus :¹

In their struggle to develop their natural economies African Governments must utilize their water resources efficiently and this can only be achieved by scientific planning based upon systematic work in the hydrological field.

Although the water resources of Africa are vast, their utilization has been rather limited because of physical, economic, technical, and political constraints. One particular political problem relates to the jurisdiction over the river and lake basins. Because of piecemeal partitioning of Africa into many colonies during the "scramble for Africa," and the subsequent development of independent nation states from these colonies, Africa has an unusually large number of rivers and lakes which are shared by two or more nations. There are in Africa no less than fifty-four such international rivers, of which the rivers Congo, Niger, Nile, and Zambesi are the best known examples. Similar is the case with regard to many lakes in Africa, e.g., Lakes Chad, Malawi, Tanganyika and Victoria. Because of the international character of these water resources, their full, harmonious,

and sustained development is dependent on the cooperation and goodwill of the nations sharing them. This factor thus adds another dimension to the problem of water resource development in Africa, as in other continents where similar international water bodies exist.

From another point of view international cooperation for water resources development is also called for. A river or a lake basin has a hydrological unity imposed on it through hydrologic cycle. The water basin as a whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and what is done in one part of the basin affects the rest of the basin. It is thus vitally important that all nations sharing the water resources of a basin should work together for its unified development. In this way it is possible to work for the optimum development of the resources in a basin, sharing out the costs and benefits of the projects. Working together will make the projects more economic because of the scale involved. It is the general consensus that a²

...full cooperative, unified development (of a river basin) would always make it possible for every participating country to achieve a better position than if it tried to go it alone. There would always be gains from collaboration.

The essential hydrological unity of a river basin has already been stressed. It is the fundamental areal unit for observation and measurement of hydrological characteristics as well as for the design, execution, and operation of the engineering works for the utilization of the water resources. It, therefore, devolves upon the nations sharing the waters of a river or a lake basin to set up jointly an adequate network of stations for standardized observations and recording of the hydrological elements. In order to get the maximum data utilization, data synchronization is required, and these operations generally bring about a greater understanding of the problems of water development amongst the nations, paving the way for greater cooperation.

Before a project can be approved for implementation, several other studies are essential. One such set of studies has to do with the potentialities of the project and the engineering feasibility; the

second set would involve an appraisal of the economic and social desirability of the project ; and the third would be concerned with financial feasibility and a financial plan. Whereas the potentiality and the engineering feasibility has to be worked out for the project as a whole, the economic and social desirability of the project and its financial feasibility and plan are considered from the points of view of individual nations. It is even useful to examine the economic and social desirability of the project at the sub-national level from the local and regional perspective. It is an important guiding principle that the development of international waters have international and national dimensions as well as regional and local ones.

While the project may be sound from the point of view of the potentiality of the basin, an important question not often asked is : are there alternative projects *within* the nation state itself which might be more desirable, economically, politically, and/or socially ? When one remembers that international river basin projects are very much capital-intensive, although they may be multi-purpose in nature, and that there is inevitably a high degree of dependence on foreign capital and technical expertise, the above question assumes a greater significance. Also relevant here is the question of underutilization of the developed water resources by the nations at their relatively low stages of economic growth. In this respect several experts have raised the question of one large versus several small projects, and one feels that such comparative studies would be worthwhile before a final decision is made.

One area of crucial concern in basin development is the allocation of costs and benefits among the participating nations. Costs and benefits are made up of both tangible and intangible items, and the nations must take all of these into account so that the division of the ultimate costs among them is commensurable to the potential benefits that each nation perceives ; otherwise, the project, even though otherwise sound, will not get off the ground. One intangible benefit of such collaborative efforts is the flow of goodwill and amity among the nations concerned. A nation will be willing to invest in an international project only when it is certain that its benefits outweigh the

costs, and when, in terms of alternative national schemes, the international project has a better benefit/cost ratio.

In order to develop international waters a suitable institutional framework is required. However, when one reviews the international development of waters, one finds very few multi-lateral treaties dealing with comprehensive basin development. This is perhaps one indication of the complexity of the problems involved. But it must also be remembered that such international cooperative efforts are of recent origin. Nonetheless there is enough experience in this regard that one can examine through the agreements on the Columbia, Danube, Indus, Nile, Rhine, Rio Grande, and St. Lawrence. Such a review by potential partners in water resources development would be most beneficial in providing guidelines for drawing up alternative institutional frameworks for comparison.

The organization and administration agreed upon must be such that not only does it take care of the routine work, but it also has some amount of dynamism and creativity built into it. As Chapman³ puts it :

...innovation and vision must characterize the institutions which are designed to facilitate international river development.

It is also important to separate out the ingredients of international development of the water resources that are common among nations from other aspects of their inter-territorial relations. Differences on development need to be resolved at the functional level, and not at the political or ideological level.⁴

International unity as the result of a basin development, inter-regional unity as a result of a common aspiration, and inter-agency coordination to ensure integrated planning and operation, must be prime goals of the organizational and administrative structure of an international development.

Against this background of general principles and policies of development of water resources, I shall now examine two specific projects from West Africa : the O.M.V.S. (organization pour le mise en valeur de fleuve Senegal) and Lake Chad Commission Projects.

O.M.V.S.

Although the O.M.V.S. was established at Nouakchott on March 11, 1972, its history goes back, through its predecessor, the O.E.R.S. (organization des états riverains du Senegal), to 1968, and the roots of cooperation among the participating states could be traced even further back to common political and administrative traditions that developed under French colonial rule. Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal (the four states sharing the waters of the Senegal) had formed parts of the A.O.F. (French West Africa) Federation, and thus had a measure of uniformity, if not unity, imposed upon them by the federal structure in several respects.

Since independence the idea of political unity in Africa has been explored with great fervour, and the four countries have felt that for both economic and political reasons they should forge strong bonds of cooperation, and ultimately, if possible, political unity. For all of them, with traditional sources of fossil fuel and energy lacking, one vital concern has been the development of the water resources of the Senegal. Thus, based on their past shared colonial experience, present sentiments for political unity, and the hopes of future economic development through the utilization of the water resources of the Senegal, these countries were predisposed to some kind of economic and political cooperation.

The interests in the Senegal river vary among the four nations. Water power development is the primary concern of Guinea with many possible dam sites within her territory. Being a land-locked country, Mali's overriding interest is in improved navigability of the river. She also has a few sites suitable for hydroelectric power generation. Along with Mauritania and Mali, Senegal has a stake in the development of irrigation. And all of the three latter countries would certainly be concerned with an improvement in the port facilities at St. Louis at the mouth of the Senegal.

O.E.R.S.

Soon after independence, an inter-state committee was created in 1963 for the explicit purpose of the development of the Senegal

waters and for seeking international aid. Further progress was made in this direction in 1968 when it was decided in principle to create an organization which would be instrumental in the development of the Senegal as well as coordination of other activities of the sub-region.

The O.E.R.S. came into existence in the same year. Among the immediate reasons for the formation of the O.E.R.S., Gautron (1971)⁵ cites the following : (a) the desire of Guinea to break out of isolation after the fall of President Nkrumah of Ghana in 1966, and (b) the continued belief of Senegal that the West African grouping would serve her future industrial growth by providing an enlarged market for her processed and manufactured goods.

The O.E.R.S. comprised the Conference of Heads of State as the supreme policy-making body, the Council of Ministers charged with implementation of the policy decisions of the Heads of State, and the Inter-Parliamentary Commission as a consultative body. The day-to-day administration was vested in the Executive Secretariat. There were separate Secretariats for the development of the Senegal, for planning and economic development, and for education, cultural, and social affairs.

The objectives of the O.E.R.S. were very broad indeed. These included economic, social, and political cooperation in wide-ranging fields from agriculture to industries, education to public health, trade and transport and included the creation of the Group of West African States with a view to the realization of African unity.

Over the three years of its existence, the O.E.R.S. touched a whole gamut of activities in the economic, social, cultural, and political fields with the central underlying idea that all these cooperative projects and activities would lead ultimately to the formation of a Union of West African States, with a common currency, a customs union, and a common market.

Despite all the fund of goodwill with which the start was made in cooperation, serious rifts began to show within the very year of creation of the O.E.R.S. The differences were ideological and

political and these affected the mutual cooperation among the partner States. One of the persistent problems in the smooth operation of the O.E.R.S. has been finance. Working essentially with a small budget (76 million CFA francs or approximately U.S. \$273,000 in 1970-71), the Organization could hardly be overgenerous with its allocations for the essential activities. Moreover, the Organization decided on a policy of distributing the available funds over a large number of investigations and thus the money inevitably had to be spread too thin to be effective in yielding desirable results from these projects.

More serious were the political obstacles. With the removal of his trusted friend Keita of Mali through a coup d'etat in November 1968, Toure virtually withdrew Guinea's support from the O.E.R.S.⁶ Over and above the political difficulties that led to the collapse of the O.E.R.S., it should be noted that the interests of Guinea, controlling, as it does, the upper basin of the Senegal, were rather marginal in the integrated river development. Her interests were more political and ideological, and when these were not served, she lost her interest in the O.E.R.S. and what it stood for. The final break-up came toward the end of 1971.

The New Organization (March 1972)

Presidents Senghor (Senegal) and Traore (Mali) started almost immediately to express their hopes for a new organization without Guinea. A joint communique declared that the two countries had affirmed their determination for an integrated development of the Senegal River Basin in a more realistic fashion.

Thus the groundwork was laid for a new grouping of the Senegal River States, now minus Guinea, and with more limited objectives. The new organization, called the O.M.V.S., (organization pour le mise en valeur de fleuve Senegal) was still open for Guinea to join, provided she accepted the spirit and letter of the convention which brought it into being. The change in the title itself is quite significant.

The experience of the three States in the now defunct O.E.R.S. has made their approach to the new organization more cautious and less political. While the objectives of the O.E.R.S. were very ambitious and wide-ranging, those of the O.M.v.S. are limited strictly to the planning for, and development of the Senegal.

This attempt at simplification is reflected in the structure of the O.M.V.S. While the Conference of the Heads of State decides on policy matters, as in the previous organizations, the Council of Ministers has been assigned a technical, rather than a political, role. The General Secretariat carries out the decisions of the Council.

A new convention defining the international character of the Senegal has been signed which is binding on the signatories for the next ten years.

The O.M.V.S. will focus particularly on the regularization of the river flow, improvement of navigation, port development, agricultural research, irrigation, and the establishment of a documentation centre.

The key to the development of the Senegal is the building of the Manantali dam on the Bafing tributary in Mali. This will help in the generation of power to be used in the extraction of iron ore in Senegal and in the processing of bauxite in Mali. The waters from the reservoir will enable irrigation of more than 400,000 ha of land for double cropping. At present Senegal uses her valuable foreign exchange to import annually 285,000 metric tons of rice. A large part of this import could be replaced by home production, since the plan calls for the harvesting of 254,000 metric tons of paddy every year⁷. In addition, a barrage at N'Diama (19 km above Saint-Louis) in the delta would provide protection against salt water invasion from the Atlantic of the riverine land. Without such protection, land as far as Bogue, 256 km. above Saint-Louis, becomes saline. The barrage will also regulate river flow, making the river navigable throughout the year up to Kayes and will allow irrigation of 28,000 ha for double-cropping.

The Chinese have agreed to finance up to 6 percent of the cost of the Manantali dam and several Chinese experts sent by Peking

have undertaken preliminary investigations.⁸ The plan for the Manantali dam proposed by the Chinese experts have been accepted by the O.M.V.S. According to this plan, the dam will impound 9,500 cu. m. of water, allowing generation of 771 million KWH of electricity annually and the irrigation of 428,000 ha for double-cropping. The dam will take ten years to build and cost CFA 49,000 million⁹. The dam will also ensure navigation from Kayes to the river mouth for most of the year.

The three countries have solemnly declared that they would undertake the project operations jointly with equal rights of access to their uses and have offered a common guarantee to the twenty or so outside countries and organisations involved in the project.

The cost of the project has been revised in the upward direction with the passage of time, and a recent report¹⁰ has disclosed that CFA 87,000, million would be required for the construction of the two dams (Manantali and N'Diama), improvement of the ports of Saint-Louis and Kayes, and about ten small ports, and the construction of a canal 900 km. long. Out of this estimate, the O.M.V.S. has received firm commitments for CFA 34,000 million, which would cover studies and construction of the dam at N'Diama. This sum, which does not include that promised by the Chinese, represents the total of firm offers from countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, France, West Germany, Iran, and Canada. These countries have earmarked their aids for specific projects. Thus France has allocated CFA 450 million for a study of the Delta dam, Canada has set aside \$5 million for port building, the Federal Republic of Germany has donated 6 millions marks for a study on the Manantali dam and finances from the U.S.A. have come for studies of the effects on the environment of the development of the Senegal River. The Federal Republic of Germany is providing another sum of 46 million marks toward the improvement of navigability of the Senegal, provision of irrigation, and the building of the dam.¹¹

Recent Developments

A reconsideration of the O.M.V.S. plans became necessary in the middle of 1975 when Guinea announced a plan to build a dam at

Koukoutamba on the Bafing tributary. The dam, to be built by a Yugoslav engineering concern, will create a very significant hydro-electric complex in West Africa when it is completed in 1980, with a 100-megawatt power capacity. An additional dimension was added to their consideration when President Toure of Guinea after his friendship tour of Mali announced that his country would like to join the OMVS.

The second important development was the inauguration in March 1975 by Mauritania of a project for the development of the Gorgol valley. A tributary of the Senegal, the Gorgol joins it at Kaedi, and its fertile *fadama* land could be used for the cultivation of irrigated wheat, rice and sugarcane. The project, estimated to cost CFA 12,500 million, will be funded by Mauritania, the European Development Fund and the World Bank.¹³ The project is integrated with the programme of the OMVS and thus brings Mauritania much more committedly into the total development of the Senegal River Basin.

Prospects

From the above analysis it can be seen that separating the political from the economic aspects of cooperation has been beneficial in the development of the Senegal River Basin. The emphasis now seems to be on a limited set of objectives related to the utilization of the water resources of the river. The riparians can clearly see the advantages that will result from the regularization of the flow of the Senegal and the river control works: control of floods and of salt water invasion; generation of electricity; irrigation for double cropping; improved navigability; and better port facilities. These benefits will be shared equitably in order to develop the agricultural and industrial potential of the partner States. Functional economic cooperation will, it is hoped, lead toward cooperation in other areas.

Lake Chad Basin Commission¹⁴

Although the Lake Chad Basin is shared by eight nations, only Cameroun, Chad, Niger and Nigeria have jointly set up the Lake Chad Basin Commission for the study and planning of its water resources.

In contrast to the checkered political history of the O.E.R.S., the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) has remained, from its inception in 1964, strictly non-political, with the sole aim of coordinating development of the resources of the Chad Basin. The area of the Lake Basin falling within the territorial jurisdiction of the four states is 345,000 sq. km., within which lie 80% of the water resources of the basin.

It is well known that the lake itself has waxed and waned in historical and more recent times, and so the magnitude of the available water resources vary. Also important is a seasonal variation of the lake level, exposing a variable amount of land round the lake margin, which has a good agricultural potential.


The lake is fed by the Chari and Logone system in Cameroun and Chad, and the Komadugu Yobe system in Niger and Nigeria. 73% of the lake waters are supplied by the Chari-Logone system, 23% by direct rainfall, and only 1% by the Komadugu Yobe system.

Within the lake basin live about five million people, whose main economic activities are crop farming, stock raising, and fishing. The division of the people among the four territories is as follows: Nigeria—50%; Chad—25%; Cameroun—20%; and Niger—5%. These represent respectively 5, 50, 25, and 20% of the total population of the territories.

The lake and its margins lie within an area of aridity defined by Thornthwaite¹⁵ (1948) moisture indices of —40 and —60 and thus the problem of evaporation from the soil and water is acute. Irrigation, with proper control measures; development of an adequate infrastructure; eradication of pests and diseases; introduction of better farming, stockrearing and fishing techniques—these are some of the common problems of the region, which for their solution call for inter-territorial cooperation

Origin of the Lake Chad Commission

As in the case of Senegal River, the four States had been engaged for some time past in identifying problems which would



need joint investigation, collection of data, and planning for a successful implementation of projects. In these collaborative studies the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa (CCTA) was involved.

As a result of such deliberative efforts, a meeting of the Heads of States in December 1962 had a sufficient basis to degree to set up a Commission, which would, among other things—

1. recognize the existing boundaries ;
2. confine the cooperative effort for the development of the basin to research ; and
3. exchange basic data and coordinate activities.

The Convention and Statute relating to the development of the Chad Basin was signed at Fort Lamy (present name: N'Djamena) in May 1964, by Cameroun, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. The preamble to the Convention underlines three important guiding policies:

1. international cooperation in the regulation and use of water ;
2. economic utilization of the Chad Basin, including the harnessing of water ; and
3. desire to coordinate and intensify cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the people of Africa.

The Convention agreed to establish the Lake Chad Basin Commission¹⁶

to prepare general regulations, to ensure their effective application, to coordinate the research activities of Member States, to study projects prepared by Member States, to recommend plans for the execution of surveys and works in the Chad Basin.

Article 4 of the Statute makes clear that

utilization of surface and ground waters shall be given its widest connotation

and development will encompass¹⁷

domestic, industrial and agricultural development and the collection of the product of its basin's flora and fauna.

Structure and Function of the Commission

The structure provides three arms of the Commission: (a) the Conference of Heads of State, the supreme policy-making body ; (b) the Council of Ministers, which translates policy and approves programmes concerning member States ; and (c) the High Commission, the executive body of the Organization, being responsible to the Council for implementation of their decisions.

Recent Developments

It is quite clear that the Chad Basin Commission has deliberately chosen not to rush into implementing development projects without detailed survey, research, and feasibility studies. Also to be noted is the agreement that no decision made by the Commission is binding on a partner State unless that decision has been ratified by the latter. Meanwhile, several research projects have been initiated, a number of pilot experimental stations have been established, and appropriate project recommendations have been made.

The thirteenth meeting of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, held in June 1971, discussed the UNDP/FAO studies, which pointed out the possibilities of development in agriculture, fisheries, and livestock, and also studies made by the Economic Commission for Africa which underlined the importance of developing road links between the countries.

The early seventies saw widespread ravage in a large area of Nigeria and Niger because of a prolonged drought that affected the Sahelian region of West Africa. Several projects aimed at fighting the effects of the drought were adopted at a meeting of the Commission held in October 1974. One year later, when the Commission met at N'Djamena, project identification was continuing, and several projects were earmarked for implementation during 1977—1981. The meeting was attended by observers from the Organization for African Unity (OAU), African Development Bank (ADB), French Aid and Cooperative Fund (FAC), and US Aid for International Development (USAID). It was realized that there would have to be a heavy

dependence on international aid in terms of personnel, equipment, and fund.

Prospects

The development of the water resources of Lake Chad will be expedited by an integrated approach from the four interested states. Although some work has been done in terms of identifying suitable projects, a breakthrough in implementation is dependent on international aid.

Conclusion

For the planning and development of international waters multi-national organizations need to be set up. The question often asked is: Can economic cooperation lead to political integration? From the experience based on several development projects, the answer would seem to be: no, not necessarily so. On the other hand it would appear that political tensions developing between nations can seriously affect economic cooperation. The failure of the O.E.R.S. is a case in point. The institutional framework for economic cooperation must be such that it can accommodate within itself a certain amount of politically controversial decisions by a system of give and take. In other words, participating nations must perceive their economic benefits to outweigh the political concessions that they see themselves making in the process of economic cooperation.

No less important in international development are considerations of the implications of the projects for the international, national, regional, and local natural-social milieux. Gilbert White¹⁸ has stressed that

an ideal study agenda for a proposed reservoir would include the impact on national economic efficiency, income redistribution, preservation and aesthetics, political equity, and environmental control.

It has been said that some of the adverse consequences of international water development could have been minimized, had there been

studies of the possible impact of the schemes on the ecology and economy of those areas. In the cost-benefit analysis these need to be anticipated and evaluated as best as knowledge, circumstances, and time permit. As Kenneth Boulding¹⁹ has put it so fervently and eloquently :

There are benefits of course, which may be countable, but which
Have a tendency to fall into the pockets of the rich,
While the costs are apt to fall upon the shoulders of the poor.
So cost-benefit analysis is nearly always sure
To justify the building of a solid concrete fact,
While the Ecologic Truth is left behind in the Abstract.

Acknowledgement

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


Fig. 1. The Senegal River Basin

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Dr. Vijay Gupta : **Indo-African Relations :**
January—March 1978

Demilitarisation of Indian Ocean

The External Affairs Minister, Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, told a delegation of Congressmen from the United States on 18 January that India welcomed the reported progress made in the US-Soviet talks on demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean. India hoped that the ultimate objective of the total elimination of foreign-military presence in the Ocean would continue to guide the US-Soviet deliberations. The delegation, consisting of 11 Congressmen and led by Mr. Lester L. Wolff arrived in New Delhi on a three-day visit on 17 January. Among other international subjects that came up for discussion between the Congressmen and Mr. Vajpayee were South-East Asia and the North-South dialogue. When asked whether non-alignment movement itself was not another form of alignment, Mr. Vajpayee explained that India was not in favour of any bloc approach nor did it like the idea of the world being divided into various blocs. However, he pointed out that since the bulk of the non-aligned countries happened to be developing nations it was natural they should take a joint view on various issues like problems of economic development and North-South dialogue.

The Soviet representative at the US-Soviet talks, Mr. L. I. Mendelevich, who was also in New Delhi as a special envoy of the Soviet Government, met Mr. Vajpayee on 17 January and briefed him about the progress in the talks. Mr. Mendelevich also had discussions with Mr. M.A. Vellodi Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, on disarmament matters, with particular reference to the Indian Ocean (January).

H.M.T. to set up Plant in Algeria

Hindustan Machine Tools (H.M.T.) International has signed a Rs. 100 million contract with the Algerian National Company—

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Sonelgaz for setting up on a turnkey basis a plan to manufacture gas meters and regulators and other meters. The project, the biggest contract taken up by India in Algeria is to be executed within two years.

The HMT has also entered a consultancy agreement with ALMO located in Constantine, Algeria. Under the agreement the HMT will provide its expertise to evolve a machine tool development plan for the country, assist in improving the operations of the existing ALMO Machine Tool Plant and plan the expansion of the second project for building other types of machine tool units in Algeria. Two teams of ten experts from the HMT are already in Algeria. They will be stationed in that country for two years. (March)

Indo-Egyptian Protocol on Energy

Under the protocol signed in New Delhi on 25 January between Mr. P. Ramachandran, Minister of Energy, and Mr. Engineer Ahmed Soltan, the Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Energy, India will extend scientific, technical and industrial cooperation in the field of rural electrification programmes in Egypt. Collaboration will be extended for the supply of equipment like transformers, capacitors, and transmission towers. It has been agreed to offer facilities in India for training of engineers and operational managers for the power sector. Egypt will identify and earmark a site for rural electrification programme in India to be jointly developed by Indo-Egyptian effort. India and Egypt will exchange information on the results of research in the field of solar energy and collaborate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It has been agreed to set up a working group to ensure timely and smooth implementation of the proposals.

During his ten-day stay in India, Mr. Ahmed Soltan called on the Prime Minister, the Minister of External Affairs, and visited the Bharat Heavy Electricals at Bhopal, the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and the Trombay Thermal Power Plant at Bombay, rural electrification programmes in Aurangabad and the Hindustan Machine Tools and the Bharat Electronics at Bangalore. (January)

Economic Cooperation between India and Liberia

The Planning Minister of Liberia, Mr. D. Franklin Neal, said on 15 February in New Delhi that Liberia has used Indian Plans as a model for its first four-year Plan which started in 1976 and looks forward to cooperation and help from India for providing consultancy services in the fields of engineering and intermediate technology and training facilities for manpower. This was stated by Mr. Neal, the leader of the 15-member delegation which visited India from 14 to 23 February, during the delegation's talks with the Vice Chairman, Prof. D.T. Lakdawala, and other senior officials of the Planning Commission.

Mr. Neal showed keen interest in inviting Indian industrialists for setting up industries in Liberia. The Liberian team also showed great interest in the strategy of mixed farming being followed by India. This strategy aims at maximization of yield in a limited area, coupled with animal husbandry, farming, forestry and fisheries and with emphasis on the development of village and cottage industries to provide small farmers a living wage. The Liberian team desired that a working group be set up to study the extent of cooperation possible in agricultural development and proper distribution of food products in Liberia.

India and Liberia initialled on 22 February two draft agreements for economic and technical cooperation and trade. After signing the draft documents, Mr. Neal told newsmen: "This is a modest beginning symbolising a new relationship between India and Liberia." Mr. V.K. Ahuja, Secretary (Economic Relations) in the Ministry of External Affairs, and the Commerce Secretary, Mr. D. Thapar, signed the agreements on behalf of India. Mr. Ahuja said that the draft documents were like "umbrella-type agreements" flashing green signals on behalf of the two countries expressing a desire for developing bilateral relations. The draft documents which will be finalised during the visit of the Liberian Foreign Minister to India in May identifies different fields for cooperation and development.

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Dr. Neal said his country adopted an "open door" policy in regard to investment from private sector in Liberia. There was no restriction in investment in productive sector. Nor was there any restriction on profits. There was also a guarantee against nationalisation. Dr. Neal said Liberia would welcome Indian private capital in areas like rubber processing and wood products.

During its stay in the country, the delegation held talks with important public sector undertakings and also visited some industrial establishments in Ranchi, Jamshedpur, Bokaro, Durgapur, Bombay, Poona, Jagadhri, Modinagar and Calcutta. (February)

Ramgoolam-Vajpayee Talks

Mr. Vajpayee said on his return from Mauritius on March 15 that he had very useful talks with Dr. Ramgoolam. Reporting to the Lok Sabha he said he had a tour d'horizon with Mauritian leaders on international matters and bilateral relations. There was complete identity of views on making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace and on the related question on convening a conference of littoral and hinterland states for putting the objective of UN resolutions on the subject. The two countries will cooperate within the framework of the UN *ad hoc* committee on the Indian Ocean and endeavour to ensure that all Great Powers and major maritime users will participate in the proposed conference. The closeness of views of the two governments was also revealed in discussions on Zimbabwe, Namibia and the Horn of Africa and West Asia.

Mr. Vajpayee informed the House that Indo-Mauritian joint ventures have been approved of which seven are already functioning. 49 Indian experts are working in different fields in Mauritius. A new credit of Rs. 100/- million (repayable in 15 years including 3 years grace period) from India to Mauritius was recently agreed to .84% of this is proposed to be utilized for purchase of capital equipment and remaining for purchasing agricultural commodities. Mr. Vajpayee said he told Mauritius leaders that India will be happy to provide assistance in the fields of irrigation, groundwater resources, power generation, transmission and distribution of urban and rural water supply, agriculture and animal husbandry.

Besides Mauritian Prime Minister, Indian Foreign Minister also had talks with Foreign Minister Harald Walster and Finance Minister Veerswamy Ringadoo.

Mr. Vajpayee had visited Mauritius to participate in the 10th anniversary celebration of independence of Mauritius. (March)

Indo-Nigerian Joint Commission Set Up

A Memorandum of Understanding between India and Nigeria was signed in New Delhi by the Minister of Industry, Mr George Fernandes, and the Commissioner for Economic Development of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Dr. O. Adewoye. It has been agreed that a joint commission would be set up to give further impetus to the industrial and economic cooperation between the two countries, in the context of their mutual desire to encourage self-reliance amongst developing nations.

Expertise will be provided by the Geological Survey of India and other organisations of the Government of India for surveys in Nigeria of mineral resources and for development of mining, particularly of mining of iron ore, and further processing like beneficiation and pelletisation. The Government of India would also depute experts to Nigeria for cooperation in the prospecting of phosphates and other mineral resources.

The Nigerian Government have desired to avail of Indian expertise and capabilities in developing small-scale industries and industrial estates. India has agreed to set up an industrial development centre in Nigeria for development of small-scale and rural industries. In the fields of consultancy and civil construction, Nigeria has expressed interest in Indian cooperation in setting up a national consultancy organisation and technology transfer centre in Nigeria. Other areas of cooperation identified in Nigeria include construction works, housing, upgradation of roads and construction of new roads. (January)

Nigerian Industrial Complex Contract for MECON

The Metallurgical and Engineering Consultants, India Ltd. (MECON), a public sector undertaking, has been awarded a con-

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tract for consultancy and project monitoring services for setting up of an industrial complex in Nigeria. The complex will include one direct reduction based integrated steel plant of one million tonnes capacity per year. Scheduled to be commissioned by December 1980, it will consist of gaseous reduction sponge iron making facilities, electric arc furnace, continuous casting facilities and rolling mills.

Last year MECON had entered into an agreement with the Arab Iron and Steel Union with its headquarters at Algiers for setting up of a Design and Consultancy Engineering Organisation for the Union. It will provide all services for setting up steel plants on turn-key basis in the member countries of the Union. MECON will afford training facilities for the engineers working in Arab Iron & Steel Union in India.

MECON has also submitted a feasibility report for installation of a small integrated steel plant in Liberia with a production capacity of 150,000 tonnes : (February)

Indian Firm Wins \$ 150 Million Tanzanian Contract

Development Consultants of Calcutta has won, against stiff international competition, a \$ 150 million Tanzanian contract for erection of two dry process cement plants and to supervise the construction of a third plant. This is the largest consultancy contract awarded by Tanzania to an Indian firm. The plants are to be set up at Tanga with capacity of one unit of 1,600 tons a day; at Mbyea with capacity of 800 tonnes a day and at Waze Hills of 800 tonnes a day. The three plants will raise the cement production of Tanzania to 4,050 tonnes a day and will make Tanzania self-sufficient in cement. (January)

Zambian-India Trade Talks

India and Zambia envisage increased cooperation between the two countries in the fields of science, technology and cultural activities. Matters of mutual commercial interests were discussed between India and Zambia when the visiting Zambian Minister of Commerce, Mr. James Mopoma, called on the Indian Minister of State for

Commerce, Mr. Arif Beg. The two countries have signed a protocol on bilateral cooperation and are shortly to sign the draft trade agreement. The Industrial Development Bank of India has agreed to offer a credit of Rs. 100/- million on soft terms to Zambia with repayment period from seven to ten years. The total trade turnover between India and Zambia during 1976-77 was of the order of Rs. 501.1 million. India imports copper, zinc and lead and exports engineering goods.

Kaunda Expresses Regrets to Desai

President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia has expressed his sorrow and sincere regrets for embarrassment caused to the government of India by the Zambian Prime Minister's recent letter to the editor of a leading British Daily. In a letter to Prime Minister Morarji Desai, handed over by the Zambian High Commissioner in New Delhi on March 13 Mr. Kaunda has reaffirmed his country's commitment to close and friendly ties with India and his personal and official confidence in Mr. Desai and his Government. He said the Zambian Prime Minister had "just misread the situation or underestimated the implications of his statement." Mr. Desai expressed complete satisfaction with Mr. Kaunda's explanation and said he now has no misunderstanding on this score.

Earlier in Zambia Mr. Chona, the Zambian P. M. called India's acting High Commissioner Mr. P. S. Sahay, and expressed his sincere regrets for the embarrassment caused to India by his letter to 'The Times'. He said his letter does not reflect the views of the government of President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. Mr. Chona added that he has great regard for Prime Minister Morarji Desai and other leaders of the Janata Party. (March)

Indian Support to Liberation Movements in Zimbabwe

The Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, has declared that India will continue to extend moral, diplomatic, political and material support to the liberation movements in Zimbabwe. Replying to a calling attention motion in the Rajya Sabha, Mr. Vajpayee declared that no settlement would be acceptable to

Dr. Vijay Gupta

India if it was not acceptable to the Frontline States and the leaders of the liberation movement.

Mr. Vajpayee agreed with the view of the movers of the calling attention notice that the settlement reached at the talks between Mr. Smith and African leaders like Bishop Muzorewa was "the setting up of a puppet government in Zimbabwe by Mr. Ian Smith under the cover of constitutional settlement". This arrangement, apart from excluding any role for the United Kingdom and United Nations, preserved the weighted position for the white minority at least for ten years. It is contrary to UN resolutions on the subject. Moreover, the elections envisaged under it do not conform to the principle of one-man-one-vote on single electoral basis.

Mr. Vajpayee said that India's diplomatic efforts were guided by the belief that greater efforts than those made hitherto were necessary for evolving a common approach acceptable to the Frontline States and African nationalist leaders so as to ensure time-bound and effective transition to constitutional arrangements leading to genuine African majority rule. He disclosed that Mr. Morarji Desai has been in touch with the leaders of the Frontline States and Zimbabwe leaders, as well as with British and US leaders, on this matter. (March)

Book Reviews

The Creation of Elizabethville 1910—1940, Bruce Petter, Hoover
Colonial Studies, Ed. Peter Duignan & Lewis Gann (Hoover
Institution Press, 1976) pp. 211.

Despite the fact that since 1960's there has been a great spurt in scholarly writings on various problems of Africa, the African urban history is one field which is still by and large in an underdeveloped state. Though many reasons can be assigned for this backwardness, yet the main reason, as the author himself admits, is that in the case of Africa there is of an utter dearth of monographic literature which is an indispensable, professional tool of an urban historian. Another handicap under which an urban historian has to work in Africa is what the few archives that are there are either frequently closed or they are in a ravaged condition with the result that they cannot be used as profitably as they could otherwise be. Yet a more fundamental problem for the urban historian of Africa is the absence of a model which explains African urban deve-

lopment in historical terms. Colonial civil servants, economists, geographers, anthropologists and political scientists have all studied African development from the point of view of their respective disciplines—which can be very helpful to historians—but their outlook is not the same as that of some one in the discipline of history.

Even within the historical discipline the work of the urban historian is far from easy. He may have before him, for guidance, some historical studies of cities of other parts of the world made by reputed scholars. The historian of African cities may make some use of these studies since there are certain aspects of urbanization which appear to be universal. However, he cannot make the study of a city of another continent as a model for his own study in Africa. This is

because history of each city is in large part a function of the experience of the people who created it. For example, the history of the cities in the United States, Latin American or Asian countries is bound to be quite different because they were created by different peoples in different surroundings. While the historian of African cities may read these studies somewhat profitably, in the ultimate analysis, he will have to look at the growth of, and the part played by, the cities strictly in the context of African situation only. Thus the historian of Africa, engaged in the writing of urban history of the colonial period, has to rely on more general, rather than specific, resources. However, he may have to select certain aspects of the other social sciences which seem to illuminate his particular problem, and he may also have to seek help from other branches of history in order to complete his work.

Bruce Fetter, in the book under review, has tried to overcome all the aforesaid difficulties in the path of an urban historian in an admirable man-

ner. His book under review is, to the best of my knowledge, the first book-length description of a colonial African city written by any historian so far. Since much material on African urban development in the form of books and articles is not available, Bruce Fetter's book will provide a building block for filling an important gap in our knowledge about colonial history of Africa. The author traces the development of Elizabethville from the stage when it was just a rough camp to the stage when it became a city housing some thirty thousand permanent residents and a much greater number of migrants.¹ The city began as an outpost of the South African mining frontier, but, after its initial phase of development, the settlement was purged of Anglo-South African influence and was effectively "Belgianized".

The question before every historian of colonial empires must be whether the development of cities by the colonial powers has done some good to the people of the colony and the colonial economy as a

whole or whether it has served the interests only of the colonial powers. One category of writers holds the view that as a result of the efforts of the colonial powers there has been an all-round development of the colonies and the cities therein, and that this development has benefitted the people of the territory immensely. It is also held by these writers that not only has the standard of life and comfort of the natives improved a lot as a result of the efforts of the colonial powers but also the revenue of the Administration has shown a marked upward trend, permitting the rendition of a number of public utilities to the community as a whole. There is another category of scholars who put forward a different interpretation to the role of the colonial powers. They hold the view that the so-called development brought about by the colonial powers has in fact resulted in considerable impoverishment of the people and destruction of the balance between the old and primitive agricultural systems, without creating a new market sufficient to make any general revolution in agricultural met-

hod possible. In their view, the way the cities were developed by the colonial powers resulted in the distant rural areas becoming poorer and more hunger-stricken than they were before. These people rushed to the town in search of a living. The result of their thronging to the cities in large numbers was that urban wages which were already not high suffered a steep fall, while the rural sector from which they migrated to cities suffered from a shortage of labour since they already had low population density.

Bruce Fetter's book proves that he belongs to this latter category of writers. He sees Elizabethville as a city built for Europeans by Europeans to serve European needs. He draws a challenging conclusion from his study that Elizabethville was parasitical on its African hinterland, drawing its food and labour and giving little in return. Fetter does not agree even with Marx who believed that urbanization and modern capitalism—despite the immediate suffering they brought in their train—were beneficial in their long-term consequences.

In support of his interpretations scattered throughout the book Fetter has marshalled a vast amount of new evidence collected largely from original sources. The book contains quite a number of tables, pictures and sketches which go to substantiate what the author wants to say or convince us about. His narrative is extremely lucid and fascinating.

One of the 'musts' for every research work, as I believe, is that in the end there should be a whole chapter devoted to the 'Conclusions' wherein the research scholar's findings should be given. If such findings are loosely scattered in various chapters of the book, they must be consolidated at

one place in the chapter entitled 'Conclusions'. I am glad to say that the book under review meets this requirement.

Fetter's pioneering work, done in the teeth of numerous difficulties, undoubtedly makes a valuable contribution, not only to a particular chapter of colonial history, but also to general urban history and also to the wider debate on the nature of colonialism and its impact on African society. His work will also serve as a model for all future urban historians who want to delve into the histories of important cities of Africa around which is woven the history of colonialism itself. The book, I am sure, will enrich every library which stocks books on Africa.

Dr. S.C Saxena

Literacy Campaigns in a Rural Society—A study of Yemissrach Dimts Literacy Campaign in Ethiopia, Margareta Rolf Sjöström, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1972, pp. 130.

Reports these days don't look impressive enough unless liberally sprinkled with tables, maps and flowcharts. The report under review* is full of them—some of them quite unnecessary. The report is claimed to have been written "with the intention of presenting the

literacy situation in Ethiopia, by specifying some pressing problems and suggesting potential solutions."

The four professed purposes of the report are: (1) "to serve as an informative documents for literacy planners, administra-

* Research report No. 39 by Margareta Rolf Sjöström, Published by Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Uppsala, 1972

tors and related practitioners, with emphasis on its practical usefulness for mass education. (2) To focus on certain key issues such as; effectiveness of instruction in terms of student's achievement over a period of time; the teaching process; relation between educational variables and the characteristics of the learner and his environment; motivational factors; drop out; low female participation; (3) to sketch a portrait of the literacy student and his milieu; (4) to explore what extent low budget schools of the YDLC model are relevant to rural mass education in developing countries; a truly tall claim, full of latest jargon from educational psychology and pedagogical strategies, signifying nothing. With all its tables, maps - formal and informal—flowcharts and appendices, this micro-study is too inadequate to enable educationists to draw such basic inferences about education and literacy as listed above. There are all kinds of irrelevant details in the report. Here are a few samples :

"This school is situated about 45 kms outside the township of Gidole in

Gardula Worreda, Gemu Gofa, at an altitude of about 1500 metres. The school was established in 1973 on the initiative of the local people. The site of the school and the building were donated by village-dwellers. The school-house is a traditional structure, measuring 6×7 metres. No physical equipment except a blackboard and a few posters were to be found. In this school 28 boys were taught by a male teacher, a 28 year old bachelor." (One hopes the correspondence between the number of boys and the age of the teacher is purely coincidental !)

"The village is very small, built on a hill, while cultivated land is found down in the valley. An extremely rough dry-weather road leads to the village. According to local dwellers malaria is the most common disease. Agriculture is the principal occupation. The chief crop is sorghum. The staple food of the village is a type of bread called kukrufa. The nearest market used to be

Gidole at a walking distance of three hours. However, a new market place is planned about one hour's walk from the village."

'A description of the physical features of school 2.1 includes the following items :

Overall measurements : the main building 5×30 metres the annexe 5×12 metres, Number of classrooms : 7, Building : Local, mud and wooden poles, Roofing : corrugated tin, Flooring : trodden earth, Lighting : doors and window openings, Seating : Logs arranged as long benches.

Football which seemed to be a favourite sport was played in a spacious playground."

The report is in effect a propaganda for YDLC and little else. For instance, we come to know from the report that YDLC-Yemissrach Dimits Literacy Campaign is "one of the four divisions of Yemissrach Massmedia Programme,

which is the outcome of ecumenical cooperation. Yemissrach Dimits is supported by the Evangelical Church Makane Yssus, ECMY, and Lutheran Church of Ethiopia. The Lutheran World Federation has played an important role ever since the outset as the principal financial backer.

The most important of the religious organisations behind Yemissrach Dimits is ECMY. It is a very fast growing church, which has increased the number of member from 20,000 when it was constituted in 1959, to 283,000 by the end of 1974".....It is the biggest of the non-governmental literacy operations in rural Ethiopia. Initiated in 1962, it has in about 13 years spread to 12 administrative regions and has covered 535,391 students.

The report however is useful in so far it gives some basic information about Ethiopia and the educational situation in the country. It is beautifully printed on expensive paper and got up quite well.

—H. C. Narang

Africa's Slaves Today, Jonathan Derrick ; London ;
George Allen and Union Ltd, 1975.

Most of us think of slavery as a thing of the past. We are smug in our belief that the Charter of Human Rights in the United Nations has made our world a better place to live in. The words—democracy, rights, progress, liberty, justice, equality—are bandied about in our world of newspapers and radios, law courts and parliaments. A great moral revolution has swept the world and the tide of opinion is against slavery. Derrick's book comes into our jostling modern world with a message that is quietly disturbing. It shakes the reader out of his complacency.

The problem of slavery has been, of late, only of marginal interest to social and political analysts. Every aspect of the problem has been subjected to searching inquiry; the psychological, racial, political, historical, economic, humanitarian and religious dimensions of the institution have been studied intensively. In short, as a problem in scholarly research it is, indeed, worked out. And the literature on the subject has grown to alarming proportions.

Yet, we have in Jonathan Derrick's work on the subject, a book with a difference. It is almost the only book of its kind, dealing with present-day slavery.

The grim truth about Slavery is that it has continued to our day. It will continue to exist in the future, disappearing in name but not in fact and often going underground in a world which looks askance at it. It exists clandestinely in states where official political respectability stubbornly refuses to acknowledge its existence. "The continuation of slavery", says Derrick, "into modern times in parts of Africa is a late chapter in an old story." Placing the phenomenon as it has existed in Africa against the background of the institution in world history, he says that African slavery is a subject on its own. As compared to the dimensions of the trans-Atlantic slavery—conducted by Europeans and Americans, affecting more than 80 million Africans over a period of 500 years and the Arab trade stretching further back into ancient

times, what we see today in Africa is milder and more endemic.

Reports of slavery appear from Africa from time to time. Derrick says in the Introduction to his book: "This book examines in a small way what lies behind such reports." It is only very profound learning that can evoke such true humility. The former is amply evident in the scores of travelogues, diaries, anthropological writings, administrative reports, historical works, journals, British Parliamentary Reports, ILO Commission Report and Anti-Slavery Reports that he has consulted. Above all, his book is enriched by oral evidence; the informants have to be anonymous because giving information for a book on slavery would not be liked.

The problem of slavery is a complex one. There are innumerable cases of practices verging on slavery. It is not easy to distinguish between a slave and a non-slave. The fact that modern law in African States makes slavery illegal has complicated the situation and made it more

difficult to detect slavery. If slavery is legally recognized, everyone would clearly indicate a slave. Slaves are not forced by anti-slavery laws to leave their masters; if they continue to stay with their masters and if the same attitudes of 'master'—'slaves' continue, while the law says that there are no slaves, the situation becomes difficult to analyse. Again, polygamy shades off into slavery, and it is often difficult to tell them apart. Revd. Halfdan Endresen, a pastor of the Norwegian Lutheran Mission raised the problem of the Lamido of Rei Bouba's harem (page 75). The Cameroon government said that he was confusing slavery with polygamy, which could not be abolished. But, for Muslims, "slavery traditionally went together with harems, for although a man was allowed to have four free wives the mistresses whom he was also allowed were supposed to be slaves". The problem of bride-price is discussed in detail as it is linked to the problem of slavery. (pp. 103—107). Traditionally it did not constitute the buying of a wife. But when the old ties

of lineage and clan broke down and cash payments came into vogue the custom degenerated into a commercial transaction. Thus there could be situations that were indistinguishable from slavery.

For decades after the legal abolition of slavery some groups of Africans have been considered by others as slaves. Still worse, they continue to consider themselves as slaves, as do the black *Bela* Slaves of the light-skinned Tuareg pastoralists. In such cases, one sees that slavery really exists. In other cases, it is quite likely that ex-slaves are really the servants of the household, as it is claimed. There are large groups of people, descended from slaves, who are regarded as slaves, even if they do not belong to anyone. Attitudes of slavery persist everywhere, making a mockery of the law. The psychological legacy of slavery and the slave-trade is incalculable in Africa. Unfortunately, it is not possible to assess this evil residue of mental attitudes.

Derrick is careful to point out that slavery is not widespread but localised in Africa.

It continues because of special economic and environmental conditions like pastoralism and aided by social institutions like polygamy, concubinage, bridewealth practices, clientage, pledging and pawning. Not only is slavery localized in Africa, but it is far less important, says Derrick than many other problems like nutrition, disease, housing, agricultural development and education. The problem should be seen in this context. Also, extreme hardships and poverty prepare the psychological ground for slavery.

Derrick also deals at length with the allied problems of forced labour in South Africa (p. 167) and in Liberia. (p. 194) Several other forms of exploitation exist that virtually amount to slavery. These often affect children, who, for instance, work as domestics (without pay) for a schooling. This and other forms of exploitation are discussed in detail in Chapter Eleven.

Derrick rightly emphasizes the great need for an understanding of ordinary African life by the peoples of the world.

"There is very little written material, even by experts on Africa, to give a good idea of ordinary life in Africa to those who do not know the continent", he says. (p. 16). Then he goes on to an even more important statement :

"Understanding does not mean acquiescence. Slavery is everywhere condemned, not because it involves special ill-treatment,..... but because it treats some people as the property of others."

The concluding chapter : "Action on Slavery" shows the baffling dimensions of this problem which is so inextricably tangled with economic, ecological, cultural, psychological and political problems. It is absurd to blame a government in power since 1960 for an institution that has existed for countless centuries. Derrick says one cannot blame them "any more than one can blame the churches for the continued existence of sin". (p. 17). He cannot be more right in his perspective on modern African governments. He says "they are rightly angered if slavery is mentioned out of context".

(p. 17). There is a remarkable success story of the Rev Halfdan Endresen who, by 1966 and 1969, had worked to free 50,000 slaves in the Lamidate of Rei Bouba in Northern Cameroon. (p. 73-74). The government, though normally sensitive to the issue, was very reasonable because Endresen *had a sincere desire to right a wrong* (besides deep knowledge of the problem) *and was devoid of any political bias or racial pride*. This is the only success story of its kind; but it shows how much doggedness can do when combined with selfless humanitarianism.

Derrick puts the problem in perspective both from the world and the African points of view. Though it is not one of Africa's major problems, it is not unimportant in the lives of those who are affected. It is important also because it touches other aspects of African life. With all its weight of scholarship it is eminently readable and absorbing. The book is fittingly dedicated to the Anti-Slavery Society on its 150th birthday with the wish : "may its days be short".

—Padma Srinivasan

Ethnicity and Military Rule in Uganda, Holger Bernt Hansen,
The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1977.

The author defines the concept of ethnicity, establishes a scheme of analysis and then attempts to show that ethnic factor helps a lot in explaining and interpreting the military rule in Uganda. He is of the view that but for this approach, an appropriate understanding of the situation would have eluded him. The first section of the book, to be precise the first four chapters, is devoted to the explication of the concept of *ethnicity* as employed in the literature in political anthropology. *Tribalism*, *cultural-sub-nationalism* and *traditionalism* are some of the terms examined to arrive at the conclusion that these terms vaguely allude to the same social reality as *ethnicity* but lack the heuristic and analytical dimension of the latter. The failure of the political scientists to pay focal attention to the problem of ethnicity in general and its correlation with military rule in particular has prompted Hansen to attempt to unravel this complex relationship in the Ugandan case. The *orga-*

nisation model, which underscores the structure, resources, morale and integrity of the armed forces as compared with the fragmentation of the civil society, *a priori* assigns political leadership role to the military regimes in promoting economic and social modernisation. The present work is an attempt to see the military coup and the rule as a dependent variable and in that light to question if the reverse determination of the character of the armed forces and their regime by the civil society is not more potent. The author seems to have demolished, both analytically and by adducing empirical evidence, the strong thesis of the organisation model. One also gets a feeling that the alternative perspective of ethnicity, explaining both Obote's early political ascendancy and deposition as well as Amin's seizure of power in 1971 and the following five years of his rule, leaves many questions unanswered or even unexamined.

As the book has been written mainly with fellow social scientists as the target public, the reviewer cannot but note that the author's preference for an analytical perspective against chronological detailing of a chaotic collection of facts has not helped to annotate the contingent character of social events. While the ethnic factor remains more or less constant with region, language, tribe and religion unaltered over time, the political developments like independence, change over to presidential form of government, military coup and the army in power cannot be understood or explained on ethnicity alone. Reading *Ethnicity and Military Rule in Uganda* one does get a picture of ethnic and language units in Uganda and its influence on the political alliances and coalitions of diverse indigenous elements to forge the ruling elite and the legitimizing principle available to them; but why this particular alliance succeeds and not the other(s) need many more explanatory variables and the dynamics of their interplay. While providing a necessary corrective to the continued neglect of ethnic factor

by political scientists and its relationship with political development, the author has politely ignored many more potent determinants of persons, parties and policies in command. Methodological preference for 'value-free' terminology of *ethnicity* over *tribalism*, *regionalism*, *subnationalism* and *traditionalism* is logically linked with shutting one's eyes to imperialism and the yearning for economic and political emancipation even after the withdrawal of formal foreign domination. Only that social science, which has an eye for values in conflict with colonial dependence as well as indigenous prejudices preventing united efforts towards African resurgence, can provide a proper understanding of Ugandan scene. Justification of any and every situation—colonial rule, struggle for emancipation from foreign rule and petty prejudices, racial discrimination and army rule with coercive apparatus turned towards one's own people—is a methodological pay-off of the dominant. Western social science and the work under review is no exception.

The colonial power and the Protestant mission, we learn,

oriented itself towards the rest of the protectorate from a 'Bugandan Standpoint', giving the Bugandans a privileged position. With this initial advantage and the numerical strength of the Bantu group, which covered most of the Southern Uganda, it should have been normally expected that with the departure of the British colonial power in 1962, sooner rather than later this southern ethnic group would have a major say in deciding the destiny of the new state. But the continued separation of the Bugandans in particular and the southerners in general from positions of power in Uganda demands an explanation, which ethnicity alone would not be able to provide. That Bugandans were in direct conflict with the colonial power in the period immediately preceding independence, probably impelled the departing colonial powers to accentuate ethnic differences on to the political arena to keep them in perpetual dissensions and hence open to external machinations. The whole account of political developments in Uganda from the first period of Obote's regime to the crises which was solved

through a greater involvement of the army and the final take over by the army is a sordid statement of the ever narrowing social base of the governing coalition, failure to build economic self-sufficiency and an ever increasing reliance on *Bakedi* (naked) coercive apparatus. If the Bugandans were dubbed "Afrika's Japanese", how long can they be kept out of power at the centre without violence to the needs of the development of Uganda as such? In the face of unequal distribution of educational facilities and consequently of divergence of starting positions, the fact that even the modern institutions of higher learning have provided one more area of "awareness of diverging interests" should have diverted the attention of the researchers towards problem of economic development and possibilities of alternative strategies of increasing avenues of employment. But the author is satisfied by asserting that 'this, cannot be ascribed to practical causes alone'. Thus the Ugandans are condemned to a perpetual ethnic divergence, articulated in the political arena, where the clashes run

along the ethnic dividing line. The conclusion is not illogical if imperialism is ingored as a negative context and developmental perspective discarded as an internal motivation.

The book not only provides useful information on the ethnic make-up of Uganda, tradition governed political institutions and the uneven development of different regions and tribes but at the same time indirectly brings out the inherent weakness of the army rule. Instead of the modernity of the army organization percolating to the civil society, the reverse

seems to be the process that is on in Uganda. The narrowing base of the Amin regime is a pointer to an impending change in the politics of Uganda.

The book can be read with profit by all students of sociology, anthropology and political science, specially those interested in understanding Africa. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies deserves to be thanked for bringing out these research reports for the benefit of social scientists interested in the area.

—Nirmal Singh

Common Approach to Common Problems (A Collection of Essays):
Ahmed Diria Hassan: New Delhi, Tanzanian High Commission,
1977, pp. 104, Price Rs. 30/-.

Imperialism started crumbling in Africa in early 60's and many important countries of Africa came on the world scene to play an appropriate and significant role in international affairs. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania led his country in struggles against imperialism and racialism. Nyerere is an ardent supporter of African Unity against the imperialists. This brought

Nyerere nearer to the Indian leadership and we witnessed growth of large areas of cooperation between Tanzania and India and also with many other independent countries of Africa. Mr Hassan as a representative of his country played a very significant role in building Indo-Tanzanian friendship and cooperation. Hassan's speeches, writings and published and unpublished

opinions reflect his great commitment to world peace, cooperation and anti-imperialism and anti-racialism. Collection of his essays reveals great insight shown by Mr Hassan in the problems of contemporary world. In this Collection of Essays, the author has shown great capacity to put

forward policies of his country in very clear term. This book is a welcome addition to the literature on Africa and Dr S.C. Saxena of Jawaharlal Nehru University deserves our thanks for helping the busy High Commissioner of Tanzania to collect his writings.
—C.F. Bhambhri.

New Theories of Revolution, Jack Woddis : International Publishers, New York, Third printing, 1977, pp. 415. Paperback, \$ 4.00.

The present era, particularly after the Second World War, is an era of unprecedented ideological tumult. Fundamental questions arise in and engage the minds of both masses and leaders in all the countries of the world, concerning the mechanics of change, the mechanics of historical transformations in different countries and continents, the course of various revolutions, and the patterns of different national liberation movements. What is the role of various social classes in propelling revolutionary changes in society? What is the validity of the leading role or dictatorship of the proletariat? Under what circumstances does the proletariat or the peasantry lead

revolutionary movements? How worker-peasant alliance is built as the axis of revolution? What is the role of students, intellectuals, national bourgeoisie in national democratic and/or socialist revolutions? Should one follow the Russian way, the Chinese way or the Cuban way? Or, how does one carve out one's own independent indigenous way? Is Marx out-dated? Are the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism still valid in today's context? How should they be further developed without deviation, right or left, or without revisionist distortions? The series of questions is unending. How do we even attempt to analyse them? Even this is

sometimes baffling.

Perhaps, there are no general universally valid answers to these questions. Perhaps one would say that the answers to these questions depend upon the concrete conditions existing at a given stage of society in a given historical period. Granting this, the analysis of the concrete conditions in the specific circumstances attending on different situations becomes all the more controversial. In the welter of this ideological crucible, there have emerged in recent times new theories of revolution—new theories in Africa, Latin America, new concepts in Western Europe and North America. Jack Woddis analyses, with characteristic brilliance and polemics, the main theories of the New Left as advanced by Frantz Fanon in relation to Africa, Régis Debray on Latin America and Herbert Marcuse on what is called the advanced industrial West. The book is written as a commentary on the views of Fanon, Debray and Marcuse but, in the process, the reader gets a succinct and a critical review

of the recent history of the developments in Africa, the contours of the Cuban revolution and upheavals in France. This is indeed a book of wide scope and profound relevance to major problems of contemporary time in the world.

On the basis of a review of the liberation and revolutionary movements in the various countries of Africa, Woddis establishes in a scientific manner the contribution of the African proletariat to the revolutionary struggles in the respective countries. Even if one were to have doubts about the role of peasants in effecting a national democratic revolution, one cannot agree with the thesis of Fanon that the proletariat in the developing countries in Asia, Africa or Latin America is a bourgeoisified and hence a conservative class with stakes in the maintenance of *status quo*. The account of the participation of the African workers in the national struggles in different African countries as given by Woddis is detailed, scientific and convincing beyond doubt about the significant contribution of the proletariat in the respective

national struggles. Woddis covers this aspect in detail separately in five divisions dealing with West, East, Central, North and Southern Africa and successfully establishes the fact that the living standards of the African workers are such that the workers can by no stretch of imagination be considered as privileged or pampered. His analysis of the revolutionary potential of the peasantry, the intelligentsia, the national bourgeoisie is almost a classic contribution to the understanding of modern trends in Africa. The class differentiation among the peasantry, the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia is a remarkable contribution to the knowledge of the role of classes in the African Continent and so is his treatment of the role the African Chiefs as well as the lumpenproletariat.

Woddis points out that "the ideology of the working class movement, Marxism, alone can guide Africa out of its present difficulties and create an alliance of workers, intellectuals, petty bourgeoisie and the peasants and even sections of national bourgeoisie in order

to take Africa along the road to socialism". He succeeds with remarkable dexterity in unravelling the main deviations or distortions implicit in the theories of the New Left and restores a scientific perspective to the main events of the contemporary African scene.

This having been said, one wonders whether any generalisations on the role of classes in Africa as a whole has some intrinsic limitations arising out of a method of study which ignores the variations from country to country and from time to time within the same country on the African Continent. The march of revolution in the various African countries does not follow a uniform path. If anything, a volatility of the situation, of the alignment of the different classes in the different countries, and an extremely zig zag course of events are the chief characteristics of the African situation. In this background, any macro analysis of the situation on the Continent as a whole which does not bring up the infinite variety in the micro situation concerning the alignment and role of classes

in the different countries does not really give an adequate insight into the why and wherefore of many of the seeming perplexities inherent in the African scene. It is easy to postulate that Marxism alone can guide Africa out of its present difficulties nor can there be much disagreement amongst the Marxists about such postulations. But the real difficulty arises out of the application of the basic principles of Marxism to the concrete conditions obtaining in the different countries and to the changing scenario from time to time in the same country. From this point of view Woddis' analysis, brilliant as it is, and fascinating for one to peruse, does leave many of the questions still unanswered.

Nevertheless, the analysis of classes in Africa made by Woddis is a unique contribution to the understanding of contemporary Africa and is a reference material of immense interest to many students of African affairs and developments both to those inside as well as those outside the Continent.

Indian readers of the book

will be interested to read the comment of Woddis namely that "in India, it has been the national bourgeoisie which, with the support of the workers and peasants, has introduced modifications in the feudal land system and opened the way to Capitalism in the countryside" (page 58). The common point Woddis points out between Gandhi and Fanon will appear strange, when he states that "(Fanon's) anxieties for the youth of Africa are only another echo of his Gandhian distaste for the 'modern world', his idealisation of the peasantry, of the village as against the town, of the lumpen 'drop out' as against the industrial worker" (page 84). His references to "the differences expressed by Lenin and M.N. Roy over the thesis on the national and colonial question" in 1920 concerning the role of the national bourgeoisie (pages 98 and 99) are also of interest to students of recent Indian history.

Woddis' comments on the theories of the New Left as advanced by Debray on Latin America and Marcuse on the industrialised West are highly

thorought provoking and provide some stimulating reading. What Woddis points out is that the New Left theoreticians like Fanon, Debray and Marcuse are, in effect, petty bourgeois, anarchist, utopian and elitist in their approach and, in spite of their apparent militancy and dedication to

violence, have nothing in common with revolutionary Marxism and its reliance on revolutionary class struggle and the organisational ability and creative initiative of the Working Class as its leader. (page 405).

—K.V. Krishnamurthy

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